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How to do things with jokes: relocating the political dimension of performance 
comedy
This practice-as-research PhD examines the possibility of 'political comedy' in 
performance and its constitution within the ideological situation of global 
capitalism. The project is comprised of a written submission, documented 
practice, and live performance. The practice incorporates elements of stand-up 
comedy, installation and 'relational art,' and participatory performance. The 
possibility of a 'radical democratic comedy' includes two elements: (a) a break 
with ideology, and (b) the creation of an affective, relational space conducive to 
the formation of an 'attachment.' I argue that satirical, carnivalesque, and 
transgressive modes of political critique in comic performance operate 
ideologically, and in spite of appearances and intentions may be bound up in 
dominant ideology. A political comedy in the present day must therefore 
somehow break with the dominant logic of a situation. This thesis argues thus 
that the political dimension of the joke (the basic unit of comedy in 
performance) is not located in its content, but in the incommensurable gap 
between set-up and punch-line, which is incompatible with common sense. In 
practice, the audience must then form an 'attachment' with the break with 
ideology, which suggests a different form of audience engagement from the 
pedagogical form that political comedy often takes. After establishing this 
theoretical framework, this thesis progresses through three phases of 
experimental practice. First, I expand and interrogate my practice as a stand-up 
comic. Second, audience-performer relations becomes the primary site of 
engagement, leading to two projects influenced by participatory performance 
and Relational Aesthetics. Third, I return to the form of stand-up, coloured by 
my previous experiments. This project argues for and performs new positions in 
relation to: (a) the discourse of the politics of comedy and the limits of satire, 
(b) psychoanalytic readings of humour and the unconscious, (c) formal ways of 
making and doing comedy as a critical and resistant practice, and (d) current 
discourses of participation, engagement, and efficacy in performance. I intend 
to escape the false choice faced by the politically-minded comedian today; to 
paraphrase Groucho Marx, when given the choice between commenting on the 
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Written somewhere between success and (symbolic) death...
With any piece of writing, it is understood that the reader may come across 
these words at any point, though of course, the burial of PhD theses in the 
bowels of university libraries perhaps suggest less a process of 'stumbling 
across' than 'treasure hunt,’ but I myself, both the writer and the main object of 
enquiry of this thesis, set these words down at a very specific point in time. It is 
10:30 in the morning, on the 24th of June 2010, and I am quietly congratulating 
myself for snagging a corner desk in Humanities 2 of the British Library. It is 
exactly one week before I submit the written portion of my PhD thesis, along 
with documentation of a series of experiments in practice. But the reader (and 
here, if I were to be less coy, I might say examiner), will most likely be laying 
their eyes upon these words after seeing a performance also entitled How to do 
things with jokes, which is part of my PhD submission. While the written thesis 
and documentation unfold in a sort of narrative, the first introduction to my 
work, for some readers, is thus an instance of practice that is, to an extent, 
cumulative. These readers, as in an episode of Link and Levinson's Columbo, 
are given the ending first - but of course what matters is how we get there. 
The liminal status of the performance provides a good opportunity to draw 
attention to the importance of 'in-between-ness' in my work. In writing this at 
10:30 in the morning, on the 24th of June 2010, I cannot describe any moments 
of this performance with any real veracity, of course; I can only imagine them. 
Here is one: Me, 28, dressed in t-shirt and tweed jacket (probably), sat at the 
head of a 'boardroom' table in a large studio at Central School of Speech & 
Drama in Swiss Cottage, London - You, whoever you are. 'Before the show,' I 
say, 'I asked a few people to write down one of their problems on an index card, 
and seal it up in an envelope...' I pick up an envelope, open it - 'I thought we 
could try solving these problems tonight.' I take out the index card and read. 
I am taking a risk, presenting practice at the very point of submission rather 
than tidying it away to be reflected on in the writing, but this risk is the very 
essence of performance comedy, and thus no other form of submission could be 
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more appropriate. As a comedian, my practice exists in a tension between 
success and (symbolic) death, between getting the joke and not getting it (for 
the audience), between 'storming it' and 'dying' (for me). Comedy is 'exclusive' 
in the sense of excluding, it draws out an already-antagonistic relationship 
between performer and audience. How to do things with jokes highlights this 
antagonism in what I will come to call an intimate 'affective space.' Breaking 
with the traditional form of audience staging in the comedy event, the 
'boardroom' suggests a certain type of urgent, argumentative discourse. How to 
do things with jokes is not a satire on business or parliament, but an alternative 
mode of audience engagement capable of generating three elements that 
determine a political comedy in performance: a visible exclusion or antagonism, 
a break with ideology or 'good sense,' and the possibility of an 'attachment.' 
For the reader who comes across these words in years to come, this 
performance can be found on Disc 4 of the documentation. But the (ideal) 
reader, to whom I address these words, has seen a performance that crystallises 
ideas of being suspended between sense and nonsense, which is itself suspended 
in a liminal state. And should they open this volume in advance of seeing the 
performance, they will only find an empty envelope awaiting a disc on the back 
cover of the book.
A note on documentation
The reader has been provided with three DVDs of documentation (and a fourth, 
to be submitted after 5 July 2010), which can be accessed when necessary; there 
is no prescriptive mechanism for navigating through these documents. As the 
material on these discs corresponds to the analyses in the written thesis, the 
reader may wish to view the documentation before reading Chapters 1, 4 and 6. 
However, they may also wish to dip in and out when desired. A diagrammatic 
outline is provided on p. 20 to make navigation easier. The documentation of 
my practice takes its cue from existing documents of relational work and earlier 
Fluxus works; still photographs, detailed descriptions and “performance 
scores.” Video documentation is used for the final projects falling under the 





 o.o - Introduction
This thesis is a critical and descriptive document charting, chronologically, a 
three-year practice-as-research PhD enquiry that investigates the political 
dimension of performance comedy, a term I employ to describe forms of 
performance, including stand-up, sketch, and musical comedy, which have the 
production of laughter as their explicit aim. These pages are accompanied by a 
live submission 1 and DVD archive of practices, and the ratio of practice to 
writing is approximately 40:60. My experimental practice takes a number of 
forms, from ‘traditional’ stand-up to installation and ‘relational’ work, and has 
been made both solo and in collaboration with several artists: painter and visual 
artist Thom Glen, comedians Nat Luurtsema, Tom Goodliffe, and Helen Arney, 
and curator Jane Linden. I proceed from two primary research questions: (1) 
What constitutes a ‘political comedy’ or a social and politically efficacious 
comedy under the present ideological situation of global capitalism? and (2) 
How does the form of performance, specifically the relationship between 
audience and performer, produce an ‘attachment,’ that is, a relationship 
between a subject and a moment of critique? This introduction sets the ground. 
I first describe what I term, following Alain Badiou, the ‘philosophical situation’ 
of comedy. I then describe the theoretical framework of the project, including its 
shifts and modulations. Finally, I make a case for a practice-as-research 
methodology, noting the problem of self-reflexivity. The reader will then find a 
diagram of the thesis structure on p. 20, to which he or she may wish to refer to 
periodically. 
  0.1 - The philosophical situation of comedy
To locate the political dimension of comedy we must consider the philosophical 
situation of comedy, which is predicated on the basic defining unit of the joke, 
which is a gap, break or fissure in meaning. For Alain Badiou the philosophical 
situation requires a paradoxical relation; two heterogeneous terms between 
which there is an incommensurable gap. The consequences of this follow: ‘there 
is a choice, there is a distance, there is an exception’ (Badiou and Žižek 2005, p. 
Chow, D.V.B.
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21). This exception is the break with the status quo, social conservatism, a 
general logic. In essence, philosophy intervenes in order to pose new problems. 
I propose that a similar break can be enacted by comedy; the proposition not of 
a solution but a new problem entirely. For the purposes of this research, the 
joke is defined as the basic unit of comedy performance. I suggest the use of 
‘joke’ as a technical term based in comic practice, which consists of a 
proposition or set-up, and a response, or punch-line. Freud, in his joke-book, 
takes Lipps’ (1898) definition of a joke as a starting point: ‘any conscious and 
successful evocation of what is comic, whether the comic of observation or of 
situation’ (Lipps 1898, quoted in Freud 1960[2001], p. 9). However, this 
definition is far too broad.
What makes a punch-line a punch-line, though? An incongruity—something 
that falls outside the original logic of the set-up, effecting a gap or fissure in 
meaning. Here is a well-known example from the opening of Woody Allen’s 
Annie Hall (1997). Alvy, played by Allen, addressing the camera and viewer, 
tells an old joke: ‘Two elderly women are at a Catskill mountain resort, and one 
of them says, “Boy, the food at this place is really terrible!” and the other one 
says, “Yeah, I know! And such small portions!”’ This is, in effect, a ‘paradoxical 
relation.’ Between the first and second repetition we find an incommensurable 
gap or chasm. When we make proper sense of the conversation of the elderly 
women we lose sight of the joke (recall the old truism that the moment a joke is 
analysed, it stops being funny). Alvy’s next line transfers the paradoxical 
relation wholesale to another field, perhaps, one might say, the field of 
philosophy: ‘That’s essentially how I feel about life. Full of loneliness and misery  
and suffering and unhappiness, and it’s all over much too quickly.‘  While Alvy 
seems to be attempting an explanation of the joke, it is explicable only through 
analogy. The incongruity itself, the momentary fissure in meaning, is elusive. 
My aim in this research, which makes both a theoretical and a practical 
contribution to the field of knowledge, is not to create a theory of humour, nor 
to study the function of humour, but to build from the philosophical situation of 




  0.2 - Theoretical framework
My theoretical framework broadly falls within the category of humour theory 
identified by John Morreall as ‘Incongruity Theory’: ‘What makes [a] situation 
[…] humorous […] is that there is something odd, abnormal or out of place, 
which we enjoy in some way’ (Morreall 2009, in Lockyer and Pickering eds. 
2009, p. 68). From this basis my research methodology branches into 
psychoanalysis and philosophy. I employ two primary theoretical frames as the 
methodology of this research: Jacques Lacan’s concept of the ‘Real,’ in its triadic 
relation to the ‘Imaginary’ and ‘Symbolic,’ and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of 
difference. In that the ‘meaning’ of the joke is unrepresentable, I argue that this 
gap is correlative to the Lacanian Real, which cannot be symbolised. Similarly, 
the repetition in the joke, which is to say, the set-up and the punch-line, 
suggests a specific form of repetition characterised by Deleuze. ‘Beyond bare 
repetition,’ Deleuze writes (1968[2004], p. 365), ‘and clothed repetition, beyond 
that from which difference is drawn and that which includes it, a repetition 
which “makes” the difference.’ This precise, ‘ontological’ form of repetition 
(ibid.), is repetition that makes ‘difference-in-itself,’ a productive difference that 
is prior-to identity. When we attempt to scrutinise the ‘meaning’ of the joke, 
which is to say the identity of the difference ‘between,’ we already perceive this 
difference through this-or-that identity; either privileging the first or the second 
piece of the joke. Again, this difference, one might say this ‘Real’ difference, 
resists symbolisation. The precise usage of incongruity deployed in this research 
is highly connected to the liminal space between meaning and non-meaning, a 
sort of ‘no-man’s land,’ as in Paolo Virno’s argument: ‘Jokes exhibit the 
logicolinguistic resources that nurture innovation in general precisely because 
they are found in a no-man’s land that separates any norm from its own 
realisation within a contingent situation’ (Virno 2008, p. 101). Hence my 
recourse to Lacan and Deleuze, two philosophers of structure and flux. The 
placing of Lacan and Deleuze in close proximity might suggest a theoretical 
deadlock. My research resolves this deadlock in a sort of Hegelian inversion. 
Butler explains, drawing on Kojève’s exegesis of Hegel: ‘the object which first 
appears turns out to have its opposite as its essence, and so becomes subject to 
an inversion on the condition of a retroactive constitution of its “truth”’ (Butler 
et al. 2000, p. 173). At the beginning of this research, I employed Deleuzian 
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concepts and set these in opposition to Lacan’s return to Freud (not without 
precedent, see Hallward 2006 and Žižek 2003, not to mention Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, 2004). As reading and practice came together in a 
process of writing, it became clear that what was most interesting to me in 
Deleuze’s work was what was closest to Lacanian theory. As Butler would say, 
the ‘identificatory source’ of my opposition to Lacan was Lacan himself. That 
being resolved, I am able to say that the political dimension of comedy is located 
in the gap of the Real or ‘difference in itself.’ My theoretical framework is 
therefore drawn from three places. From Lacanian theory and Lacanian-
inflected political philosophy, including the work of Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto 
Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, I draw the philosophical situation of comedy, as 
above. Deleuze’s philosophy provides a means of looking at ambiguity and 
nonsense, particularly in relation to the linguistic side of performance comedy. 
And there is a final source, which provides the basis for my experimental 
practice, drawn from the discourse of Relational Aesthetics and dialogical 
aesthetics (Nicolas Bourriaud, but also to a lesser degree, Grant Kester and 
Claire Bishop). This finds its proper place as a practical and provocative means 
of working with and thinking about ‘audience.’
At this point we are in a position to state the argument of the thesis concisely, 
before embarking on an analysis: the political dimension of performance 
comedy in the era of late capitalism is not found in satire (which is focused on 
the object or content of the joke), but is found in the incommensurable gap 
between set-up and punch-line, or between ‘getting-it’ and ‘not-getting-it.’ This 
is correlative to the frontier of exclusion that defines every group or social 
formation and is thus the very site of politics itself. Comedy in performance is 
potentially able to enact a break with ideology and, through a political 
articulation, form an attachment by the subject to the moment of the break. It 
is my argument that the political possibilities of comedy go beyond satirical 
transgressions to draw attention to the operation of the political itself. Purdie 
suggests, drawing on Lacan’s Symbolic Law, ‘[…] joking paradigmatically 
involves a discursive exchange whose distinctive operation involves the marked 
transgression of the Symbolic Law and whose effect is thereby to constitute 
jokers as “masters” of discourse: as those […] in controlling possession of full 
human subjectivity’ (Purdie 1993, p. 5, original emphasis), meaning joking and 
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therefore humour is constitutive of human subjectivity. I want to argue that 
beyond these ‘marked transgressions’ there can be certain forms of joke-making 
qua comedy performance that do not constitute the subject but problematise 
the subject’s very constitution. These events of comedy would truly transgress 
the Symbolic Law in breaking with it entirely; in a Lacanian sense, they would 
be authentic ‘acts.’ The notion of the ‘act’ is developed in Chapter 2, but one 
simple definition is provided by Žižek: ‘the act [is] a gesture which, by 
definition, touches the dimension of the impossible real’ (Žižek et al 2000, p. 
119). This thesis therefore examines the possibility of comedy in performance 
not merely as political commentary, but as the movement of the political itself. 
How might it do this? Through the foregrounding of the gap at the heart of joke-
making, which is precisely correlative to so many similar ‘betweens’ in political 
theory: the ‘act’ in Žižek’s Lacanian stance on ideology (see Chapter 2), the 
‘antagonism’ in Mouffe and Laclau’s radical democratic paradox, or the 
dissensus or disagreement Rancière argues is the ground of politics (Chapter 5). 
The difference, I think, between my position and Purdie’s, is the difference 
between joking as comparison and joking as paradox. The former is perhaps the 
bread and butter of the topical satirist, taking a figure in a position of power and 
comparing them to an incongruous thing; the latter is the ‘such small portions’ 
that opens Annie Hall. If the former signals its incongruity, the latter embodies 
it fully. 
So the question here is: how can a comic event also be a psychoanalytic ‘act,’ 
that is, break from the Symbolic order, and crucially, what would this do? The 
break from the Symbolic order can be illustrated by another old joke, commonly  
attributed to the Marx Brothers; it is used by Žižek in his discussions with 
Laclau and Judith Butler in their book Contingency, Hegemony, Universality to 
illustrate ‘false alternatives’: ‘In a well-known Marx Brothers joke Groucho 
answers the standard question “Tea or coffee?” with “Yes, please!”—a refusal of 
choice’ (Žižek [et al] 2000, p. 125). The false alternative is, of course, tea or 
coffee, which does not allow for the choice of neither. A modern version is the 
couple ‘Coke or Pepsi,’ both of which are just brown, sugary water—as comedian 
Mark Thomas points out in his 2008 book Belching Out The Devil, in a 
scientific blind taste test measuring brain activity, Coke and Pepsi are 
indistinguishable to the human senses. A more precise theoretical name for this 
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phenomenon is the Deleuzian concept of the ‘disjunctive synthesis.’ In 
grammar, a disjunctive is a modifier such as ‘or,’ or ‘but,’ which joins two unlike 
terms in a state of opposition. The 1995 pop song ‘Hand in my Pocket’ by 
Canadian artist Alanis Morrissette is composed lyrically of a list of disjunctive 
syntheses—‘I’m short but I’m healthy,’ ‘I’m poor but I’m kind’—which 
demonstrate the possible pernicious effects of the disjunction. In the statement 
‘I’m poor but I’m kind,’ the ‘but’ connects poverty and kindness in an 
oppositional relationship, which is to say, the ‘but’ positively links poorness and 
unkindness, as if it were exceptional anyone poor could also be kind.
To return to the Marx Brothers, what specifically happens in the punch-line 
(Groucho’s answer)? The gap between first and second meanings appears again, 
with Groucho’s answer irreconcilable to the question (and it is important we 
sustain this gap in our reading of the humour of this joke—it is not very funny if 
Groucho’s answer is changed to ‘Both, please!’, just a bit greedy). The false 
choice Groucho is faced with here is fairly innocuous, but his gesture qua act is 
truly radical, for he strikes at the very conditions of possibility of the choice 
itself. As Claire Colebrook points out, ‘the subjection of modern thought lies in 
the illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis.’ Another example from 
Hollywood comedy Žižek provides is Howard’s (Kevin Kline) outburst at his 
wedding to Emily (Joan Cusack); faced with the choice ‘Do you take this woman 
to be your lawfully wedded wife?’2, Howard blurts out ‘I’m gay’ (Žižek [et al] 
2000, p. 122). Howard takes the ‘impossible’ choice, arguably losing everything, 
that is to say, everything that had been constitutive of his identity as a 
heterosexual schoolteacher in a small American town, but in doing so ‘gain[ing] 
the space of free action’ (ibid.). It is the aim of this thesis to begin to locate the, 
as it were, ‘active’ dimension of performance comedy. The basis of my research 
is a sort of pun, conflating the psychoanalytic act with the act of performance 
comedy, which is a description of what a comedian does ‘what’s your act like?’ 




2 And in this case the notion of false choice is even more striking; in our collective imagination 
the question must be answered with ‘I do,’ for to answer otherwise would be simply 
embarrassing to all parties involved. 
0.3 - On practice-as-research
The problem of practice-as-research is also a problem for the possibility of 
political performance, that is to say, performance as praxis. By engaging with 
the theoretical questions above, I also strike out at a false choice faced by the 
comedian, that is, the choice between commenting on the world and changing 
it. This false alternative haunts the possibility of political performance. On the 
one hand the comedian must withdraw, viewing the world from a distance in 
order to critique it through writing and performance. In this case, the best the 
comedian can hope to achieve is raising ‘awareness’ (while letting others get on 
with the ‘real work’ of politics). On the other hand we have the tradition of using 
humour in public protest situations, which of course has its roots in Medieval 
Carnival, but also characterises such diverse groups as the Orange Alternative 
(Poland), the Situationist Internationale, and Clandestine Insurgent Rebel 
Clown Army. But is this humour simply a relief from the actual work of political 
struggle? Both of these cases suggest the disturbing possibility that ‘comedy’ 
may not do anything, which is to say in enjoying the satirical gags of the topical 
comedian or the collective silliness of a group protest we are silently buying into 
the hegemonic or ideological regime that permits it (when the true ‘act’ would 
be to change the conditions of possibility for the ideological determination 
itself). In Chapter 2 both choices in this false alternative are examined critically. 
But how do I propose to escape the ‘disjunctive synthesis’ and redefine the 
conditions of possibility for a radical democratic political comedy? Through 
practice. 
The first thing to note is the way in which the false alternative faced by the 
politically minded comedian (between critique and change) truly is a disjunctive 
synthesis. If phrased in the following way—‘As a comedian I critique politics/
society/the world but I really want to change it’—we see that the ‘but’ becomes a 
bar that forever separates the practice of critique from change, as if critique 
were not a necessary part of change and vice versa. Is this not correlative to the 
false binary active/passive in the discourse of theatre and performance? Jacques 




I shall call it the paradox of the spectator—a paradox that is possibly 
more fundamental than the famous paradox of the actor. The paradox is 
easily formulated: there is no theatre without a spectator (if only a single, 
concealed spectator, as in the fictional performance of Le Fils naturel 
that gives rise to Diderot’s Entretiens). But according to the accusers, 
being a spectator is a bad thing for two reasons. First, viewing is the 
opposite of knowing: the spectator is held before an appearance in a state 
of ignorance about the process of production of this appearance and 
about the reality it conceals. Second, it is the opposite of acting: the 
spectator remains immobile in her seat, passive. To be a spectator is to be 
separated from both the capacity to know and the power to act. (Rancière 
2009, pp. 2-3).
Of course, Rancière’s ultimate conclusion, is that this binary is false. But 
pursuing this connection with audience and spectatorship, and attempting to 
unpack the falseness of this binary forms the basis of my experimental practice. 
My second research question is therefore: what forms or arrangements of 
audience-performer relationships contribute to a form of comedy performance 
as positive/transformative/subversive social praxis? I draw on the writing of 
Nicolas Bourriaud (2002, 2009), Claire Bishop (2004, 2006) and Grant Kester 
(2004), whose contributions to the theorising of participation and ‘Relational’ 
or ‘Dialogic’ aesthetics in the contemporary visual arts provide a valuable frame 
through which to consider both the role of the audience in the performance 
comedy event, and the relationship between audience and comedy performer. 
This body of writing also provides a number of methods for my experimental 
practice. Through the latter I question or attempt to ‘practice’ out of the false 
spectatorial binary active/passive, and consequently the false binary of critique/
change. I (respectfully) attempt to situate the practical submission of this thesis 
in a context of practices that includes those of comedian Andy Kaufman, British 
artist and comedian Kim Noble, the Canadian performance artist and theatre 
maker Darren O’Donnell and the conceptual artist Marc Horowitz. In examining 
these artists I am attempting to locate techniques for experimental engagement 
with the audience that may, as I will later put it, experiment with the possibility 
of an ‘attachment’ to the radical ‘break’ of the act.
  0.4 - Self-reflexivity, acts, and effects
The problem of self-reflexivity in a practice-as-research project such as this one 
is illustrated by another joke, one with a very clear paradox appearing in-
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between first and second meaning. In Matt Groening’s animated science-fiction 
situation comedy Futurama, Professor Farnsworth presents the crew with his 
latest invention, a ‘What-if? Machine.’ When posed a ‘What if?’ question by the 
user, the machine generates a video sequence demonstrating the answer. 
Bender, the robotic crew member, desires to know what it would be like to be 
human, saying: ‘We robots don’t have any emotions. And sometimes, that 
makes me very sad.’ A similar paradox appears in the television series Star 
Trek: The Next Generation, which features the Android character Data. Data’s 
character-arc is dominated by what might be called the Tin-Man’s dilemma: he 
longs to be human (he only wants a ‘heart’). Of course, if Data is a robot, defined 
by the lack of human emotions, how can he possibly feel ‘longing’? The more 
plausible split in robot subjectivity is between those robots that actually exist 
today (automatic machines completing tasks by fulfilling programmes) and the 
replicants of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (based on Philip K. Dick’s Do Robots 
Dream of Electric Sheep?), which do not know they are robots. This is perhaps 
the split we find with practice-as-research; in the first example we have the 
programmatic researcher performing the ‘task’ of research (that is, outside of 
the practice), and in the second (the replicants) we have the artist as embedded 
fully within the practice without the awareness that they may also be 
simultaneously outside of it, or other.
But how can the robot do both? If this thesis theoretically locates the political 
dimension of comedy in a gap inherent to joke-making and joke structures 
themselves, in comedy event as ‘act,’ it simultaneously attempts to actualise this 
in practice, from inside. Like Bender, or Data, I am embodying a sort of self-
reflexive paradox. I am suggesting that to truly be political, a comedy event 
must be an ‘act,’ touching ‘the Real,’ yet the act may only be viewed 
retroactively. Rex Butler writes: ‘There is always an element of the unexpected 
and unpredictable […] of something not foreseeable within the current 
conceptual horizons. […] the act, in so far as it is successful, can only be spoken 
of in its own terms’ (Butler 2005, p. 67). The retroactive identification of the 
‘act’ calls into question whether it is even possible for a comedian to be a 
political comedian. I want to suggest that the practice of stand-up is perhaps 
best place to address this deadlock, seeing as it lies in-between pre-planned 
written material and spontaneous improvisatory performance. Furthermore, the 
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indeterminacy of the ‘act’ in the present (‘[…] it is incalculable, not the outcome 
of strategic argumentation; it is a totally free act’) (Žižek 1997[2005], http://
www.lacan.com/symptom6_articles/zizek.html), means that elements of 
chance, contingency, and the aleatoric are embraced as a significant part of the 
practice, especially as realised in Easy, Tiger! which forms the final practical 
submission that accompanies this thesis. 
With regard to the quantification and qualification of results and evidence, the 
new knowledge produced by this thesis is a re-articulation of the discourse of 
comedy and revolt; a result in theory led by an interrogation through practice. I 
seek to propose formal methods of comic performance (ways of making and 
doing) that embody a more appropriate force for social transformation, thus the 
underlying activity of the thesis is a sort of modelling. Efficacy is measured 
against the complementary and very partisan theoretic of democracy, 
antagonism, ideology, and hegemony formulated in the already mentioned 
sources. In the light of visible changes in the present, including globalisation, 
information technology, sustained war and conflict, a practical and theoretical 
intervention into the field of comedy studies, currently dominated by questions 
of offense (see Lockyer and Pickering 2005[2009] for a thorough study of 
humour and offense in Great Britain), is appropriate and necessary. The 
timeframe of a three-year PhD through practice cannot accommodate a 
sustained qualitative study of the effects of a certain comic performance, 
therefore use of the default techniques of questionnaires and surveys is not 
appropriate. Rather, I engage in a process of reflexive analysis. 
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In this chapter I analyse two pieces of practice-as-
research that radically deconstruct my existing 
stand-up practice. I conclude that while formally 
useful, these experiments lacks the key quality of 
‘antagonism.’
Archive Disc 2
The reader may consult this disc as a 
demonstration of the radical deconstruction of my  
comedy practice through elements of participatory  
performance and relational aesthetics. 
Documentation of these practices is primarily 
through still photography. There are 2 sections:
1. The Centre for Dangerology - accompanied by 
slideshow of images and ‘about.’
2. Dangerology at Alsager Arts Centre Gallery - 
accompanied by slideshow and video recording 
of research seminar event.
Chapter 5
Drawing on the work of Lacanian inflected 
political philosophers Mouffe and Laclau, I 
critically review the idea of attachment through 
participation. I argue that antagonism is a 
necessary part of both social formation, and the 
joke. Archive Disc 3
The reader may consult this disc as a 
demonstration of the return to performance 
effected by Easy, Tiger! (a) - a one-to-one 
performance, and Easy, Tiger! (b) - which again 
resembles comic performance. 
1. Easy, Tiger! (a) - consists of an edited film with 
commentary, and a full, in-camera edit.
2. Easy, Tiger! (b) - consists of an edited version 
of the 2 October 2009 performance, and three 
clips (corresponding to the written text) with 
commentary. 
Chapter 6
In these two projects of experimental practice I 
attempt to actualise the model drawn by this 
thesis. While my practical attempts are by no 
means conclusive, my model is a contribution to 
the study of comedy as social praxis. 
Archive Disc 1
The reader may consult this disc as a 
demonstration of my earlier practice in comedy. 
There are three sections: 
1. Akira California - documents the first piece of 
experimental practice. 
2.Homework for Heroes - an edited version of a 
practice-as-research project 2007-2008. 
3.Circuit - Here the reader will find clips of my 
performance on the comedy circuit. 
Clicking ‘about’ will take the viewer to a short 
audio-explanation of each project.
Chapter 2
How can performance comedy be efficacious? 
This chapter argues that comedy performance 
can be a specific form of Ideologiekritik, through 
a theoretical framework drawn from Lacan and 
Deleuze.
Chapter 1 
This chapter contextualises my existing practice 
as a stand-up comedian in terms of the history of 
stand-up comedy in Britain. Analysing the 
particulars of my practice, I detail the projects 
Akira California and Homework for Heroes.
Chapter 3
The break with ideology requires an attachment 
by the subject in a relationship of fidelity to be, 
stricto sensu, ‘effective’. Here I outline the frame 
of Relational Aesthetics as a means of forming 
these attachments in practice.
CHAPTER ONE: CONTEXTS FOR COMEDY PRACTICE
 
1.0 - Opening moves… on comedy in performance
Watching stand-up, in its form and content, can be a highly discomfiting 
experience. Stand-up is often uncomfortable, and at times, entirely strange, not 
for nothing does the novelist and erstwhile comedian A.L. Kennedy call it ‘a very  
peculiar martial art, for masochists.’ Ridout (2004) employs Jonas Barish’s 
term ‘ontological queasiness’ in reference to the theatre, and what Barish calls 
the ‘anti-theatrical prejudice.’ What we find in stand-up is a related queasiness, 
less ontological and more concerned with looking and being looked at; it puts us 
in mind of Lacan’s famous paper on the ‘Mirror Stage,’ in which the subject is 
constituted through ‘being objectified in the dialectic of identification with the 
other’ (Lacan 1966[2006], p. 76). The point is not, of course, that the audience-
member recognises himself in the face of the comedian and thus becomes 
subject, but rather that there is a recognition that, for the audience, in this form 
there is no possibility of anonymous spectating, you are the object for the other 
(comedian). Thus the audience member is queasily trapped between, on the one 
hand, fully meeting the gaze of the comedian, and losing his or herself to 
laughter on the other. The condition of possibility for the form of stand-up, as 
Derrida would argue, is also its condition of impossibility; which is to say, the 
queasiness of being looked at is at once the thing producing audience laughter 
and the thing ultimately preventing a full loss of self to what D. Diane Davis 
calls laughter’s post-human ‘sweep’ (Davis 2000, p. 63). And a similar catch 
goes to the comedian, captured by stand-up’s aggressive rhetoric of fights and 
battles: one ‘kills’ or ‘slaughters,’ or one ‘dies.’  For the comedian-cum-gladiator, 
the audience is both lion and Caesar—the thing to be conquered, and the thing 
from which to seek approval.
In this chapter I will describe and frame the field of what I call performance 
comedy (encompassing both stand-up and sketch; while there are distinct 
differences between the forms, for me the circumstances of their performance 
are enough to lump them together in one category—in many respects stand-ups 
and sketch performers engage with the audience in the same way, particularly 
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when things go wrong). My argument is that performance comedy is tied to the 
logic of capital. The consequence of this for a practice-based project seeking to 
locate the politically transformative dimension of performance comedy is that 
we must revisit the unfashionable concept of ideology. I will first examine the 
way in which performance comedy is exclusively market-driven in 
contemporary Britain, making a case for an exploration through practice-as-
research in the academy. I will then describe the historical development of 
stand-up in Britain as a series of emergences and reincorporations into a 
capitalist mode of production (here I draw predominantly on work by Double 
[2005, 1997] and Thompson [2004]). Finally, I examine my own existing 
practice in order to provide a base from which to build an experimental practice 
in the following chapters. I do so through analyses of two performances: Akira 
California (Central School of Speech and Drama, Etcetera Theatre) and 
Homework for Heroes (multiple venues, Edinburgh Festival 2008). These case 
studies will establish the methodological basis for ‘evidence’ in this project. I am  
not engaging in a project of either quantitative or qualitative research. Instead, 
the case studies are self-reflexive analyses, through which a model develops in 
both practice and theory. 
In general, arguments regarding the social and political efficacy of stand-up 
comedy as a practice fall into three categories 1) transgressive/iconoclastic, 2) 
formative of community or identity, and 3) critical. While these are not hard 
and fast rules, there is a distinct sense that stand-up affects the social body (in a 
positive way) because it breaks social conventions, and/or strengthens social 
bonds, and/or ‘fosters critical thinking’ (Morreall 2009, p. 113). I take up the 
issue of transgression in the following chapter, following the New Historicist 
critique of what I call the ‘logic of the Carnivalesque’ (see Greenblatt 1989, 
Stallybrass and White 1986). As for the issue of formation of group identities 
through comic representations, I must acknowledge the work of Wagg (ed., 
1998) and Lockyer and Pickering (eds., 2009). The authors in these volumes 
follow a sociological approach that provides useful examples, but is only 
laterally relevant to my project. Of more immediate interest are philosophers 
such as Morreall, Zupančič, and Critchley, who attempt to probe more 
comprehensively into humour and comedy as philosophical situations. I will 
draw on Zupančič’s work in the following chapters, but it is perhaps wise to say 
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a few words about Morreall in order to defend against the possibility of 
behaviourist analysis. Morreall’s approach is to sketch a triad of theories of 
humour—Superiority, Incongruity, and Relief—and attributes to each a 
rejection of humour as a field of study, that is humour is ‘anti-social,’ 
‘irrational,’ or a ‘pressure valve’ for unpleasantries. He then validates each of 
these cases as necessary and constitutive of the social. Thus the very thing that 
might have prompted the rejection of humour is identified its point of interest. 
With regard to the possibility of a transformative comic practice, Morreall’s 
model falls short; caught between a discourse which naturalises humour as 
human behaviour and a more interesting ‘ethical’ discourse. On the one hand, 
as natural behaviour, humour comes across as palliative: ‘in humour we 
experience a sudden change of mental state—a cognitive shift […]—that would 
be disturbing under normal conditions, that is, if we took it seriously’ (Morreall 
2009[1], p. xii). The comic reflex is simply this, a neurological reaction to a 
certain stimulus under certain conditions. On the other hand, there is a socially 
constructed, ethical justification for humorous practices, what Morreall calls an 
ethics of disengagement. Humour disengages from a practical concern (‘To have 
a practical concern about a situation is to be emotionally involved with it’), and 
blocks ‘negative emotions’ promoting ‘divergent thinking’ (ibid. p. 101 - 124). I 
suggest that Morreall’s definitions are far too sweeping, and even in his ethical 
discourse he is firmly imbricated in a behaviourist discourse. The key is in his 
recourse to theories of humour (inescapably part of his methodology), which 
require there to be a bar or gap to be crossed or transgressed (without this bar, 
that is, ‘difference,’ there is nothing to render humour an exceptional mode of 
discourse). So when he asserts that the ethical disengagement of ‘our sense of 
humour makes us not only more tolerant of people’s differences, but more 
gracious’ (ibid. p. 117) this is flagrantly one-sided, particularly when said 
difference is that which draws the bar that creates the joke. Ultimately, 
Morreall’s argument is that comedy is efficacious inasmuch as it is a part of 
human social life, however because it ‘disengages,’ ‘satire is not a weapon of 
revolutionaries’ (ibid., p. 101). 
The problem lies in the necessity of the ‘bar,’ and what I would say is the 
fundamental exclusion of comedy. Ultimately Morreall’s view is far too idealist, 
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only allowing for instances of successful comedy. But, as I will argue more fully 
later, comedy is at once inclusive and exclusive. It posits a division between 
‘getting a joke’ and ‘not getting a joke,’ and there is in this gap something 
deeper, perhaps more Real than this recourse to fundamentals of human 
behaviour. 
  1.1 - On PaR, comedy, and the market
The thesis is divided between chapters of critical reflection on practice and 
chapters of theoretical discussion. The structure is a dialogue between practice 
and theory, between action and reflection, between two discursive poles that 
propose and refute until they reach an eventual, praxical proposition on the 
form a politically transformative performance comedy must take today. In 
reestablishing this binary I am aware that I run against the grain of practice-as-
research today, which seeks to erase the binary entirely. I suggest this premiss is 
misplaced. As demonstration, let us take a not entirely dissimilar example from 
another field, political philosophy. There is a similar binary here between 
political action (qua activism) and theoretical reflection. Judith Butler takes up 
this issue in her book with Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek (2000). There is a 
gulf between activism on one hand and ‘Theory’ on the other, she suggests. But 
there is to be no comfortable synthesis, rather it is the ongoing dialectical 
process which matters. She writes: ‘The commitment to radical interrogation 
means that there is no moment in which politics requires the cessation of 
theory, for that would be the moment in which politics posits certain premisses 
as off-limits to interrogation—indeed, where it actively embraces the dogmatic 
as the condition of its own possibility’ (Butler et al 2000, p. 264). But why this 
resistance to theory?: ‘[…] those who fear the retarding effects of theory do not 
want to think too hard about what it is they are doing, what kind of discourse 
they are using; for if they think too hard about what it is they are doing, they 
fear that they will no longer do it’ (ibid.). So it goes for PaR in the arts. While I 
reject the idea that theory might be ‘applied,’ as one applies a tool to a particular 
job, throughout this thesis methodical, critical reflection is most appropriate to 
the project at hand. I am interrogating the political dimension of performance 
comedy, and as such it is imperative I consider how any action or impulse to 
action might be coloured by a set of ideological presumptions. Badiou’s famous 
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pronouncement on art is my watchword: ‘It is better to do nothing than to 
contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which 
Empire already recognises as existent’ (Badiou 2004, p. 119).
But practice is of course, crucial. A practice-as-research enquiry into stand-up 
comedy can itself be seen as a political act. Engaging in what Butler would call a 
‘radical interrogation’ of my practice within the institution enables me to 
disengage from the conservative mechanisms of the market. Along with the 
critical engagement with my specific practice, this thesis contributes to 
broadening the profile of stand-up comedy, both in theory and practice, within 
the academy. Stand-up comedy is heavily market-driven, existing entirely 
outside government funding. At the time of writing, the Arts Council explicitly 
does not fund any practices or works that fall under the rubric of performance 
comedy (stand-up, sketch, and musical) as it considers these practices self-
funding. In response to this policy promoter and agent Lisa Keddie has 
organised the petition and campaign ‘I Think Comedy Is Art,’ the response to 
which has revealed a split in the comedy community. While some comedians 
whole-heartedly support the idea that their practice should be supported by a 
UK funding body, there are others who see any exchange of monies between a 
government organisation and a comic artist as fundamentally compromising the 
comic’s freedom of speech. My own rejoinder, which I will demonstrate in the 
historical analysis that follows, is that far from guaranteeing freedom of speech, 
the throwing of comedy to the wolves of the marketplace does precisely the 
opposite. The field of performance comedy, and particularly stand-up, can be a 
bullying, conservative place; in certain clubs there are few practices that look 
less like freedom of speech. Fundamentally, performance comedy is 
ideologically determined with or without Arts Council funding. 
Joanne Gilbert (2004), an academic and former professional stand-up comic 
also notes the relationship between stand-up and capitalism (she is specifically 
referring to stand-up comedy in America, but as we shall see in the following 
section, it equally rings true in Britain): ‘perhaps it is not surprising that a 
comic’s jokes are called “material,” for within the commodification of cultural 
performance, jokes are exactly that—the material of capitalist currency’ (Gilbert 
2004, p. 17). She argues that ‘when comics—specifically members of 
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marginalised groups like women and minorities—get paid for “performing” their  
marginality and attacking the dominant culture, they provide a unique context 
for examining power relations in public discourse’ (ibid., p. 169). As fruitful as 
this is, she stops there: ‘the “master’s tools” may never dismantle the “master’s 
house,” but the master’s cover charge and two-drink minimum might help to 
build another very nice house’ (ibid., p. 165). In other words, the (marginal) 
comedian can play the system, but not transform it. The blame lies on laughter’s 
door once again: ‘[…] humour renders its audience passive. Although it may 
send a double message, if it is successful, humour produces laughter and 
laughter does not constitute a radical politics’ (ibid., p. 172). While I agree with 
Gilbert’s argument, I do not agree with her resignation to the idea that stand-up 
can only be efficacious inasmuch as it operates within the system. If we were to 
follow this line of reasoning, political or subversive comedy would be reduced 
almost exclusively to an assertion of marginal identity within heavily capitalistic 
circumstances of performance. My starting point must then be the possibility of 
a comedy in performance that breaks with the dominant ideological structures. 
Consideration of comedy’s relation to ideology is crucial therefore, and forms 
the heart of this project. 
  1.2 - stand-up comedy in Britain 1852-2010
Stand-up occupies an interesting interstitial place in the cultural economy of 
Great Britain, emerging as a marginal, minor practice within a larger, popular 
frame. Its history is one of emergences and reincorporations. In Britain, stand-
up comedy’s origins are generally thought to lie in the music-hall 
entertainments of the mid-1800s, beginning with Charles Morton’s opening of 
the Canterbury Hall, London in 1852 (Double 2005, p. 29). Victorian music-
hall, in a kind of futur anterieur, occupies in 1852 the role that could only later 
be filled by the technologies of radio and television; less of a show and more of a 
warm place where the public could spend the entire evening. An 1899 
programme cited by Oliver Double features a staggering 85 acts (ibid., p. 30). 
The embryonic form of stand-up comedy in the United Kingdom, is ‘patter,’ or 
interstitial spoken-word pieces of direct-address, mostly humorous, which 
covered scene changes or musicians tuning-up. This break with theatrical 
convention, employing direct address, is a defining element of stand-up comedy  
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in performance. This period also produced another paradigmatic element of 
stand-up: heckling. ‘Patter’ therefore represents a kind of inadvertent invention. 
By the late 1800s patter sections were so popular some performers began 
abandoning the music and creating acts out of spoken-word alone.
By the 1960s, television occupied the place held by music-hall, leading to a steep 
decline in this form of live performance. Music-hall, and therefore the emergent 
form of stand-up was suitably ‘mainstream,’ however, the cost of running a live 
venue (and providing dinner, drinks, and entertainment) in comparison to the 
unprecedented ease of access provided by television was simply too high. Live 
stand-up migrated to another set of venues, the Working Men’s Clubs, leading 
to the emergence of another variation of the stand-up form, the Working Men’s 
Club comic, the most well-known exponent of which is the late Bernard 
Manning. Often representative of Working Men’s Club comedy as a whole, 
Manning’s comedy is notable for its use of deliberately offensive jokes. Although 
he claimed to ‘offend everyone equally,’ (Bennett 2002: http://
www.chortle.co.uk/comics/b/3136/bernard_manning/review/). Manning 
primarily took shots at other races, women, and homosexuals. Steve Bennett, of 
comedy website Chortle, writes: ‘whereas most of his material is ribald teasing, 
there’s a vile undercurrent of festering hate in anything involving race—and its 
not just because it’s an automatically sensitive subject to liberal ears’ (Bennett 
2002: ibid. ). This is an assertion surely borne out by Howitt and Owusu-
Bempah (2009), who cite an incident in which Manning performed  for a group 
of around 300 white police officers. Picking on the single black member of the 
audience, Manning launched into a ‘barrage of obscenity,’ including: ‘They 
actually think they’re English because they are born here. That means if a dog’s 
bone in a stable, it is a horse.’ At this point, the authors note, Manning’s white 
audience cheered; this moment must be therefore be interpreted as ‘social, 
emotional and psychological violence against the vulnerable since immediate 
retaliation from the black police officer was simply not possible’ (Howitt and 
Owusu-Bempah 2009, p. 53, in Lockyer and Pickering 2009). What is most 
interesting in this moment is its clear, and unfortunately visible ‘frontier of 
exclusion’ (a term I will come to use heavily in Chapter 5) drawn by comedy. For  
me, the joke is most offensive because it denigrates the victim’s right to name 
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himself as a citizen. The joke therefore draws a frontier, a line excluding, at the 
ontological level, the right of the black police officer to be included among the 
communitie(s) (English, British, Citizens, Officers). At the same time, this 
frontier also divides ‘getting the joke’ from ‘not getting the joke’—those who 
laugh form the new, exclusive community. 
Along with new venues and subject matter, Working Men’s Club comedy also 
involved a shift in form. While the front cloth comedy often performed in a 
monologic style that is fairly similar to what we know as stand-up today, in this 
period gags or one-liners were more common: ‘club comics has a more minimal 
approach: unoriginal, self-contained gags, told one after another, with little else 
going on’ (Double 2005, p. 37). The club comic became a mainstream 
phenomenon with the incorporation into television. In 1971, The Comedians, 
featuring Manning, Frank Carson, Ken Goodwin, and Charlie Williams, 
debuted, forming the dominant model of what is still called ‘mainstream’ 
comedy today. Concurrent to this incorporation into the mainstream of the club 
comic was the arrival of comics such as Billy Connolly, Jasper Carrott, Mike 
Harding, and Victoria Wood. All four began their careers as folk-singers, with 
comedy appearing in patter, as in the days of music-hall. 
In 1979, with the opening of The Comedy Store, as well as the election of 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of Britain, came another, visibly 
oppositional form of stand-up comedy, ‘Alternative comedy.’ The name is 
problematic. As Marxist cultural critic Raymond Williams writes: ‘There is a 
simple theoretical distinction between alternative and oppositional, that is to 
say between someone who simply finds a different way to live and wishes to be 
left alone with it, and someone who finds a different was to live and wants to 
change society in its light’ (Williams 1980, p. 42). Alternative comedy, is 
actually ‘oppositional’, with an ideological commitment to a sort of anarchic 
Marxism. The term Alternative comedy is attributed to Tony Allen, who 
gathered a group of comedians and cabaret performers together under the name 
Alternative Cabaret. Acts such as Rik Mayall, Ade Edmondson, Alexei Sayle, and 
French and Saunders are among those associated with Alternative comedy. As 
well as an opposition to Thatcherism, Alternative comedy placed itself in 
opposition to the racist, sexist, and homophobic gags of the club comics, 
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performing material that was ‘blue’ (i.e. foul-mouthed), but ‘politically correct.’ 
Allen notes that Alternative comedy strove for a sort of new social realism: ‘[…] 
it was the sad state of traditional British stand-up and its total irrelevance to the 
post-sixties generation (never mind the post-punk generation) that was 
probably the most important element. There was an enormous vacuum and it 
had to be filled’ (Allen 2002, p. 82). 
What begins as oppositional rarely stays oppositional—Williams writes: ‘In 
capitalist practice, if the thing is not making a profit […] then it can for some 
time be overlooked, at least while it remains alternative. When it becomes 
oppositional in an explicit way, it does, of course, get approached or 
attacked’ (Williams 1980, p. 43). The popularity of the form led to its eventual 
incorporation into the mainstream and dulling of its ideological sensibilities. 
Double notes that in 1999, the Comedy Store, the recognised birthplace of 
Alternative comedy, turned a profit of more than £2.5 million (Double 2005, p. 
82). I would argue that this demonstrates that Alternative comedy never fully 
broke with the ideological conditions of Thatcherite Conservatism, and in the 
following chapter I will engage with the precise nature of the ‘break’ from a 
philosophical and theoretical perspective. It is sufficient here to simply note 
Thompson’s (humorous) suggestion that Margaret Thatcher was the ‘mother-in-
law’ of Alternative comedy, ‘not only in providing it with a necessary object of 
antipathy, but also (further echoing the historic tension between working-class 
men and their wives’ mothers) by giving it a house to live in’ (Thompson 2004, 
p. 38). It was Thatcher’s ‘obsession’ with deregulation, Thompson argues, that 
led to the founding of Channel 4 and ‘a changed TV power structure in which 
competing production companies would compete to satisfy egotistical 
comedians’ every artistic whim’ (ibid.). This submission to market logic enabled 
Ben Elton, Mayall, Edmundson, and French and Saunders to achieve great 
success on television, but dulled their oppositional edge. The greatest casualty of 
this incorporation by far is Ben Elton, whose career is seen by many as a series 
of ethical compromises. 
When I began performing on the comedy circuit, it seemed the most fashionable 
form of comedy was what was casually referred to as ‘DIY’ or Do-It-Yourself’ 
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comedy. The term was later given credence by Tim Jonze, who, writing in the 
Guardian, notes: 
Like any artist in an emerging scene, the last thing Josie [Long] will do is 
admit that she's part of an emerging scene. But it seems obvious that a 
group of comedians—inspired by the likes of Daniel Kitson, Stewart Lee 
and Demetri Martin—are taking a hands-on approach to combating the 
rise of bland Friday night TV, stale one-liner routines and pissed hen 
parties doing conga dances through Jongleurs. (Jonze 2007, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2007/aug/04/
comedy.edinburghfestival20071). 
This emergent form of comedy shares an ethos with the later-discussed 
Relational Aesthetics in its celebration of conviviality and interactivity. Long, for  
example, employs a number of interactive mechanisms in her work. In her 
show, Kindness and Exuberance, audience members are greeted individually, 
given a photocopied magazine she has made, and directed to a table upon which  
there are homemade badges, small slips of paper and a makeshift ballot box. 
Long asks them to write their ‘Favourite Small Thing’ on the slip of paper and 
drop it into the box. The material gathered through such a ‘relational 
mechanism’ is incorporated into the live performance. 
As the name suggests, DIY comedy did not make very much money, with clubs 
running either at a loss or just breaking even. All the same, when the form 
became de rigeur on comedy stages (with the increasing numbers of bookings 
for ‘whimsical’ comedians), one could argue that even this most recently 
emergent of forms was reincorporated into the dominant. Worse yet, the very 
discourse on which it based its resistance (DIY)3 has been, to an extent, co-
opted. During the general election of 2010, the Conservative Party’s manifesto 
on ‘The Big Society’ employed the rhetoric of Do-It-Yourself as a justification for 
the slashing of public services. All the same, the experimental fervour of DIY 
comedy, with an explosion of innovative, mixed-genre events—including 
Laughter in Odd Places (which took stand-up to laundromats, libraries, and 
museums), Ward and White’s Karaoke Circus (a mixture of stand-up and 
karaoke with live band), and Tom Bell and the Dude Patrol (stand-up with arts 
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3 DIY and ‘maker culture’ have been cited as oppositional to capitalism (or more properly, 
consumerism), for example, Spencer (2005). 
and crafts)—can be seen as a significant period in the history of British comedy, 
and has been a major influence on my own practice.
1.3 - Case Studies: Akira California and Homework for Heroes
How is my own creative comic practice situated within the context of stand-up 
comedy in Britain? Broadly, my stand-up might be called ‘anecdotal,’ and to a 
degree, ‘observational,’ though I also incorporate a large number of short jokes 
and near one-liners. Additionally, much my work may be said to fall into the 
domain of ‘postmodern irony’ (see Chapter 2). My ‘persona’ most likely falls into 
the spectrum of comedy personalities within a category defined by Double as a 
‘naked self,’ though there is a great deal of ambiguity. My writing generally 
purports to be autobiographical, signalling its ‘truth’ through the first-personal 
past-tense: ‘This happened to me yesterday. I was…’ But behind the 
autobiographical signifiers the narratives in my writing are fictionalised 
versions of the truth—like an exaggerated version of my own life, as in Bret 
Easton Ellis’ Lunar Park. Take, for instance, the first story on the first video 
featured on the DVD appendix, in which I recount an incident in which I am 
mistaken for a Japanese person on the London Underground. Though it errs on 
the side of believability, the story is fiction, an amalgamation of several such 
mis-recognitions. While the announcement I hear and recount is a real incident, 
my misguided involvement is not. Instead, to write a joke, I follow these 
incidents through to their (il)logical conclusion.
I will often incorporate ‘topical’ satire into my stand-up, though this alone does 
not make my comedy ‘political’ in the strictest sense. More often than not, 
popular culture features heavily in my material. What this somewhat thin 
description of my stand-up demonstrates is the difficulty of categorising stand-
up comedy. I am often at a loss for words when a non-comedian asks ‘what kind 
of stuff do you do?’ This reluctance to categorise myself and my practice is 
related to the fact that I view the object of stand-up as an event and process, 
rather than a self-contained artefact that may bear the violence of 
categorisation. One might discern an affinity with the ‘activists’ Judith Butler 
cites above, a reluctance to theorise in this case arises from the fear of making 
inert what is at times an ‘alchemical’ process. In an act of respect to theory, I 
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will make a single conclusion here: as a comedian, I identify the dominant logic 
of a situation, and attempt to find an alternative logic that breaks from it, 
simultaneously revealing the absurdity of the dominant logic. This might be 
demonstrated by the following joke of mine, about the leader of the British 
National Party, Nick Griffin. To give this joke its context, I first performed it in a  
Soho comedy club the day after Griffin had controversially appeared as a guest 
on BBC’s Question Time.
I think Nick Griffin is a disgusting person, there’s no doubt in my mind. 
But, just for a moment, let’s do a little thought experiment. Imagine Nick 
Griffin in front of you, his hideous, bloated face, his head stuffed with a 
racist ideology. [mild laughter] That’s Nick Griffin. [pause] Now, 
imagine if Nick Griffin was this big [gesture of about four inches with 
fingers]. Like, the size of a hamster. Then it’s like, ‘Oh my God, 
adorable!’ [laughter] Now he’s like the cutest thing ever! [laughter] It’d 
be great, cause you could ruffle his weird hair [pause, mild laughter], or 
let him run around the wheel, and the best thing about it is that he’d be 
dead in a year. [laughter].
The joke works as a satirical joke by mock-celebrating the BNP leader on a 
different, almost absurd level, breaking with the usual logic of disagreement. 
This idea of a ‘logical break’ is rehearsed in greater detail in the following 
chapter.
What strikes me as significant is the question of the context of performance; 
does this joke have efficacy only in audiences that for the most part agree with 
its sentiments (efficacy in this case meaning a diffusion of the fetishistic threat 
posed by Griffin’s appearance in the media)? If it were performed at a BNP 
meeting, it would have a different sort of efficacy, fomenting antagonism 
towards myself, the joke teller. Therefore the break in logic can serve to further 
strengthen existing logics. The problem lies in the rigidity of the form. My 
practice-as-research project would therefore have to begin by investigating, on a 
deeper level, the relationship between audience and performer, in order to 





1.4 - Akira California: a post-apocalyptic stand-up comedy
My first piece of practice made under the aegis of practice-as-research was an 
hour-long piece of stand-up and storytelling called Akira California, presented 
at the Etcetera Theatre in August 2007 and at Central School of Speech and 
Drama’s The Festival of Emergent Art in September of that year. The title was 
derived from Katsuhiro Otomo’s manga and animated film Akira. This work 
was intended to expand my existing stand-up practice, and I experimented here 
with the conventions of story-telling. In a sense, while exploring the ‘relational’ 
aspect of stand-up, I chose to focus on the convention of ‘relating’ a story. The 
narrative of the work is set in the near future, and is a science-fiction tale that 
places a real-life person (Maddox Jolie, adopted son of Angelina Jolie and Brad 
Pitt) in a futuristic setting. Taking place in an Orwellian, surveillance state 
version of Japan, Maddox and Hanami, a girl he meets, talk about life, fall in 
love, and sing karaoke. 
While the piece was satisfying from a creative point of view, I did not feel that it 
necessarily fulfilled the aims of the research. Partially, this is related to what I 
then perceived as the strict conventions of stand-up. Although audiences easily 
warmed to both stand-up and storytelling modes, both seemed to require an 
end-on staging. A deeper level of audience engagement within the stand-up 
mode, at this point, at least, was not forthcoming. The following work, 
Homework for Heroes, began a progressive move towards the total 
deconstruction of my practice seen in Chapter 4. 
  1.5 - Homework for Heroes
Directly after finishing Akira California, I began working with a group of three 
other comedians: Nat Luurtsema, Helen Arney and Tom Goodliffe on a stand-
up show entitled Homework for Heroes. The show explored ‘everyday heroism,’ 
and ‘achievable goals’—in its whimsical tone and content it falls easily within the 
frame of DIY comedy, identified above. Our process led to monthly work-in-
progress showings from February 2008 to July 2008, culminating in a 25-day 
run at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe. I was able to bring my interests in 
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alternative modes of audience-engagement within the stand-up form to the 
process, and we conducted a number of experiments.
In March 2008, at our monthly work-in-progress show at The Defector’s Weld, 
Shepherd’s Bush, we incorporated an element of chance. We hung a cork-board 
against the back wall, and all four of us sat beneath it, for the duration of the 
show. On the board we had each pinned images, corresponding to various 
pieces of written material. Audience members were given the opportunity to 
‘choose’ their own show by choosing which image would go next. The process of 
selecting an image opened the way to a dialogue between the audience member 
and performer, as the performer would attempt to find out why the audience 
member chose that particular image, and so on. This was not, to my mind, a 
successful experiment. While the selection process was vigorous and the open 
dialogue fairly comfortable to begin with, the show soon lost momentum as the 
audience became less and less interested in choosing images. What this 
demonstrates is what I have cited in the introduction as ‘false choice,’ the 
appearance of free choice, without the actuality of freedom. For the audience, 
crucially, their choices did not matter—the show would only be completed when 
the last image was chosen, giving it the tone of a chore to be completed. In this 
particular instance we were unhappily trapped between a partial 
implementation of an alternative mode of audience engagement and the 
conventions of stand-up comedy. 
In the final version of the show that appeared at the Edinburgh Festival, our 
interest in audience participation took an absurd form. In the course of the 
show, each comedian nominated their personal ‘everyday hero,’ and explained 
the reasons for this choice. It was then the role of the audience to choose where 
on a ‘scale of heroism’ (‘wall of heroes’) they thought that particular hero should 
fall (see DVD appendix disc 1). At the end of the show, whoever was acting as 
compère that day (in the documentation it is Nat Luurtsema taking this role) 
would take the highest ranked ‘everyday hero’ and the highest ranked real-life 
hero and square them off in a competitive game of ‘Ponkers.’ Ponkers, 
essentially, was a game of conkers played with potatoes. Two of the comedians 
would reenter the stage, carrying potatoes on strings with paper faces of the 
‘heroes’ affixed on them. As in normal conkers, they would take turns bashing 
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each other’s potato/hero—the winner, and hero of the day, was the last one 
standing. 
What is interesting about this game is how little, in the end, audience 
participation contributed to a different result each time. While the participatory 
mechanism was designed to bring a sense of chance to the work, in each of the 
25 performances, the same ‘everyday’ hero was ranked highest. The only real 
‘chance’ involved was the game of Ponkers. This suggests that there is a complex 
relationship of power involved in any comedian/audience engagement. As in the 
‘choose-your-own-show’ experiment at the Defector’s Weld, to a point, the 
audience were happy to be ‘led.’ In other words, the participatory mechanisms 
contained an inherent degree of control. The essential element of the possibility 
of failure was missing. 
  1.6 - Conclusions: Comedy and resistance
In this chapter I have outlined my existing practice in stand-up comedy, and 
positioned it in the context of the history of stand-up in Britain. I have outlined 
and attempted to describe my style and approach to jokes, and detailed two 
pieces of early experimental practice, Akira California and Homework for 
Heroes. Though the roots of the eventual deconstruction of my practice can be 
discerned in these pieces, ultimately they are fairly conservative as experiments. 
However, they must also be read in relation to my own positioning against the 
historical framework and the emergent form of DIY comedy. Both pieces are 
heavily influenced by this emergent form. 
I have argued throughout that performance comedy, as professionally practiced 
in both Britain and America, is implicated in capital, which poses an obvious 
problem for the possibility of a politically and socially transformative stand-up 
practice. I have suggested that other academic studies of performance comedy 
and efficacy can limit themselves to the ideal situation of comedy (that is, when 
it works). In considering the possibility of a comedy of resistance to the ideology  
of global capitalism, the form of stand-up, a peculiar, discomfiting machine 
fraught with exclusion, antagonism, and possible failure, is a neglected site of 
study. In the next chapter I will consider these issues in greater detail, moving 
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away from the analytical commonplaces of Morreall’s triad of humour theories 




CHAPTER TWO: PERFORMANCE COMEDY AND 
IDEOLOGIEKRITIK
 2.o - The Sense and Nonsense of Comedy and Revolt
What is the possibility of a political comedy performance today? In answering 
this question I will propose a model of comedy performance as political praxis, 
which forms the basis of my experimental practice. This chapter draws heavily 
on a reading of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory with Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy  
of difference. 
The condition of postmodernity—a specific ideological formation defined for the 
purposes of my work as the ideology of neo-liberalism and global capitalism, 
and characterised by withdrawal of state power, and increasing atomisation of 
political demands—raises an ‘aporetic bind’ for the possibility of a ‘political 
comedy.’ Chiefly, this problem may be defined through three axioms, which I 
will briefly outline and then discuss in detail. (1) Satire, the traditional operative 
mode of ‘political comedy’, exposes figures of power, institutions, and ideologies 
to ridicule, revealing the inconsistencies and absurdities behind the public 
presentation. (2) This ‘logic of satire’ is already characteristic of the postmodern 
condition. As Willett (2008, p. 63) writes, our ‘age of satire’ is ‘riddled by the 
ironies of postmodern scepticism.’ (3) Ironic or sceptical distance is therefore 
incorporated into the ideology itself, effectively rendering the satirical distance 
impotent. In the most brutal terms, effectively everything is rendered open for 
parodic performance, and this invitation to laugh at and hence dissipate a 
cathectic investment in the obscene dimension of a figure of power, exploitative 
relationship, or ideology, is part of the game. To be precise, this is a problematic 
unique to Western democracies, based around what Lefort calls the empty place 
of power; more specifically my examples in this thesis narrow the problematic 
further to the United Kingdom and the United States, and the predominant 
ideology of neo-liberalism. All the same we might look to Italy for an illustration 
of Willett’s ‘age of satire,’ with one of our most well-known political clowns, 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, known for his repeated gaffes and brazen 
behaviour. Žižek writes: ‘The wager behind Berlusconi’s vulgarities is that the 
people will identify with him as embodying the mythic image of the average 
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Italian: I am one of you, a little bit corrupt, in trouble with the law, in trouble 
with my wife because I’m attracted to other women’ (Žižek 2009, http://
www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n14/slavoj-zizek/berlusconi-in-tehran). 
What happens when the ironic distance the people are to take towards authority  
is incorporated into the public face of authority? The first thing to remember is 
that despite identifying with the emptiness of the place of power, Berlusconi’s 
authority is by no means less authoritative. Quite the contrary: controlling the 
majority of television in Italy, Berlusconi not only lays open the obscene 
dimension of his place of power, he controls its very discourse. Behind this 
‘clownish facade,’ of which a constant stream of jokes is a not-insignificant part, 
‘there is a state power that functions with ruthless efficiency’ (ibid.). To Žižek, 
Berlusconi represents the new, comic face of authoritarian capitalism. The 
jokes, vulgarities, and swagger are part of that efficiency; Berlusconi has made 
himself into that most despised figure for the comedian, the ‘easy target.’
The problem with satire in the era of the postmodern is therefore a problem of 
ideology, and in particular the specific way in which ideology functions within 
the postmodern. To paraphrase Žižek, ideology today often appears as its 
opposite. From the world of Great British comedy we can take Thompson’s 
(2004) scolding of the Alternative comedians of the 1980s for their refusal to 
deviate from ‘anti-Thatcher ideology.’ This, of course, was true—at least initially, 
what defined the new Alternative comedians was an ethical commitment to 
Marxism. But was the television comedy that followed this period, the 
depoliticised silliness of Vic and Bob or the documentary verisimilitude of The 
Office less ‘ideological?’ Our answer must be no.
All the same, it is my conclusion that the possibility of a ‘political comedy’ must 
begin with comedy as what the Frankfurt School would call Ideologiekritik. This 
chapter develops a theoretical model of comedy as a particular form of 
Ideologiekritik that responds to the ideology of global capital and the condition 
of the postmodern. I first engage in a detailed analysis of ideology as a crucial 
category for political thought, drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek and the 
hegemony in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. This leads me to a  
directed critique of what I define as ‘Carnivalesque laughter,’ referring to 
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Russian formalist Mikhail Bakhtin. I then elaborate the methodology that 
carries through the rest of this thesis. As stand-up, paradigmatically, is a verbal 
form, it follows that my first point of interrogation should be comedy 
performance as a series of ‘enunciations,’ which we might then consider in 
terms of their relation to what in the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan is 
known as the Symbolic Order. Comedy as critique of ideology in the face of the 
postmodern condition must, in Lacanian terms, approach the conditions of the 
psychoanalytic ‘act’, which radically breaks from or restructures the Symbolic 
Order. This Lacanian framework should be read as a fidelity to the importance 
of Freud’s analysis of jokes, and their relation to the unconscious. The basis of 
clinical psychoanalysis is the intervention of the analyst through the Symbolic 
(language, signs), hence, talking cure, therefore, it is perhaps the wager of this 
thesis that comedy might enact a sort of ‘joking cure’ on a large scale, 
intervening through the Symbolic in order to touch some dimension of the Real. 
The final section of this chapter uses Deleuze’s concepts of difference, 
repetition, and non-sense to explain the ‘real’ of ambiguity found in the joke at a 
linguistic level. 
  2.1 - Enjoy! your comedy: on ideology, cynical reason, 
and the ‘obscene double’
In order to precisely define performance comedy’s capacity as form that is 
critical of ideology, or even breaks with it, we must first define ‘ideology’ and its 
operation in the postmodern era. For Žižek, whose synthesis of psychoanalysis, 
philosophy, and political theory (in essence, a socio-pathological mode of 
reading) I draw upon throughout this thesis, ideology in the postmodern era can 
be summarised by Lacan’s formula of the fetishist’s disavowal. In French: Je 
sais bien, mais quand même. In English, the phrase translates roughly to ‘I 
know very well, and yet, all the same…’ The fetishist knows there is nothing 
inherently special about her desired object (shoe, hair, and so on), but all the 
same, she does not change her behaviour. ‘Disavowing’ the belief allows the 
subject to maintain her pathological behaviour without accepting the full 
inconsistency of her pathology. Žižek writes (1989[2009], p. 25, italics added): 
‘[…] Does this concept of ideology as a naive consciousness still apply to today’s 
world?’ The word naive is important here: against the classical Marxian 
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definition of ideology as false consciousness, Žižek argues that ideology today 
functions in full transparency, but embodies itself in ‘disavowed’ acts. He gives 
the example of ‘commodity fetishism.’ In the classic analysis, money is simply 
an embodiment of social relations, yet, for individuals using money the social 
relation ‘appears as an immediate, natural property of a thing called “money,” 
as if money is already in itself, in its immediate material reality, the 
embodiment of wealth’ (Žižek 1989[2009], p. 28). On the other hand, today:
When individuals use money, they know very well that there is nothing 
magical about it—that money, in its materiality, is simply an expression 
of social relations… The problem is that in their social activity itself, in 
what they are doing, they are acting as if money, in its material reality, is 
the immediate embodiment of wealth as such. They are fetishists in 
practice, not in theory. (ibid., original emphasis).
This, as it were, ‘postmodern’ version of ideology might be termed ‘cynicism,’ 
which already draws a connection to the aforementioned ‘logic of satire.’ What 
is suggested by the application of a psychoanalytic framework is clear: there is 
something perverse in the postmodern functioning of ideology, and like the 
clinical patient disavowing their passionate attachment to the fetish item (shoe, 
hair, doll), the ideal subject of neo-liberalism may disavow a passionate 
attachment to ‘Capitalism,’ while all the same in practice rejecting out of hand, 
any movements or actions that interrupt or critique the ‘Master Signifier’4 of the 
‘Market.’ To go further, this fetishistic attitude to ideology means that cynical 
distance is already part of the ideological text. If that distance is already 
incorporated into the ideological framework, then to simply stand outside 
ideology (if that were possible) and subject the ideological text to critique, is no 
longer sufficient. Or, as Žižek argues: ‘We can no longer subject the ideological 
text to “symptomatic reading,” confronting it with its blank spots, with what it 
must repress to organise itself… cynical reason takes this distance into account 
in advance’ (Žižek 1989[2008], pp. 26-27). 
What relation does this have to performance comedy? Simply, that to subject 
the ideological text to ridicule does not liberate either the joker nor receiver of 
Chow, D.V.B.
40
4 A Master Signifer is an ideological signifier that ‘quilts’ the hegemonic field. It is ‘that signifier 
which gives those others their meaning to which they must ultimately be understood to be 
referring’ (Butler 2005, p. 32). 
that joke from ideology, for ideology is already ‘laughing with.’ In other words, 
like Berlusconi’s or Bush’s gaffes, laughter and a sense of humour can be an 
intrinsic element of the neo-liberal state. Alenka Zupančič argues: ‘If the 
imperative of happiness, positive thinking, and cheerfulness is one of the key 
means of expanding and solidifying […] ideological hegemony, one cannot avoid 
the question of whether promoting comedy is not part of the same 
process’ (Zupančič 2008, p. 7). The problem inherent with the logic of satire, 
then, is one of subject position. The fool is traditionally positioned ‘outside’ 
society, and thus able to comment on it, with greater impunity than a citizen. In 
other words, the fool is outside ideology and his/her position of abjection 
affords him/her a voice to ridicule or critique that ideology. On the other hand, 
today all individuals are, as it were, ‘outside’ ideology while simultaneously 
being contained within it. 
Parody, satire, and forms of comedy involving a cynical or ironic distance can 
therefore be drawn together into a category that I will call, following Žižek 
(1994), comedy as ‘obscene double.’ The ‘obscene double’ can be illustrated by 
the fabled status of Aristotle’s famously lost second book of Poetics. This 
mysterious text is at the heart of Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1980). Andrew 
Stott summarises:
The book is at the heart of a monastic conspiracy to keep humour out of 
religion by suppressing the Aristotelian authority that lends comedy 
intellectual legitimacy […] Eco’s conspirators fear that if comedy were to 
be rehabilitated within respectable academic contexts, the conceptual 
order of things would be radically altered, and with it the social fabric 
that draws on its hierarchies […] (Stott 2005, p. 17). 
In this narrative, comedy is the ‘dirty secret’ that must be repressed, for the 
potency of its oppositional force. The monk’s investment of faith in the radically 
disruptive potential of comedy reminds the reader of a (naive) belief in the 
transformative power of Carnival misrule, yet, as we will return to in the 
following section we must question whether such disruptions, obscenities, 




What is really disturbing about The Name of the Rose […] is the 
underlying belief in the liberating, anti-totalitarian force of laughter, of 
ironic distance. Our thesis here is almost the exact opposite of this 
underlying premiss of Eco’s novel: in contemporary societies, democratic 
or totalitarian, that cynical distance, laughter, are, so to speak, part of the 
game. The ruling ideology is not meant to be taken seriously. (Žižek 1989
[2008], p. 24). 
In other words, to explore the possibilities for a political comedy, we must first 
accept that comedy and comedy performance can be part of an ideological 
process, while at the same time, appearing oppositional to it. 
An unusual, real life example illustrates the extreme degree to which laughter 
and joking are in advance incorporated as a part of the social structure. On 10 
September 2002, Rena Salmon, a 43-year-old woman from Berkshire, England, 
shot dead her husband’s lover Lorna Stewart, at Stewart’s hairdressing salon in 
west London. At her trial, Salmon’s husband Paul, read the jury a text message 
received from Salmon, which read ‘I have just shot Lorna. This is not a joke.’ 
How are we to read Salmon’s bizarre addendum, ‘this is not a joke?’ On one 
hand this is a commonplace, an expression that stresses the seriousness of the 
previous statement (‘I have just shot Lorna’). On the other hand, to paraphrase 
Zoe Williams’ 2003 article for the Guardian on irony, we are now much more 
alert to irony than sincerity, that is, we perceive it more readily. Why should 
Salmon have felt the need to qualify her statement; why should anyone have 
thought Salmon was joking at all? The use of the phrase ‘this is not a joke’ 
suggests the degree to which nearly all communication today is, in a way, 
infused with a sense of joking. If even the gravest, most serious 
pronouncements must be suffixed then comedy in performance has no critical 
purchase. John Morreall writes: 
The person with a sense of humour can never be fully dominated, even by  
a government which imprisons him, for his ability to laugh at what is 
incongruous in a political situation will put him above it to some extent 
and will preserve a measure of freedom—if not of movement, at least of 
thought. (Morreall 1983, p. 101). 
A pessimistic rejoinder to Morreall might be the question: ‘what if that freedom 
is ideologically grounded,’  which is to say, the possibilities of ‘humorous 
freedom,’ amount to Sartre calls ‘bad faith,’ passive acquiescence to social 
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conventions and roles. Imagine for instance a typical joke from the popular 
primetime Hanna Barbara cartoon The Flintstones, in which a prehistoric 
animal is being used for a demeaning chore or manual labour task: the animal 
looks directly into the ‘camera,’ and in a heavy, working-class, Northeastern 
American accent says, ‘It’s a living,’ eliciting gales of canned-laughter. Of course, 
it isn’t a living, it’s really backbreaking and demeaning, yet the animal’s quip is 
correlative to the modern ideology of work and employment. Laughing at one’s 
boss (who appears, more often than not, deliberately, as a figure of fun) is 
necessary to the smooth functioning of the working relationship and allows 
certain exploitations to be borne with a smile and a ‘sense of humour.’ The 
parallels between this model and the medieval traditions of Carnival and 
‘misrule’ are unavoidable, and I will discuss these in the following section. To 
return to Žižek, if ideology is not meant to be taken seriously, or to put it 
another way, ‘ideology doesn’t take itself seriously,’ then ideology might be said 
to delimit the contours of possibility within humour. 
How has the ideology of late capitalism delimited the contours of comedy today? 
Precisely by ensuring that we do not take capitalism as an abstract system too 
seriously yet at the same time precluding any imaginings of possible alternatives 
to it. See, for example, the comic fictions that fall under the rubric of ‘chick-lit,’ 
or their big and small screen equivalent, Sex and the City, in which 
consumption itself becomes an ‘ironic’ activity, with Carrie et al’s fetishistic lust 
for ‘Manolos’ eliciting laughter while also appearing deeply aspirational. Or, as a  
more left-field example, we might look at Carl Banks’ reinvention of Dickens’ 
Ebenezer Scrooge as ‘Scrooge McDuck, the loveable Glaswegian 
anthropomorphised waterfowl hero of Disney’s animated television series Duck 
Tales. In a frequent comic motif, with a grace of an Olympic champion, Scrooge 
is shown diving from a high-dive board into his ‘money-pit.’ Contrary to the 
laws of physics, he does not break his bones on the hoard of gold coins, rather, 
they part, like water. We watch as this avatar of the subject of capitalist ideology  
‘splashes’ around in his material fortune. On one level, laughter occurs here 
through incongruity; we laugh out of surprise as the material does not behave as 
it should. On another level, there is a sort of corrective laughter after Bergson’s 
well-known analysis. Scrooge is a ‘miser,’ and thus anathema to the ‘flowing’ of 
capital. We laugh at the ridiculousness of his money-pit and his pathological 
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revisiting of it, episode after episode. But these two levels of laughter prove to be 
two sides of the same coin, so to speak.. While laughing at Scrooge the miser, we 
delight in the excessive imagery of treasure spilling over; both of these levels 
affirm the function of capitalism through the principle of circulation. As we 
laugh and take pleasure in the spectacle of coins, bank-notes and other 
treasures belying their solid state and literally ‘flowing,’ like water, we affirm, 
ideologically, the smooth flow of capital.
While the above discussion of ideology as a category for political thought may 
strike the reader as utterly pessimistic or totalising—if there is no position from 
which one is outside ideology, then how can one go about critiquing it?—we 
must bear in mind that ideology, in the terms I have used here, is theoretically 
related to Lacan’s concept of the Symbolic, in triadic relation to the Real and 
Imaginary. Lacan’s symbolic order is defined in terms of linguistic 
structuralism, the order, upon entering, by which human subjects become 
parlêtres, in other words, ‘beings-of-language.’ But this structure is always-
already incomplete: ‘[Lacan] introduces a conceptualisation of the symbolic 
which is not that of a closed circuit but that of an always lacking and incomplete 
ensemble. […] Lacan’s structure is antinomical and lacking’ (Stavrakakis 2002, 
p. 523). Comic efficacy can therefore be defined as the comic act that breaks 
with the symbolic order. Rather than, as above, confronting the ideological text 
with its excluded obscenities or parodic form, the comedian might somehow 
break with it entirely, restructuring the symbolic fabric in its wake. Existing 
strategies for this precise form of Ideologiekritik are examined in the third 
section of this chapter. Before coming to these suggestions for a political 
comedy I will first examine some existing arguments for comedic-political 
efficacy, specifically in what I term the logic of the Carnivalesque. 
  2.2 - Critique of Satirical Reason: Carnivalesque 
Practices
Having explored the relationship of comedy to ideology, noting its problematic 
status in the era of the postmodern and under the ideological conditions of 
neoliberalism, we are now in a position to explore some concrete practices of 
comedy performance as sociopolitical praxis. These might include satirical 
stand-up and sketch, ‘transgressive comedy’ (that is, comedy that pushes the 
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boundaries of taste and propriety, and, the focus of this present section, 
Carnivalesque practices of activism (which have today been formalised as 
‘tactical frivolity’). The philosopher Simon Critchley celebrates tactical frivolity 
as a means of deploying humour as resistance against the oppression of the 
state, noting groups or practices such as Pink Bloc, Billionaires for Bush, and 
Rebel Clown Army. While by no means dismissing the positive aspects of 
Carnivalesque activist practices, I question Critchley’s uncritical celebration of 
resistance through enjoyment. By identifying precisely the relationship of the 
multitudinous practices of carnival to ideology, the state, and power, we might 
better understand the possibilities of comedy in performance as subversive 
praxis. Later, I will move on to satirical practices and comedies of transgression. 
I must first note that in all its appearances, from Bakhtin onwards, ‘The 
Carnivalesque’ makes, in my analysis, two quite sensible and important claims 
as a resistant and eventually revolutionary practice. Firstly, the possibility of 
misrule claims that the the symbolic order or law is not all-encompassing, and 
can be suspended or even broken. Secondly, carnival, as the writer Barbara 
Ehrenreich has charted in her ‘history of collective joy,’ is communal 
celebration, and operates through the formation of a community of equals 
(Ehrenreich 2008). These two claims encompass both content and relation to 
audience, both of which will become important grounds for my experimental 
practice, meaning a more critical interrogation of both claims is needed. The 
first of these claims, comedy/Carnival’s suspension or breaking of the symbolic 
order/law will be discussed in this chapter, leaving the question of audience/
community for later chapters; it is enough for now to note that an uncritical 
celebration of ‘community’ is as troubling as the valorisation of transgressions I 
will explore here. 
To return to the idea of ‘misrule,’ or suspension of the symbolic order/law, the 
question is of course, in what way is the law suspended? and for what reason? In 
my view, conventionally, practices of the Carnivalesque, satire, parody, and 
comedies of transgression, fall into the formal category identified above as the 
‘obscene double.’ These practices often place the joking subject in a position at a 
distance from the dominant ideology or institution of power. But equally, this 
position might be read as a ‘fold’ of power, in the Deleuzian sense—that while 
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appearing exterior to official culture, it is really a necessary part of it. This leads 
us to question whether or not comedy performances might not act as a 
consolation or palliative, or even worse, a justification, for exploitation or 
injustice. In what way, therefore, might a Carnival protest act that begins by 
opposing a form of dominance, ultimately reproduce that same form? Willett 
notes that ‘the practices of comedy provide terribly effective tools, strategies, 
and tactics for reinforcing social patters of domination and exclusion. 
Oppressive communities, for example, may generate internal unity by using 
ridicule to target social outcasts’ (Willett 2008, p. 116). But this suggests that 
this is always a conscious process. My interest here is in the unconscious 
process; that when one feels they are doing something subversive they are really  
doing the opposite. Sam Leith writes, with regard to the G20 protests in London 
on 1 April 2009: ‘Misrule festivals are not revolutionary, that’s the thing. 
Misrule festivals are what you have instead of a revolution. They invert the 
established order for a day, and thereby actually reinforce it’ (Leith 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/02/g20-protest), which 
quite succinctly captures the problem in a formal sense—Carnival acts as safety 
valve, a sanctioned event to release political frustrations. It may seem churlish 
or puritanical to argue against such a celebratory practice, for, if anything, at 
least Carnival allows subjects of even the most oppressive regimes to tolerate 
their conditions. But Carnival laughter as release acts as a palliative for the 
smooth functioning of ‘official culture.’ This should be our first lesson; 
suspension or inversion of the established order/law cannot be confused with a 
break or rupture in the established order/law.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the Carnivalesque (1941) develops from his 
analysis of the 16th century French early novelist François Rabelais. Rabelais, 
Bakhtin diagnoses, develops a dialectical picture of medieval society, organised 
into ‘official culture’ on one hand, and ‘the culture of the marketplace’ on the 
other. Bakhtin, importantly, also uses the term ‘folk humour’ interchangeably 
with ‘culture of the marketplace.’ Folk humour is comprised of ‘1. Ritual 
spectacles: carnival pageants, comic shows of the marketplace.; 2. Comic verbal 
compositions: parodies both oral and written, in Latin and in the vernacular.; 3. 
Various genres of billingsgate: curses, oaths, popular blazons’ (Bakhtin 1941
[1965], p. 5). It is tempting to find in Bakhtin’s writing a justification for the 
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emancipatory potential of transgression in comedy performance. Stott (2005, p. 
34) writes: ‘the inversions and suspensions permitted and legitimised by 
carnival represent substantive challenges to authority, therefore offering the 
possibility that comedy, invested with the spirit of festive and carnival 
traditions, may also be an expression of popular discontent.’ But in no way is an 
expression of discontent equivalent to change or action. Stephen Greenblatt 
suggests that the formalised nature of such an expression in Carnival serves to 
keep this discontent in check: ‘[…] the form itself, as a primary expression of 
Renaissance power, helps to contain the radical doubts it continually 
evokes’ (Greenblatt 1985, p. 45, quoted in Stott 2005, p. 35). ‘Inversion and 
misrule, then, exist within a matrix of “licensed transgression”’ (ibid.). In other 
words, the disruptive potential of Carnival is necessary to the smooth 
functioning of official culture. The expression of the obscene (disavowed) 
double of official culture is the very thing that sustains its ideological fantasy. 
What is the relation of this critique of Carnival to comedy in performance? We 
might see Greenblatt’s critique of Bakhtin as an enlarged version of Freud’s 
economic theory of joking. In laughter, he writes, ‘[…] a sum of psychical energy  
which has hitherto been used for cathexis [an investment of mental energy in an 
object or person] is allowed free discharge’ (Freud 1960[2001], p. 148). This is 
commonly known as ‘relief theory’ (Morreall 1983) and suggests that laughter is 
a form of waste or excess. Extrapolating from the private unconscious to the 
social or community unconscious, the dispersal of cathexis in Carnival laughter 
relieves subjects of a particular regime of their (potentially) ‘revolutionary’ 
investment in overturning the conditions of their exploitation. Freud continues: 
‘since laughter […] is an indication of pleasure, we shall be inclined to relate this 
pleasure to the lifting of the cathexis which has previously been present’ (ibid.). 
We might therefore conclude: sanctioning a subversive message in the affective 
pleasure of Carnival laughter negates the message altogether. Recall Adorno’s 
discussion of an imagined ‘extremely light comedy of pranks’: in this 
hypothetical television comedy, a young schoolteacher attempts to subvert her 
exploitation by a cruel principal through a series of comic scenes in which she 
hustles food. Regardless, her exploitation continues, and she is starving. Adorno 
suggests the form of light comedy enables the ideological indoctrination:
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[…] the script implies: ‘If you are as humorous, good-natured, quick-
witted, and charming as she is, do not worry about being paid a 
starvation wage. You can cope with your frustration in a humorous way; 
and your superior wit and cleverness put you not only above material 
privations, but also above the rest of mankind.’ In other words, the script 
is a shrewd method of promoting adjustment to humiliating conditions 
by presenting them as objectively comic and by giving a picture of a 
person who experiences even her own inadequate position as an object of 
fun apparently free of any resentment. (Adorno 1972[2007], p. 167, 
emphasis added). 
It attests to Adorno’s perspicuity as a cultural critic that this example, while a 
fictional academic exercise, seems entirely plausible. This example seems even 
more apt at the present time with the popularity of television comedies of 
humiliation, such as The Office, Arrested Development, and The Life and Times 
of Tim, which wring humour from excruciating situations. The latter, written by 
Steve Dildarian, is set in New York City and centres around Tim, an everyman 
worker for ‘Omnicorp,’ a name that telegraphs its satirical nature clearly. Tim 
endures constant, brutal humiliations at the hands of his employer (‘The Boss’) 
and Omnicorp—for example, taking the blame for his employer’s dog soiling a 
lift and biting ‘Helen’—but in each instance his deadpan humour can be read as 
‘promoting adjustment’ to his conditions. But all this does not mean Dildarian 
and other comedy writers are secret ideologues, rather, it is a problem of form 
and structure. An audience might empathise with the plight of Adorno’s heroine 
(or Tim), but our conclusion is that simultaneously there is an unconscious 
acceptance of the ideology that forms the backdrop of the work. In other words, 
ideological critique does not necessarily take place in the content of the artefact, 
practice, or enunciation, but should be identified on a deeper level. 
The problem is further complicated by the functioning of ideology in the era of 
the postmodern, discussed above. Firstly, any proper discussion of Carnival, or 
the culture of the marketplace, must consider that any transposition of 
Carnivalesque ideals to the present-day is far from symmetrical. Rabelais, c. 
1494-1553, writes during a period of ecclesiastical official culture in dialectic 
relation with the culture of the marketplace, from which Carnival springs. If  
today’s present official culture is the free-market ideology of global capitalism, 
then official culture is to a degree, already ‘Carnivalesque.’ Sloterdijk proposes 
the idea of kynicism to describe the Carnivalesque opposition to the state. In a 
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satirical, mocking fashion, kynicism presents the obscene underside of the law. 
But today, this obscene underside of the law is already there for all to see. Žižek 
writes that this kynicism is answered by cynicism: ‘a kind of perverted “negation 
of the negation” of the official ideology: confronted with illegal enrichment, with 
robbery, the cynical reaction consists in saying that legal enrichment is a lot 
more effective, and moreover, protected by the law’ (Žižek 1989, p. 26). Perhaps 
the clearest example of the sanctioned subversion I am describing is the 
conciliatory spectacle of protests that dutifully accompany any gathering of 
world leaders, such as the G20 protests described above. Apart from the media 
furore rightly surrounding the death of Ian Tomlinson at the hands of police 
officers, perhaps the most sinister practice was the police strategy of ‘kettling,’ 
the concept of sanctioned subversion made material and visible. ‘Kettling’ 
describes a police action in which protesters are confined to a specific area by 
both police and physical barriers. Inside, the law is ‘suspended,’ but only within 
a defined physical space. Despite the brutality of their situation, an atmosphere 
of celebration and ‘frivolity’ accompanied the protests. It might be argued 
therefore, the affective, pleasurable, and communal dimension of this Carnival 
laughter convinces performers they are taking part in something very 
subversive, when instead they are rendering visible the law’s internal logic. As a 
thought experiment, one is tempted to imagine the (comic) absurdity of the 
opposite situation—a protest where no one at all turns up, so that the cavalcade 
of riot police are faced with empty streets. This would expose the clear 
asymmetry of power relations. In a situation similar to the premise of José 
Saramago’s novel Seeing (in which, unorganised, 83% of voters in an unnamed 
country turn in a blank ballot at an election, throwing the system into chaos), 
this non-protest would reach towards the status of the Lacanian ‘act,’ the event 
that radically ‘breaks with’ (rather than ‘suspends’) the symbolic order/law. In 
contrast, Carnivalesque practices are ‘a specific form of transgression of the 
law,’ that hold together a community far more than the law itself (Žižek 2006 
[2], p. 64). In the case of April 2009’s G20 protests, we can see that the 
established order was reinforced, along with its inherent sense or value: ‘they 
just want to create chaos!’ Or, as Sam Leith puts it, wonderfully: 
The G20 protester who hesitated to condemn violent or invasive action 
against property—on the grounds that she would like to hear some 
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"rainforest polyphonic singing" in the vaults of the Bank of England […] 
will have made it all too easy to connect concern with climate change and 
developing-world poverty, disapproval of unregulated capitalism, human 
rights protests, political problems including but not limited to the 
situations in Gaza and Iraq, and a host of other issues, and roll them up 
into a great big ball marked stupid hippies. (Leith 2009, ibid.). 
   ‘Tactical frivolity’
We have now established the problematic kinship between Carnival practice as 
Ideologiekritik and the ideology itself, in that the ‘parodies both oral and 
written’ (Bakhtin 1941[1965], ibid.) that Bakhtin attributes to folk humour are 
themselves the necessary obverse of official culture and deeply implicated in its 
efficient functioning. We have also considered the psychoanalytic implications 
of the negation of demand in Carnival, from the perspective of both individual 
subject and collective. What of the practices themselves? 
The term ‘tactical frivolity’ is used by Critchley (2008, p. 123-124) to designate 
‘a new language of civil disobedience that combines street-theatre, festival, 
performance art and what might be described as forms of non-violent warfare,’ 
though the term most likely emerged in the discourses of the activists/artists 
themselves. The predominant mood of these modern practices is celebratory, 
grotesque, silly; in a word, Carnivalesque. Eschewing the more ‘old-fashioned’ 
solidarity of chants and worker’s marches (no Emma Goldmans here!), the 
manifold practices of tactical frivolity seem to me unique for their refusal to 
voice any concrete demands, aiming instead at disrupting the functioning of the 
state. There is some undeniable merit to these practices. Before the first ‘Battle 
for Seattle’ in 1999, a gathering of activists under the world-wide banner of 
People’s Global Action (organised via the internet), descended on London in a 
‘carnival against capitalism.’ According to Wat Tyler, despite intense media 
scrutiny, the event ‘took everybody by surprise. 10,000 revellers wearing 
carnival masks split into dozens of autonomous groups and invaded the heart of 
London’s financial district, disrupting trading while dancing to the wild sound 
of samba music, and causing over a million pounds worth of damage’ (Tyler 
2001, http://artactivism.gn.apc.org/allpdfs/188-Dancing%20at%20the
%20Edge.pdf, emphasis added). Tactical frivolity, in this case, is a way of 
‘softening the blow,’ appearing less threatening while causing the same 
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disruption to a system of exploitation as older, angrier anarchist practices. As 
Critchley writes: ‘Politically, humour is a powerless power that uses its position 
of weakness to expose those in power through forms of self-aware 
ridicule’ (Critchley 2008, p. 124). It is not my desire to criticise this aspect of 
Carnivalesque protest, but rather to interrogate the role of humour and comedy 
in these practices and their relationship to the ideologies in which they are 
embedded in perhaps a deeper way than Critchley does. It seems to me that 
moments of true disruption (blocking roads in order to stop a meeting) in these 
practices are separable from their humorous trappings, and it is imperative to 
consider this before uncritically valorising humour’s non-existent qualities of 
subversion. 
While giving tactical frivolity a philosophical legitimacy, Critchley’s view on 
humour is entirely too optimistic and for the most part, vague. He writes (ibid.): 
‘contemporary anarchist practice exercises a satirical pressure on the state in 
order to show that other forms of life are possible.’ From a Freudian 
perspective, or to follow Bataille, this is unacceptable; the ‘forms of life’ 
represented here are defined by their inability to be sustained; moments of 
Carnival relieve excessive waste energy. Similarly: ‘it is the exposed, self-
ridiculing and self-undermining character of these forms of protest that I find 
most compelling as opposed to the pious humourlessness of most forms of 
vanguardist active nihilism and some forms of contemporary protest (I name no 
names)’ (ibid.). I for one would like Critchley to ‘name some names’—as it 
stands his denunciation of others’ pious humourlessness would include 
Medecins sans frontières. And other than the obvious spectacle, what is 
precisely so compelling about humorous protest? The great problem, as I see it, 
is celebrating humour, joy, or ‘dancing’ in these practices as ‘goods’ in and of 
themselves. In doing so, the eschewing of (ideological) demands for silliness can 
find itself very much replicating the conditions of the ideology in which it is 
embedded. In the eleven years which have passed since the WTO Summit in 
Seattle, protest of this sort has become formalised and depleted of its original 
anarchic values (see my earlier example of the G20 protests above). Celebration,  
humour, and Carnival, then, as values in themselves, are, as I have 
demonstrated above, deeply inculcated in the ideology of neo-liberalism. There 
can be an Orwellian cast to some of the literature of tactical frivolity; one 
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particular activist writes: ‘Essentially, if you're not happy, you're doing the 
wrong thing!!!! [sic]’ (http://www.rhythmsofresistance.co.uk/?lid=116), which 
is a terrifying and succinct summary of Žižek’s elaboration of the modern 
superego injunction to Enjoy!5. There is no room, in contemporary politics of 
resistance, for anger or frustration. This sort of ideological inculcation, 
reabsorption into dominant discourses, is not confined to protest, of course.  
While the opening of The Comedy Store in 1979 for a time provided an antidote 
to the racist, sexist and homophobic ‘mainstream’ comedy, in a sort of double-
negation, it soon became absorbed into the very thing it sought to critique. Stott 
writes (2005, p. 126), ‘Parody and satire are good for demolishing dogma but 
not for constructively offering alternatives to it. Alternative comedy found itself 
censoring guilty form to the extent that it struggled to find material and had to 
replace blacks and women with red-haired people and Margaret Thatcher.’ The 
affective pleasure of laughter was a gathering point for a communal experience, 
but the solidarity of community soon became a form of dominance.  It is not 
merely a distrust of profits or success at stake, the point is that the subversive 
message itself was diluted. While retaining characteristics of Alternative comedy  
such as the monologue form (as opposed to the repeatable one-liners of club 
comics), the current crop of (oxymoronic) mainstream ‘Alternative’ comedians 
rarely retain their forebears’ social concerns. Whereas Thompson berates 
Alternative comedy for being too ideological, my problem with what follows is 
that it is perhaps not ideological enough, or rather, it does not engage in a 
critique of ideology in any meaningful way.
  
 2.3 - The Big Other is hilarious: a Lacanian approach to 
comedy studies
Accepting that performance comedy’s sociopolitical efficacy in the era of late-
capitalism is determined by its capacity as a form of Ideologiekritik, and having 
previously in this chapter established the functioning of ideology today as 
somewhat ‘comic’ in itself, I now intend to pursue this line of thinking more 
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5 ‘[…] enjoyment itself, which we experience as “transgression,” is in its innermost status 
something imposed, ordered—when we enjoy, we never do it “spontaneously,” we always follow 
a certain injunction’ (Žižek 1991[2008], p. 9). 
deeply, and to examine performance comedy qua critique of ideology according 
to the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. This turn to Lacan is necessary 
for two reasons. Firstly, while Freud’s ‘economic’ model of humour as a release/
relieving of cathectic energy is almost dogmatically accepted as forming a 
theoretical pillar of comedy studies (‘Relief Theory’), it takes on a cast of benign 
resignation when applied to my particular project, which questions whether 
humour might not merely have a structural/economic social function, but a 
more radical, disruptive function. In the same way that Lacan saw American 
ego-psychology as a corruption of Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, and his 
own theories as a return to Freud, I feel it is important to step away from the 
present concerns of comedy studies (offense; identity politics) to return to jokes 
and their relation to the (political) unconscious. Therefore Lacanian theory 
forms the methodological/theoretical backdrop of this thesis and should be read 
as a return to Freud in comedy studies. 
Secondly, following Žižek (1989), I will argue that Lacanian theory is well suited 
to explaining the subject’s ‘disavowal’ of dominant and exploitative ideologies, 
one of the crucial ways in which ideology is able to today function with ruthless, 
utilitarian efficiency. Thus, by exploring the theoretical propositions of (comic) 
disavowal, we might also identify those ways in which a comic practice might do 
precisely the opposite, and serve to enable the audience-subject to ‘Traverse the 
Fantasy,’ that is, to identify with the little kernel of the Real (their Symptom), 
and in doing so, lose the fantasy which sustains their repetition of institutional 
rituals and also their Symbolic identity (Boucher & Sharpe 2010, p. 12). In this 
loss of stable Symbolic/institutional identity the subject is then able, in theory, 
to learn to live again, imagining new possibilities, new ways of being. While this 
is my hypothesis, subsequently developed through praxical investigation 
supported by a number of case studies, the uninitiated reader may find these 
terms (fantasy, symbolic order, Real) unfamiliar. My aim in this sections is 
threefold: (1) to define and explore the concepts of Lacanian theory most 
relevant to my project, particularly those concerning the structure of ideological 
disavowal; (2) to investigate the relation between Lacan’s concept of the 
unconscious and ideology, particularly the postmodern, cynical, or ‘disavowed’ 
function of ideology; and (3) to explore two ways in which comic practices, I 
argue, can intervene in the political unconscious, in a similar way as 
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psychoanalysis, as a ‘talking cure’ can intervene into the unconscious of the 
analysand.
 R, S and I. 
Following Žižek’s application of Lacanian psychoanalysis onto political 
philosophy, I submit that not only is Lacanian theory useful in explaining 
political ideology in the era of late capitalism, particularly with regard to the 
psycho-social phenomenon of ‘disavowal’ I have previously detailed in the 
beginning of this chapter, it is also useful in mapping and identifying certain 
forms of comic practice that function as Ideologiekritik, beyond the ‘inherent 
transgressions’ of satire. While, previously (2.1) I have focused on Žižek’s 
application of Lacan’s formula of the fetishist’s disavowal (‘I know very well, and 
yet all the same…’) to ideology, the term, for Lacan is clinical, relating to the 
structure of perversion: the pervert simultaneously knows and denies his/her 
own fetish. The clinical origin of Lacan’s concept necessitates an elaboration of 
Lacanian subjectivity before we can fully extrapolate from subjectivity to 
‘political subjects,’ and from fetishistic disavowal to ideological disavowal. I 
focus my discussion here on the R, S, and I, or the formal matrix by which Lacan 
develops his three ‘orders,’ the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary, as these 
will be recurring concepts in my analysis of comic practices. 
The orders R, S and I are held in what Lacan describes as a ‘Borromean Knot,’ a 
figure comprised of three interlocking rings. Although each order or ring is 
independent of the others, the structure (of the psyche) falls apart if any one 
ring is broken or removed entirely — for example, psychosis is the failure of the 
Symbolic to properly come to terms with (that is, Symbolise), the traumatic 
Real.To explain the RSI, we may turn to de Saussure’s linguistic structuralism 
(Lacan’s recourse to which often sees him labeled a ‘post-structuralist theorist‘ 
— when in actuality, his is a theory of the clinic). Bailly (2009, p. 91) notes that 
Lacan describes the relationship between the two orders as correlative to that 
between signifier and signified; the Symbolic is the order of the signifier, while 
the Imaginary is the order of the signified. It is imperative to note that ‘signified’ 
in this context does not refer to some ‘Real’ content, but rather to an idea of the 
Real. ‘Cat’ in the order of language (Symbolic) is defined through its differential 
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relations to other words in a sentence or grammar; Cat refers to an Imaginary 
idea of a furry, four-legged, carnivorous animal; but in the order of the Real, 
there is some undefinable, unknowable ‘cat-ness’ that ultimately escapes both 
the idea and the word. The connection with language is imperative; Lacan’s 
famous discovery, as groundbreaking as Freud’s original discovery of the 
unconscious, is that ‘the unconscious is structured like a language,’ by which he 
means it obeys a radical set of rules and grammar, rather than the implication 
that it can be ‘read.’ The entering into language is what, for Lacan, constitutes 
becoming a subject (‘parlêtres,’ in the Lacanian neologism, literally, ‘beings of 
language.’ ). Language is not used purely in the sense of the language which we 
speak, but might be better referred to as discourse: ‘the unconscious is the 
discourse of the other. This discourse of the other is not the discourse of the 
abstract other, of the other in the dyad, of my correspondent, nor even of my 
slave, it is the discourse of the circuit in which I am integrated’ (Lacan 1978
[1988], p. 89). This circuit, in other words, is the Big Other (le grand autre), the 
symbolic order, which, as Bruce Fink writes: ‘serves to cancel out the real, to 
transform it into a social, if not socially acceptable, reality’ (Fink 1995, p. 56, 
emphasis added). What is the real that is canceled out by the Symbolic? Stricto 
sensu, the Real is not ‘real,’ rather, it is the breaks or kinks in the symbolic 
order, the (horrifying) Thing that cannot be symbolised, what we touch in 
‘traumatic’ experiences.  The Real gives support to reality, while simultaneously 
undermining it. For the purposes of this thesis, our primary concern should be 
the relation between reality (the Imaginary and Symbolic appropriation of the 
Real) and Real as ‘impossible encounter.’ It is in the ‘impossible encounter’ with 
the Real that a disavowal (of a fetish, of an ideology), is no longer sustainable by  
the subject. The clinical subject must learn to live again without the background 
support of their fetish, the political subject regains political agency. Let us 
explore this further through Žižek’s contribution to Lacanian theory, an analysis 
of modern political ideology.
The (political) subject identifies herself with an Ego-Ideal, which is her place in 
a network of Symbolic Relations. Say, she, as all political agents are, is a 
complex person with many ‘selves’ in many circumstances, but overall she 
identifies as an ‘American.’ ‘American’ then functions as a ‘Master-Signifier,’ or 
point de capiton (quilting point), which holds together an impossible-to-
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reconcile field of innumerable other signifiers (that is to say, what meaning does 
‘American’ have in-itself bar a collection of insufficient and contradictory 
elements such as ‘apple pie’ or ‘Mom’?). Because the Master-Signifier is 
effectively meaningless, the subject must suppose an Imaginary Other, 
represented as I(O), or a ‘big Other,’ a psychic representation of a vast socio-
symbolic network that functions as the guarantee of the subject’s Ego-Ideal. 
Žižek’s grand theoretical discovery is to note that while the big Other ‘gives the 
subject a social mandate, a definite role to play in worldly affairs’ (Sharpe & 
Boucher 2010, p. 52), it also protects the subject from fully identifying with, or 
getting too close to, the empty, inconsistent Master Signifier (in this case, 
America). The subject does not need to fervently believe in this or that political 
ideology, because there is a big Other, a socio-symbolic network of others, which 
she supposes all believe in her place. Which means that she can go about her 
business, perhaps enjoying some inherent transgressions, all the while 
reproducing, in her actions, the ideological fantasy she does not whole-heartedly  
believe in. 
But there is also a psychic cost. Take, for example, a nationalistic ideology, such 
as Tea Party movement in the United States. Borrowing Lacan’s formula, $ ◇ 
(a), we see that political subjects, or $ (barred subject), are united by a 
relationship of ‘mutual exclusion’, or ◇, to an objet petit a, or (a), a little piece of 
the Real (Sharpe & Boucher 2010, p. 58). In other words, the subject fades away 
the closer it comes to getting what it truly wants. Applied to the Tea Party, these 
subjects define themselves by their relationship to ideological objects, little 
pieces of the impossible Real such as ‘free-market,’ ‘no government 
intervention’ and so on. But of course, if they ever had these things, their very 
identities as Teabaggers would be nullified. Thus, they must posit a fantasy of 
Imaginary Others who are a threat to this (a), in this case, represented by 
signifiers such as ‘socialism,’ ‘Obama-care,’ and so on. In other words, political 
subjects are passionately attached, through their impossible desire, to ‘sublime 
objects of ideology,’ which they suppose are always under threat. In this way the 
social field becomes riven with antagonisms and conflicts, a point that will take 
on a useful importance in my later discussion of audience in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Taking together two Žižekian/Lacanian concepts of disavowal and sublime 
objects of ideology, we see that what psychoanalysis fundamentally tells us is 
that ideology, for example, national identification, is not as simple as habitual 
adherence to a symbolic law, but a libidinal investment, an attachment to a 
fantasy which allows for a safe relationship with the Real. It can also be argued 
that this analysis of ideology is fundamentally pessimistic and leaves no room 
for political action. In the following section I will address this question of 
exteriority, through the Lacanian concept of ‘traversing the fantasy,’ and its 
relation to a comic practice. 
 Ideology and exteriority
In a number of ways, Žižek’s ‘materialist’ analysis of ideology is similar to 
Althusser’s, but where he differs is in the possibility of an exteriority to ideology. 
The Lacanian analysis of ideology, detailed above, tells us that no symbolic 
network is ever perfect, or total. Rather, like a round hole to a square peg it 
refuses to fit, and like a spider’s web, it is rent by fissures, through which the 
Real is made sensible. In this analysis, the subject’s disattachment from an 
ideological fantasy is always possible, just as it is possible for the analysand to 
detach herself from her symptom. From this point I would like to develop a 
theoretical line mapping the analysand/political subject onto the figure of the 
comedian, in order to identify the correlation between my explication of 
Lacanian theory and Comedy. The ‘political agency of comedy’ lies in its ability 
to transform disavowal of ideology into agency, through a ‘nonsensical’ counter 
to the stultifying effects of the illegitimate ‘disjunctive synthesis’ (outlined in the 
following section, 2.4).
Simon Critchley argues that humour acts as a kind of sublimation, drawing on 
Lacan’s use of the term as a redirection or outlet for some traumatic ‘Real.’ In a 
way, Critchley is right: in the postmodern-cynical mode of ideology, it is 
humour which helps sublimate the traumatic inconsistencies of ideology 
(papering over the cracks, as it were) — take, for instance, the now clichéd 
expression ‘laugh it off.’ Boucher and Sharpe argue that ‘few people can happily 
accept the idea that they are dupes or fools [of a set of ideological beliefs],’ but 
comic practices are indeed one way in which people can and do accept this 
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duped, foolish stance. Take, for instance, Sarah Palin, who takes every attempt 
by satirists to characterise her as a stupid, crazed Republican ‘dupe,’ and wears 
them openly, like a badge of honour, the culmination of which was an 
appearance on Saturday Night Live behind Tina Fey, the comedian responsible 
for some of the most vicious Palin satire. Palin’s ‘being able to take a joke’ is 
actually an exercise of power. In this way, a comic practice is actually a 
component of a political subject’s disavowal. 
I want therefore to demonstrate that it is possible for a comic moment to do 
more than sublimate these traumatic inconsistencies. The key is to identify the 
difference between transgression and what Žižek calls traversing the fantasy. 
This is the point at which the comic act can be said to be an authentic 
(Lacanian) ‘act.’  For Lacan, the end of the clinical process of psychoanalysis 
comes when the analysand ends the transferential relationship, that is, when it 
is no longer supposed that the analyst has the ‘key’ to unlock the analysand’s 
neuroses. The analyst takes on full responsibility of his/her identification with 
the objet petit a, the object-cause of his/her desire, and in doing so, becomes, 
more fully, an agent. In Žižek’s political analysis, this traversing of the fantasy 
involves two steps. Firstly, recall that ‘individuals transpose their belief on to the 
big Other [the official discourse] (embodied in the collective), which therefore 
believes in their place’ (Žižek 1991[2008], p. lxx). This means that it is the 
subject’s dis-identification from the official discourse that gives the discourse its 
consistency; someone, somewhere, this unknown ‘other’, is the perfect subject 
who truly believes. Secondly: ‘if individuals were deprived of this belief 
(projected onto the “big Other”), they would have to jump in and directly 
assume the belief themselves’ (ibid.). To assume the belief is to encounter 
ideology directly, in all its inconsistency—and as we have seen above, it is 
precisely where the gaps in the symbolic order are rendered that the traumatic 
Real emerges. At the same time, in this process the political subject regains his/
her capacity for action. 
The Lacanian ‘act’ transposed onto the political field is that which violates the 
symbolic order of language, law, and social relations, but it differs from the 
inherent transgressions of Carnival. It is, ‘a move that, so to speak, defines its 
own conditions; retroactively produces grounds which justify it’ (ibid., p. 192). 
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In other words, it does not ‘break’ the law, but restructures the law entirely. 
Lacan’s celebrated reading of Antigone provides an example (1986[1992]). At 
the heart of Sophocles’ play is a dialectical confrontation between the symbolic 
law of Creon (one might say, Ancient Greek ideology), and Antigone’s moral 
law, which emerges in the cracks of the symbolic law. In Antigone’s refusal, or 
‘No!’ to Creon, she is excluded from the symbolic order, expelled from the 
community, and condemned to a ‘living-death,’ entombed alive in a cave. But 
her ‘no’ reaches the status of an ‘act’ through its effect on Creon—his symbolic 
authority is ablated, and he loses everything. The comic ‘act’ is perhaps less epic 
in scope. A comic ‘act’ is an enunciation by which the comic (like the analysand, 
the political agent) realises his own misperception of the problem, not striking 
at a target outside of himself, but back at himself. In other words, it is the 
passage from traditional satire, to the more nuanced case studies and other 
performative and literary examples of comic practice detailed in this thesis. 
How do we distinguish the precise breaking with the symbolic order embodied 
in the ‘act’ with the many inherent (and comic) transgressions that form the 
basis of the subject’s dis-identification with the dominant ideology. It is clear 
that the majority of (particularly ‘transgressive’) comic performances are 
contained within and indeed sustained by the symbolic order (or big Other, or 
dominant ideology, and so on). Michael V. Tueth writes: 
[transgressive humour] depend[s] upon a basic consensus of standards 
and boundaries, otherwise the joke would not be pleasurable. The 
societal taboos must remain, so that one can experience the delight of 
the entry into forbidden realms, a childish joy in simply breaking all the 
adult taboos, a pleasure indulged in for the sake of exposure of the 
impulses we have all been forced to repress. (Tueth 2005, in Dalton and 
Linder eds. 2005, p. 29. emphasis added). 
Is this not the logic of the Carnivalesque on a smaller scale—in the idea of a 
sanctioned transgression, and a release of repressed impulses? But does 
transgressive/Carnivalesque humour serve a social purpose beyond the 
reinforcing of the symbolic order? I want to argue that it is at this point that 
most literature on comedy and social efficacy stumbles. Take for instance, 
Maggie Andrews (1998, p. 51), who suggests: ‘Comedy has potentially a unique 
ability to be political in that it operates so frequently by transgressing 
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boundaries’ (quoted in Wagg ed. 1998), emphasis added). What does it mean to 
‘be political?’ and how exactly does the transgression of boundaries do this? 
Andrews’ overall argument is that comic representations can challenge and 
therefore deconstruct hegemonic discourses. So far, so good. But Andrews is not  
specific enough in her definition of ‘transgression,’ and retreats to celebrating 
grotesque, comic representations as by definition ‘political.’ This cannot square 
with our precise, Lacanian definition of ideology or discourse. Firstly, the 
supposed transgressions—a comic representation, revelling in low forms of 
behaviour, obscenity, and so on—are contained already by the dominant 
ideology. Secondly, performance comedy as a form is ‘sanctioned’ by official 
culture, frivolity or enjoyment operating within a logic of leisure time.
This is not to say that comedy is by definition always in collusion with official 
discourse, the pessimistic conclusion that may be drawn at this point. On the 
contrary, the way in which ideology functions today, through cynicism and dis-
identification; this opens up a number of avenues for comic resistance. One 
might take Virno’s statement as a starting point: ‘[…] joke-making is a very 
specific language game, one that shows, in filigree detail, that all language 
games can be transformed’ (2008, p. 165). Some developments in comedy 
performance have, as it were, ‘played games’ with the symbolic order. The 
episode ‘Notapusy,’ of the cultish American television comedy Arrested 
Development provides a good example, which, if not reaching the radical 
restructuring of the ‘act,’ certainly plays a specific game with the implicit and 
explicit rules of the ideologies of American media and television, censorship, 
and propriety. Written by Ron Weiner, and directed by Lev L. Spiro, the episode 
features an encounter between Michael Bluth (Jason Bateman) and his new 
English girlfriend, Rita, played by Charlize Theron. Riding his bike to meet Rita,  
Michael arrives out of breath. When Rita asks him why he is so, Michael replies: 
‘You leave me breathless.’ Rita’s response: ‘Oh Michael, you’re such a 
[pussy].’ (The word in square brackets is censored).  Ron Howard’s narration 
tells the viewer: ‘Michael couldn’t believe it. What he didn’t know was that she 
meant it in the British sense of the word: sweet or gentle, like a pussycat.’ The 
scene then cuts back to Rita and Michael, and the line is repeated: ‘you’re such a 
pussy.’ This time the word is not censored, though Michael’s shocked reaction 
remains the same.  
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In the second instance Charlize Theron is openly saying the word ‘pussy,’ which, 
in its implied, though not, in this case, explicit, meaning, is verboten on 
American television. What then is the purpose of censoring the first usage? 
Spiro and Weiner seem to play with the status of symbolic prohibitions, calling 
into question the logic that would ban one use of the signifier ‘pussy’ from the 
airwaves but not the other. The moment is doubly complicated through the 
inter-subjective double-meaning the word pussy produces in the second 
instance. Rita’s British usage of ‘pussy’ is intended as a term of endearment, 
while Michael’s interpretation of the word comes as an unpleasant, genital term 
of abuse (this double meaning, or misrecognised communication, is at the heart 
of many jokes). But the mechanism of television censorship (i.e. ‘bleeping’) is 
such that the received meaning cannot be censored leaving the other intact. 
Thus the moment seems to call on the big Other to act, to expressly prohibit, 
and therefore recognise the existence of, the obscene underside of its own 
ideology. 
The Lacanian framework established in this section allows us to identify 
moments that comedy can infiltrate into the fissures and cracks of the symbolic 
order, and the precise positioning from which to do this. In order to avoid the 
logic of the Carnivalesque, a socio-politically efficacious comedy practice must 
acknowledge the limits of opposition (forms of mocking, satire, inherent 
transgressions, and kynicism), all of which are social and cultural practices that 
enable political subjects to disavow their adherence to a dominant or 
exploitative ideology, and devise new ways of making comedy that step ‘outside’ 
the fold. Such practices can be better understood through Lacan’s category’s of 
the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary. In other words, the comic, like the 
analysand, utters enunciations that operate at the level of the Symbolic and 
Imaginary, and, through a particular discursive formula, encounter the 
inconsistencies of the symbolic order. This ‘traversing of the fantasy’ is the 
process by which the subject can no longer continue to believe without 
believing, that is to say, to disavow their belief in an ideology. Let us now 
examine two forms of comic practice that embody this theoretical structure.I 
will firstly look at Žižek’s concept of ‘over-identification,’ and secondly, the 




The art collective NSK (Neue Slowenische Kunst), and its most popular 
members, the music group Laibach, practice, according to Žižek, a strategy of 
over-identification. He writes: ‘In the process of the disintegration of socialism 
in Slovenia, they staged an aggressive, inconsistent mixture of Stalinism, 
Nazism and Blut und Boden ideology’ (Žižek 2006 [2], p. 65). Arts critic of the 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer Regina Hackett notes one particular project, in which 
a group of NSK artists submitted a poster entry to a contest in order to win the 
chance to represent the Yugoslavian Youth Day Celebration (Hackett 2004, 
http://www.seattlepi.com/visual_art/200214_visual19.html). The poster won, 
however, ‘[it] turns out the artists […] had copied a painting by Nazi artist 
Richard Klein, replacing the Nazi flag with the Yugoslav flag and the German 
eagle with a dove’ (ibid.). What separates this from a traditional comparative 
critique between two regimes of power is the reaction of the authorities (the 
NSK artists were arrested), which demonstrates an unease rarely found with 
parodic art practice. It is really the reaction of their intended audience (and 
targets) we should be watching. Žižek writes:
The first reaction of enlightened leftist critics was to conceive of Laibach 
as the ironic imitation of totalitarian rituals; however, their support for 
Laibach was always accompanied by an uneasy feeling: ‘What if they 
really mean it?’ […]—or in a more cunning version of the same thing, 
transferring one’s own doubt on to the other: ‘What if Laibach 
overestimates their public? What if the public takes seriously what 
Laibach mockingly imitates, so that Laibach actually strengthens what it 
purports to undermine?’ This uneasy feeling feeds on the assumption 
that ironic distance is automatically a subversive attitude. (Žižek 2006 
[2], p. 65).
Instead of signifying their distance from the ideology they critique, NSK collapse 
the distance, identifying too much, too traumatically with the ideology. It is 
important to note that this form of resistance is made possible under ideological 
conditions where cynical distance is already part of the ideological text. For 
example, the question immediately raised is that surely some internal or 
intentional distance must be there on the part of the artist, or else how can the 
work differ from the everyday practice of those who genuinely do identify with 
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the ideology? The point, of course, that Lacan’s RSI shows us, is that in actual 
fact, no one can genuinely and authentically identifies with the ideology, for to 
do so would be to take on for oneself all the ideology’s inconsistencies and 
antagonisms, precisely the points where the Real emerges. The strategy of over-
identification presents this genuinely identifying subject in all of its traumatic 
dimensions; if we are not meant to take ideology seriously (and therefore, in 
practice, reproduce it), then to over-identify is to take it far too seriously. In 
some cases this can assume an ‘asymmetric’ and ‘innocent’ subject position, as 
in the story of the child who points out the emperor’s lack of clothes. In Hans 
Christian Andersen’s story, the community disavows two things: the fact of the 
emperor’s nudity, but also the underlying fact that the Emperor (or any 
emperor) has no inherent or individual qualities that make him an emperor. 
The role is purely symbolic. The community is thus sustained by an ideological 
fantasy: the thing ‘everyone knows’ (the emperor is just a man) remains unsaid, 
with the belief in the official discourse (‘the emperor is our leader’) transposed 
onto the Other. So, in a Lacanian reading, the child’s performative speech act 
(‘the emperor has no clothes!’) is 1) an ‘act’ with equally catastrophic 
consequences as Antigone’s refusal to Creon, though in this case, comic, rather 
than tragic, and 2) an ‘over-identification.’ The child is the ideal ideological 
subject, the one who believes too seriously. For him, the emperor is an emperor 
in himself, therefore, it is too troubling to see him nude, exposed, and 
humiliated. In his comic act, the unsaid core of the community comes to light, 
and the emperor’s symbolic authority is suspended. It is not as if the subjects of 
the kingdom are suddenly given glasses that can liberate them from a collective 
delusion; rather it is that once the unsaid core is said, the fantasy can no longer 
be sustained6. 
From theory to praxis, one comic example of this strategy is found in Žižek’s 
own biography. It is summarised here by Robert Pfaller: 
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6 Over-identification is also an inherently comic strategy, as this example of ‘The Emperor’s New 
Clothes’ illustrates. Take for instance, the ludicrous story of the Heenes, and their son Falcon, 
the so-called Balloon Boy. Is this not a modern version of the boy who points out the emperor’s 
nudity? In October 2009, the Heene parents devised a hoax in which they would say their son, 
Falcon, had been accidentally launched into the sky in a weather balloon. While television 
cameras captured the balloon floating away, Falcon was waiting in the attic. Later, when 
interviewed on live television, Falcon gave the game away, saying to his father ‘You said we were 
doing this for a show.’ Balloon Boy himself is the ideal subject of his parent’s authority, guilty 
only of playing the game too earnestly. 
It was an open secret that the communist party [of former Yugoslavia] 
would get 99% of the votes in every election. Once, shortly after such an 
election, the newspaper of Žižek’s oppositional group came up with a 
headline stating that after a part of the votes had been counted, it looked 
‘as if the communists would actually remain in power.’ Playing the 
official game of ‘free election’ to that extent, without sharing the obscene 
distance towards this semblance, brought Žižek and his comrades into 
serious trouble with the police. Not to declare the allegedly free elections 
a joke, but on the contrary, taking this semblance seriously proved to be 
the dangerous move. (Pfaller 2005, p. 119).
What is radical in this strategy is the way in which it throws the deadlock of 
forced choice back onto the location of power. In a way, the act of over-
identification is the ‘Yes, please!’ of the old Marx Brothers’ joke quoted in the 
introduction of this thesis. In the example from Žižek’s own life, the gesture of 
his and his fellow students made it impossible for the communist apparatchiks 
to act (to shut down the newspaper, or force the students to print a retraction) 
without officially confirming the disavowed, implicit rule (we don’t acknowledge 
the election is fixed) that sustains the explicit rule (we must vote because our 
system is a democratic one). 
Of course, both Žižek & company’s gesture, and NSK are based in the specific 
historical circumstances of former Yugoslavia and the final days of ‘Really 
Existing Socialism.’ The situation is very different in the context in which this 
thesis is being written, in other words, the present-day, Western logic of global 
capital. I want to argue that though still effective, over-identification with 
neoliberal or neoconservative ideologies as specifically performative gestures 
contained by the cultural industries demonstrate less concrete ‘proof’ of their 
efficacy than the examples given above, though even in the smallest gestures we 
might read a ‘Yes, please!’ reversal of the ideological forced choice. I want to 
examine two examples: the performances of Andy Kaufman, which cultural 
theorist Florian Keller argues is a form of over-identified critique of American 
ideology, and the explosion of home-made iconoclasm of amateur videos in the 
age of the internet. 
In the 1970s, American comedian Andy Kaufman confounded audiences with 
his bizarre performances. Keller (2005) argues that Kaufman’s comedy was so 
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confounding because of this strategy of over-identification; in this case with the 
ideology of the ‘American Dream,’ embodied in Kaufman’s overly sincere 
performances of ‘showbiz’ characters as nightclub singer Tony Clifton. Keller 
defines this form of comedy in contrast to the work of Lenny Bruce, who is 
frequently celebrated for his ‘transgressive’ performances as a hero for free 
speech. At a time when obscenity laws were actually enforced, Bruce repeatedly 
used offensive or obscene language in his stand-up performances, which lead to 
his arrest on several occasions. Keller describes this as ‘aggressively teas[ing] 
the law’ (Keller 2005, p. 26). Though Bruce was actually violating the law with 
his performances, these violations were no less Carnivalesque:
[…] his transgressions may have been purely formal gestures that failed 
to redefine the symbolic field or make the law collapse. On the contrary, 
insofar as his violations induced the law to operate on its own terms, one 
can say he actually courted its symbolic sanction. […] In the final 
instance, then, the ‘sick’ comedy of Lenny Bruce actually ‘makes the law 
work.’ (Keller 2005, p. 27). 
It is Kaufman, Keller argues, who was the truly transgressive comedian of this 
period, taking the position of an ‘innocent’ (note the recurring theme), who truly  
believes in the ideology of the, as Keller describes it, ‘American Dream.’ 
Kaufman’s childishly playful performances ranged from sing-alongs with the 
audience to ‘99 bottles of beer,’ to inviting the audience to another venue to 
have milk and cookies after the show. This, as Auslander describes, is 
Kaufman’s ‘intentional infantilism’ (Auslander 1994, quoted in Keller 2005, p. 
13). Like the child in Andersen’s story, Kaufman takes the position of one who 
does not know what to disavow. The American Dream, according to Keller, is 
the ideological imperative that the American citizen must self-invent and self-
rely in pursuit of happiness. Followed to its limit, this is a dream of stardom and 
showbiz success (Keller 2005, p. 65). The constant re-invention of Kaufman’s 
onstage personae show a man playing the game too much and too earnestly. It 
was a fundamental contradiction, it seemed, that a man who could charm so 
effortlessly as Latka on the sitcom Taxi could be filled with such terrifying 




On the one hand, Kaufman acts as the ‘nice’ American star who has 
perfected the trajectory prescribed by the myth of success […] but at the 
same time he confronts his audiences with the ‘psychotic night’ of 
excessive enjoyment […] he reveals that this enjoyment can only be 
gained at the expense of your own self-evacuation. In this sense, Andy 
Kaufman represents the uncanny ‘incarnation’ of this traumatic 
jouissance that forms the unacknowledged kernel of the American 
Dream. (Keller 2005, pp. 63-64). 
Let us recall the Lacanian definition of ‘traversing the fantasy’ earlier in this 
chapter. ‘Fantasy’—and for ‘fantasy’ we might substitute ‘ideology,’ in other 
words, the set of values, ideals, or beliefs that ‘fill out’ the symbolic positions of 
the social structure—is the means by which the trauma of the Real (jouissance) 
is subjectified. By over-identifying with the fantasy of the American Dream, 
Kaufman embodies the perfect Žižekian ‘subject supposed to believe.’ We, the 
audience, see the perfect, believing subject of American ideology 
contemporaneously with its breakdown: the manic, psychotic trauma as the 
performance descends into rage, tears, or ‘symbolic death’ (Keller 2005, p. 20)7. 
The ideology of the American Dream shares a number of characteristics, with 
the ideology of global capital, particularly the focus on constant re-invention, 
and an imperative to ‘enjoy,’ in other words, to ‘pursue happiness,’ a peculiarly 
Lacanian formation that seems to acknowledge the originary lack at the heart of 
all desire (we don’t value happiness, but rather, the pursuit). One is even 
tempted to confront the term ‘pursuit of happiness’ with the psychoanalytic 
notion of the drive, which is not about satisfying a need but its own endless 
reproduction. Kaufman plays the game too much, as if the ideology of the 
American Dream is only viewable from an already-cynical distance; to view a 
man’s full, passionate identification with it is far too terrible. In the face of the 
postmodern operation of ideology today, summarised as above by the formula je 
sais bien, mais quand même, Kaufman’s work suggests a radical comic gesture 
might be one in which the comic player ne sait pas (doesn’t know), and all the 
same, horrifyingly continues to play the game. Keller’s study is important for 
our purposes, breaking as it does with the logic of Carnivalesque transgression. 
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7 ‘Death’ being a common term for comedians to use when a stand-up performance fails—Keller 
points out that this death exists in a symbolic economy: ‘But another death will be involved, 
namely the symbolic death of the comedian (or performance artist, for that matter) who 
physically enacts this fantasmatic narrative, taking the American Dream by its word’ (Keller 
2005, p. 20). 
Problematically, Keller questions whether or not Kaufman’s work is 
performance comedy at all. Following Auslander, Keller suggests that Kaufman 
falls in the category of performance art. He points to the frequent confusion and 
confrontations with audiences and his many onstage ‘deaths,’ to use the 
parlance of stand-up comedy. This suggests, I believe, a commonplace 
discomfort with the serious study of comedy and ‘low’ forms of performance. 
What Keller and Auslander fail to acknowledge is the way in which Kaufman’s 
work functions only within the boundaries of comic form; the traumatic effect 
relies on a precise play between the division between ‘getting it’ and ‘not getting 
it’ inherent to comedy. We will return to this thread of argumentation in 
Chapter 5.
Finally, if Kaufman’s work is Ideologiekritik as violent, traumatic spectacle, the 
internet and video sharing sites such as YouTube demonstrate a more gentle, 
though still effective, form of homemade iconoclasm. Many amateur 
reconstructions of well-known cultural artefacts can be found on the site, and 
while I am far from suggesting that on a formal level this amounts to any sort of 
subversion, certain videos present interesting propositions with regard to 
ideology, over-identification, and forced choice. One example is the University 
of Rochester Yellow Jackets’8 remake of the music video for Taylor Swift’s song 
‘You Belong With Me.’ Swift’s music video is a saccharine, high-school set story 
of a good-looking boy and the more studious ‘girl-next-door’ (portrayed by 
Swift), who share messages through their facing bedroom windows. The Yellow 
Jackets remake the video, shot for shot, with two young men. The video is 
presented on YouTube without comment or contextual framing. Beyond the 
quite obvious disruption of the heteronormative gender roles in the original 
music video, ‘You Belong With Me: Same Sex Version’ is an interesting teasing 
of the symbolic law/order. In essence, the video is a violation of written, 
copyright law, which the official discourse (embodied by the institution Big 
Machine Records LLC) cannot act on without appearing homophobic. Or, to put  
it another way, the record company cannot exercise their authority (given by the 
law) without simultaneously affirming the exclusion of other gender formations 
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8 The Yellow Jackets are a university Glee Club, or show choir, and the video described here was 
created to be projected during a live show, though on the internet it is presented entirely 
without comment or contextual framing.
or sexualities that function as the fantasmatic support of the heteronormative 
ideology espoused by Swift’s video and music. In this way, the video functions as 
a semi-permanent disruption of the symbolic law through provocation. 
 Postmodern irony and its discontents
The concept of a semi-permanent disruption presents some difficulty, 
particularly as the object of this thesis is comedy in live performance. If 
performance comedy qua Ideologiekritik entails a break with the symbolic 
order, this break must open a space for the refashioning of the symbolic order, 
and hold this space open. Which is to say, the subject must form an attachment 
with the moment of the break. As such the double movement of this thesis is 
beginning to take shape; in one movement there is the question of the content 
and precision of the critique qua break, and in a second movement there is the 
question of attachments to the new demand or group formed around this radical 
break. At this point we might begin to identify some protean forms of 
attachment. In the case of the video, as I have earlier noted, the attachment is a 
relationship of ‘deadlock,’ in which neither party can move. In Kaufman’s case, 
the predominant reaction to the break with ideology in his performances was 
one of befuddlement, though one example demonstrates something far more 
interesting. In 1978, Kaufman was hired as an actor on the television series 
Taxi. In his contract, he stipulated that ‘Tony Clifton’ (Kaufman’s alter-ego, 
though he insisted they were different people) would be hired for a set amount 
of episodes as well. ‘Clifton’ created so much trouble that he was eventually 
forcibly removed from the set. Everyone knew it was Kaufman as ‘Clifton.’ But 
all the same... 
For the remainder of this chapter I primarily focus on the first of these 
movements through a case study of comedy texts, beginning with the recent 
phenomenon of what could be called ‘postmodern irony.’ This is not a hard and 
fast term within the discourse of stand-up comedy. My usage will refer to the 
commonly accepted definition: postmodern irony uses irony as a justification 
for controversial or potentially taboo topics. Often this is qualified by some sort 
of social purpose, for example, in making light of race, homosexuality, or sexual 
violence the comedian actually draws attention to the obverse problem of 
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discrimination or inequality. So far, so transgressive, however, particular 
comedians who work in this vein often reveal interesting ambiguities and 
radical suspensions of meaning. In many cases, ‘how they say it’ is far more 
important than ‘what they said,’ and controversial and offensive material merely  
serves to highlight what Paolo Virno would call the ‘filigree language game(s)’ of 
their jokes (Virno 2008, p. 165). 
The highly popular Jimmy Carr is one of the UK’s best known exponents of this 
form of comedy. In the autumn of 2009, Carr came under fire from both the 
general public and numerous media outlets for a joke that seemed to take 
injured army servicemen and women as its ‘butt’: ‘Say what you like about those 
servicemen amputees from Iraq and Afghanistan, but we’re going to have a 
pretty good Paralympic team in 2012.’ While this joke is by no means 
linguistically complex, the first thing to note is the ambiguity of its target; the 
‘butt’ might equally be the wars themselves, or a government that engages in a 
war that few of its citizens support9. Carr refuses to justify his comedy 
(including the joke above) in terms of social purpose; interviewed by Stephen 
Moss, he says: ‘There is a tendency, when someone is upset, to say “Well, I was 
highlighting the tragedy.” I wasn’t. I was trying to make people laugh’ (Moss 
2009, p. 7). Carr’s concern is rather the construction of the joke and its absurd 
logic, even in the most offensive case: ‘I do a lot of jokes about rape, but it’s not 
a discourse on rape. I happen to think the construct of “99% of women kiss with 
their eyes closed, which is why it’s so difficult to identify a rapist” is funny. It’s 
not really about the act of a serious sexual assault’ (ibid.).
In a similar way, American comedian Sarah Silverman’s work can also divide 
audiences. A cursory glance through the topics that pepper her set-lists reveal 
race, anti-semitism, AIDS, rape, and abortion. I believe Silverman is a more 
interesting comedian than Carr, with an ambiguity of meaning in her joke-
writing less found in Carr’s work. There is more at work than ‘saying the 
unsayable,’ nor is Silverman merely a crusader for free speech in the face of 
political correctness. Nor is she rehashing the tired, prejudiced gags of working 
men’s club comics such as Bernard Manning, albeit in a postmodern frame. In 
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9 I owe this idea to my friend and fellow comedian Gràinne Maguire, who expressed this opinion  
while defending Carr in a debate on SKY News with Conservative MP Patrick Mercer. 
Silverman’s writing, multiple lines of argument are constructed through an 
asymmetry at their heart. An example from her concert film Jesus is Magic 
(2006): ‘Nazis are a-holes, and I’ll be the first one to say it, ‘cause I’m edgy… 
They’re cute when they’re little, I’ll give them that. They’re cute when they’re 
little. Why can’t they stay small!’ Whom or what is the target of this joke, and 
where is the position from which the subject (comedian) speaks? In its 
ambiguous, shifting target and place of enunciation, this joke cannot be said to 
be traditionally ‘satirical.’ To use a scientific term borrowed from Žižek, the gap 
at the heart of this joke is ‘parallactic,’ referring to the parallax gap: ‘a 
confrontation of two closely linked perspectives between which no neutral 
common ground is possible’ (Žižek 2006[2009], p. 4). In other words, the gap 
at the heart of the joke can only be viewed from shifting perspectives. 
Silverman’s material on race is arguably her most controversial. In a live 
performance at London’s Hammersmith Apollo (19 October 2008), Silverman 
introduces a story about attending a fundraiser for then presidential candidate 
Barack Obama:
I was really fortunate to be able to go to a fundraiser for Barack Obama. 
It was in Los Angeles, a real who’s-who, and I was able to go right up to 
him, and I wanted to have a smart question to ask. So I said: ‘Senator 
Obama, when you were a student in Boston, did you ever encounter any 
racism?’ And he said something really interesting. He said ‘I’m Kanye 
West.’ And I was like (sighs) ‘I get it. We’re all Kanye West.’ 
The audience laughs, and she continues:
He’s half black, so I hope my stupid, retarded country still votes for him. 
(Pause) Oh my god. I just heard myself say that. I am such a pessimist! 
He’s half white. 
Is Silverman ‘saying the unsayable,’ that is, making a comment about the ‘law’ of 
political correctness by transgressing that law? In this reading, the joke is really 
just a racist joke in quotation marks. We might read the second part of the 
above joke text thus: 1) The set-up is a variation of the standard line of liberal 
pessimism: ‘he’s half black, so I hope my stupid, retarded country still votes for 
him’ is a vulgar version of ‘America isn’t ready for a black president.’ 2) A 
caesura, as if to confirm the first line: ‘I just heard myself say that. I am such a 
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pessimist!’ This is as if Silverman has suddenly realised her remark is 
symptomatic of an unconscious problem. 3)Following this line of thought, the 
comedian surprises us: ‘He’s half white.’ In this first reading, then, the set-up, 
which is assumed to refer to liberal pessimism, is revealed to be about 
Silverman’s attitude to Obama’s race all along.
But this reading is too brutal and reductive. Too much is left unaccounted for, 
including Silverman’s fervent support for Obama during the campaign. The fact 
of Silverman’s ambiguity remains. The joke is uncomfortably cramped by the 
interpretation above, therefore, we might instead focus on the paradox or 
‘parallax’ of the text; its inherent non-sense. ‘Half-black/half-white’ quite clearly  
refers to the half-full/half-empty platitude, so that (at least partially) the frame 
is shifted from race and politics to the discourse of race and politics itself. The 
only satisfactory answer to the question ‘is it racist or isn’t it racist’ is ‘it’s both 
and it’s neither.’ The ‘filigree language game’ of the joke contains multiple lines 
of argument. In other words, Silverman’s joke cannot be taken in any one 
‘sense,’ and it is the consequences of ‘multiple senses’ to which I now turn, 
drawing on a Lacanian-inflected reading of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. 
2.4 - Sense to Nonsense and Back Again: On Deleuze and Comedy
 As identified above, comedy qua radical Ideologiekritik must take the form of a 
break with the symbolic order, and in the examples I identified, this invariably 
takes the form of an absurd logic, rather than what Critchley (2002) calls a 
reactionary humour (a comedy of recognition). It is the difference between 
exposing an existing logic’s inherent absurdity from a position of ‘knowing,’ (as 
demonstrated above, this distance is in advance taken into account), and 
identifying and staying within an uncomfortable point of suspension, where 
common sense is set aside for non-sense. My aim in the following section is to 
explore the contours of nonsense through the concepts of the French 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze and his collaborator; psychoanalyst, and activist 
Félix Guattari, focusing on the capacity of nonsense to counter what Deleuze 
calls the ‘disjunctive synthesis,’ which is the function by which modern thought 
is subjected. I will also examine the political implications of nonsense, through a 
close reading of Melville’s story ‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’).
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How should one square Deleuze and Guattari, the famous opponents of 
psychoanalysis, with the discussion of comedy as Ideologiekritik in this chapter, 
which is based primarily in a Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalytic framework? 
Here are three sources of precedent for a Lacanian Deleuzism. First, note 
Zupančič’s noting of the closeness of Deleuze and Lacan’s positions from her 
book of philosophical reflections on the nature of comedy: 
How is [Lacan] situated in relation to the (Deleuzian) thesis about the 
primary, original character of difference? In a certain way this is, of 
course, also Lacan’s thesis. Yet there is a crucial difference: for Lacan the 
primacy of difference is the primacy of the symbolic cut; whereas for 
Deleuze […] the primary and fundamental difference functions as a real, 
even as the only Real. Perhaps a more precise way of putting it would be 
to say that the Deleuzian conceptual project aims precisely at abolishing 
the difference between the Symbolic and the Real, that it involves a kind 
of ‘realisation of the Symbolic,’ or a becoming-real of the symbolic. 
(Zupančič 2008, pp. 161).
We find that while there is sympathy between the two positions, the Deleuzian 
stance affirms the creative value of collapsing symbolic reality for unmitigated 
access to the Real (or, confusingly, in Deleuze’s terms, the Virtual). As Zupančič 
also notes, while the Real may occupy the same theoretical position for Deleuze 
and Lacan, for Deleuze it ‘ultimately refers to the cosmic whole as an inherently 
productive self-differentiating substance,’ as opposed to the ‘impossibility’ or 
fissure in the symbolic order it is for Lacan (ibid. p. 162). But in terms of my 
project of practice-as-research, the important thing to note is for both, radical 
change requires a reorganising of the symbolic reality. This position is 
supported by Ronald Bogue’s reading (2009) of Deleuze as, in some sense, a 
Freudian philosopher. Far from denying the Freudian discovery of the 
unconscious, Deleuze relied on the concept of unconscious thought processes 
throughout his work. Bogue writes: ‘Throughout his work, Deleuze stresses the 
involuntary nature of genuine thought. To think differently […] requires a 
violence to thought, a disorienting, unsettling shock to common sense and 
orthodoxy’ (Bogue 2009, p. 235). 
Finally we might turn to Smith (2004), in his criticism of Žižek’s (2004) 
‘Lacanian book on Deleuze,’ Organs Without Bodies. While for Žižek, Deleuze’s 
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philosophical career entailed a turn from the deeply Lacanian early work Logic 
of Sense to a ‘corruption’ by Guattari in their jointly written books Anti-Oedipus 
and A Thousand Plateaus, Smith notes that Lacan’s reaction to Anti-Oedipus 
was positive. Was there, he asks, a fidelity to Lacan in Anti-Oedipus missed by 
most readers startled by the violently heretical attack on Freudian 
psychoanalysis? Smith writes: ‘Deleuze can be seen as one of Lacan’s most 
profound, but also most independent, disciples, inventing a whole new set of 
concepts to describe the inverse side of the symbolic structure’ (Smith 2004, p. 
648, emphasis added). What Smith means is that Deleuze’s concern is for the 
Real, and his philosophy of becoming, production, and affect is a set of concepts 
intended to usefully describe it. All of which is to say that while my primary 
theoretical framework in this thesis will be grounded in Lacan’s concepts of 
Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, I find several of Deleuze’s concepts — including 
the ‘disjunctive synthesis’ and later, the concept of ‘smooth and striated space‘ 
— useful in describing and interrogating the making of work in the context of a 
practice-as-research project. While my diagnosis of the problems and 
pathologies of the circumstances of our historical present remains on one side of 
the symbolic structure, the ‘inverse side,’ can usefully be actualised in the 
making of art and performance. Take for instance, Deleuze on art: the artwork is 
a ‘bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 
167). Deleuze views an artwork as comprised on ‘affects’ (sensations separated 
from the subject) and ‘percepts’ (perceptions separated from the subject). An 
artwork is a machine for feeling. The consideration of affects will become ever 
more important in the following chapters and discussion on practice, as the 
focus shifts from the break with the symbolic order to the affect needed to 
‘attach’ a subject to the symbolic proposition made by a comedy performance. 
Performance comedy is also one of the most clearly ‘affective’ forms of art, 
evidenced through laughter, of course, but also in the sensations of unease that 
accompany an Andy Kaufman performance, or the discomfort that follows a 
Sarah Silverman routine. For the moment I will continue to limit my focus to 
the idea of a break with the symbolic order, drawing on Deleuze’s conception of 
‘nonsense.’
  Curiouser and curiouser!: Difference and Nonsense
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In the introduction to this thesis, I defined the ‘disjunctive synthesis’ in 
grammatical terms, as the use of an operator such as ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘but,’ to connect 
two independent terms in a relationship of ‘common sense.’ We might broaden 
our understanding of the concept at this point; for our purposes we can say it is 
any ‘statement’ or enunciation that presents as natural a relationship (of 
domination, of subordination). It is allied to the notion of ‘common sense.’ The 
concept appears in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus in relation to Oedipal 
structures — the structures of traditional family (‘daddy-mommy-me’), for 
example (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, p. 87). For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
‘either/or’ of familial roles is an example of ‘an exclusive, restrictive, and 
negative use of the disjunctive synthesis’ (ibid., p. 84), that is to say, the 
restriction of the immanent possibilities of life to a series of exclusive ideals: 
‘When Oedipus slips into the disjunctive syntheses of desiring-recording, it 
imposes the ideal of a certain restrictive or exclusive use on them that becomes 
identical with the form of triangulation: being daddy, mommy, or child’ (ibid., 
p. 84). What they counter to the neurotic, exclusive disjunctive synthesis of 
either/or is the schizophrenic, ‘immanent’ disjunctive synthesis: ‘“either… or… 
or…”’ (ibid., p. 84):
This is free disjunction; the differential positions persist in their entirety, 
they even take on a free quality, but they are all inhabited by a faceless 
and transpositional subject. [Judge] Schreber [whose memoirs of 
schizophrenia form one of Freud’s most well-known analyses] is man and 
woman, parent and child, dead and alive: which is to say, he is situated 
wherever there is a singularity, in all the series and in all the branches 
marked by a singular point […] (ibid., p. 85).
Alternatively, to this schizophrenic ideal of singularities freely associating, it is 
my argument that comedy, or to use Deleuze’s frequent term, ‘nonsense,’ 
provides another possibility for the breaking of disjunctive-synthetic bonds, not 
through abandoning the symbolic structure of reality altogether but by 
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paradoxically enunciating the inconsistencies of the symbolic order10. In Kirby 
Olson’s Comedy After Postmodernism, the author notes that for Deleuze: ‘To 
understand [comedy], we cannot resort to a transcendent definition. We have to 
look at individual cases, in all of their singularity, and recuperate their 
context’ (Olson 2001, p. 14, emphasis added). Comic practice, as it were, thinks 
difference-in-itself, not subordinating this difference to the identical, but 
thinking the singularity of the situation. James Williams (2008, p. 17) notes that 
humour occupies a special place in Deleuzian philosophy: ‘Humour helps us 
sense that meaning is not the point of certain forms of communication and that 
reason has limits that do not define a boundary with nonsense or absurdity, but 
with a different kind of sense allied to ‘non-sense’ and to paradox.’ We might 
refer back to Silverman’s jokes, with a ‘parallactic’ structure, or the classic 
Jewish joke referenced by Woody Allen in the opening scene of Annie Hall, 
quoted in the introduction of this thesis, for evidence of this ‘paradoxical’ nature 
of humour. Bogue (2009, p. 235) emphasises the necessity of paradox for the 
creation of new ways of thinking: ‘New thought is necessarily “para-doxical,” 
beyond doxa, and hence beyond common-sense rationality.’ This paradox that 
does violence to thought might take the form of an enunciation or statement 
that affirms two contradictory senses simultaneously. In Logic of Sense, Deleuze 
takes Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as an example. As Alice 
changes size, Deleuze states ‘But it is at the same moment that one becomes 
larger than one was and smaller than one becomes’ (Deleuze 1969, p. 3). Which 
is to say, how can Alice be growing both larger and smaller at the same time? 
This, for Deleuze, is truly ‘nonsense,’ which undermines ‘good sense’: ‘Good 
sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction; but 
paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time’ (ibid.). 
Deleuze’s theoretical contribution here is to define nonsense as simultaneously 
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10 The degree to which Deleuze’s invocation of the ‘schizo’ is a provocation is unclear. For me, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of psychoanalysis is against its conservative uses; they do not, 
for example, deny the fundamental discovery of the unconscious. It is interesting to note here 
their argument that the function of the psychoanalytic clinic is to bolster the status quo and 
authority: ‘[…] everybody knows what psychoanalysis means by resolving Oedipus: internalizing  
it so as to better rediscover it on the outside, in social authority, where it will be made to 
proliferate and be passed on to the children’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, p. 87). In this same 
passage, however, they celebrate Lacan (as Smith, 2004, argues above), as the clinician capable 
of loosening the ‘nuts and bolts’: ‘[…] injecting a schizophrenic flow capable of subverting the 
field of psychoanalysis’ (ibid., p. 92). This ‘flow’ is of course, the Lacanian Real, which though 
differing in some crucial respects, is correlative to the singularities of the Deleuzian Virtual. 
Both perform the same function, providing an escape route from the stultifying nature of the 
symbolic order and hence the possibility of liberation from domination.
the ‘absence’ of sense, despite at the same time having a recognisable but as-yes-
uncategorised sense. If this is opaque, let us again examine the old Marx 
Brothers joke, which seems to exemplify this senseless-sense: 
 1: Tea or coffee?
 2: Yes, please!
The first statement (the set-up), ‘Coffee or tea,’  opens a symbolic universe with 
a finite number of options. I can find four: ‘Coffee,’ ‘Tea,’ ‘Neither, I’m fine, 
thank you,’ or the greedy ‘Actually, I’d like both.’ But in the interlocutor’s reply 
(the punch-line), ‘Yes, please!’ we essentially find a sensible answer that 
nonetheless exists outside of this particular symbolic order. Clearly, ‘Yes, 
please!’ is a senseless answer, however, at the same time there is movement 
towards sense, though in the symbolic order opened by the set-up, the punch-
line cannot ever be fully reconciled. This movement is undeniably important. If 
we were to rewrite the joke in this way: 
 1: Tea or coffee?
 2: Turtles!
it somehow loses its humour, or at least its humorous core is relocated outside 
of the joke capsule itself. Therefore, the nonsense of a ‘Yes, please!’ is a very 
particular type of nonsense that lies outside of the symbolic order opened by the 
first statement while at the same time presenting the possibility it might be 
reconciled with it, rather than the full ‘psychosis’ suggested by the answer 
‘Turtles!’ We should also note that the comedy of the joke, by which I mean its 
propensity to provoke laughter, is only contained in the ‘movement.’ If we begin 
refashioning the symbolic order in order to accommodate the nonsense of ‘Yes, 
please!,’ perhaps by suggesting the second interlocutor misheard the first, the 
joke, under scrutiny, loses its ‘funny 11.’ 
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11 As this chapter is essentially devoted to a precise interrogation of the terms ‘comedy’ and 
‘humour,’ I hesitate to use either here to describe ‘being able to generate laughter.’ In which 
case, it seems appropriate to borrow a term that is in common usage on the comedy circuit, 
‘funny,’ or ‘funnies,’ which is a loose fashioning of the word as both noun and adjective: ‘bring 
the funnies,’ ‘it needs more funny,’ and so on.
Humour, then, can break from ossified categories of sense or logic, revealing a 
new perspective. James Williams (2008, p. 18), writes: ‘Humour matters 
because we have to feel that some of the expectations of the question were 
mistaken, not in a way that could be connected or refined, but in a more 
persistent manner: it was the wrong kind of answer to expect.’ What is the 
relation of this new refinement of our understanding of humour to our main 
problem of Ideologiekritik and political efficacy? Deleuze insists that in addition 
to right and wrong answers there are also right and wrong problems. To critique 
sense, or to show how nonsense ‘enacts a donation of sense’ (Deleuze 1969
[2004], p. 81) is to show that our categorical common sense by which we 
recognise a political problem is always-already supported or founded by an 
exclusion (of nonsense, that is to say, other possibilities). The effect of nonsense 
is to show the limitations of the symbolic order opened by ‘good sense’ or 
‘common sense.’ 
The continuum between the revolutionary, post-1968 politics of Deleuze and 
Guattari and the post-Kantian Deleuze of Difference and Repetition is this 
radical examination of sense and nonsense. Why should we (as political 
subjects) privilege ‘good sense’ or ‘common sense’ as the limit of every problem? 
After all, as Deleuze writes: ‘Sense […] is only a vapour which plays at the limits 
of things and words’ (1968[1994], p. 195). Beyond the quibbling over the 
tyranny of tea or coffee, there are some major, ‘Actual’12 consequences, that 
perhaps Hallward loses sight of. Williams applies these Deleuzian concepts to 
the discourses of power and justice:
In other words, it is a mistake to think that solutions are simply true or 
false solutions to a problem. Instead, a solution makes some aspects of a 
problem more clear and others more obscure. For example, when we 
answer yes or no to the question ‘Can there be a just war?’, we are not 
giving final correct answers to the question. Rather, our reasons for 
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12 Peter Hallward, a perspicuous reader and strong critic of Deleuze, despairs that despite the 
inspirational, creative nature of Deleuze’s project, ultimately: ‘Deleuze’s work is essentially 
indifferent to the politics of this world’ (Hallward 2006, p. 126). Hallward argues that Deleuze’s 
privileging of the Virtual leaves no room for the Actual of emancipation from exploitation or 
domination. ‘A philosophy based on deterritorialisation, dissipation and flight [as in ‘escape’] 
can offer only the most immaterial and evanescent grip on the mechanisms of exploitation and 
domination that continue to condition so much of what happens in our world’ (ibid.). Against 
Hallward, I would argue that challenging exploitation structures of power takes place on both 
levels of Virtual and Actual (or, in Lacanian terms, across the spectrum of RSI—hence, why 
psychoanalysis is precisely a cut through the Imaginary and Symbolic into the Real).
deciding on a positive or negative answer shed a different light on the 
problem of war. (Williams 2003, p. 130). 
The solutions (yes or no) are opened by the manner in which the problem is 
posed (that is to say, the manner in which the disjunctive synthesis is employed 
— restrictive, ‘either/or,’ or immanent: ‘either...or...or...or’). Additionally, the 
choice of one or other of the solutions retroactively changes, or more precisely, 
‘colours’ the problem, inflecting it with a certain ‘sense.’ This is evident in the 
way the choice seems to inflect the question with either a neoconservative 
‘sense,’ or a pacifistic ‘sense,’ which perhaps shows the hold discursive 
formations have a hold over even the most simply phrased questions. But a 
comic solution out of this ideological deadlock can be formulated as well. For 
instance, we might transpose the Marx Brothers’ reply wholesale to create the 
dark, but wholly critical:
 1: Can there ever be a just war?
 2: Yes, please!
Or, we might create a Carrollian neologism:
 1: Can there ever be a just war?
 2: Yes, absopositivelynegalutely not!
A more modern version might employ sarcasm and a more casual tone, but still 
reach outside of the symbolic order opened by the question. Imagine the 
following exchange in a Woody Allen film, between a WASP-y blond tennis 
player and Allen himself.
 1: But can there ever be a just war?
 2: Yes, of course! But seriously no, not in the slightest. Where’s that 
waiter again?
In these instances comedy and joke-making is a way of posing another problem 
entirely, of forcing the original problem to confront the ‘lack’ that sustains it. At 
this point we must connect our discussion to the earlier proposition of comedy 
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performance as Lacanian ‘act,’ a liberation from the collective structure of 
categorical thinking. In its comic actualisations, this can take fairly subtle and 
nuanced forms: consider again the earlier joke text of Sarah Silverman, in which 
she confuses Barack Obama and Kanye West and merges, in a potentially 
offensive way, black/white and half-full/half-empty. As discussed earlier, the 
meaning of this joke is ambiguous, however, is it not also structured like a 
‘series’ of nonsense that ‘donates’ sense, as we find in Logic of Sense? What 
forms the series in this case are the repetitions of the empty usage of ‘Obama.’ 
Silverman reveals the disparate uses of his proper name as it circulates through 
various systems of meaning. But the humorous repetitions show that the ‘sense’ 
of these uses is constantly donated by another piece of ‘nonsense.’ The symbolic 
order opened by one enunciation is not an a priori, transcendental limit, but 
more like, quoting Žižek (2008, p. 49), a ‘contingent series intersecting and 
generating totally disparate meanings, like a science-fiction story in which 
scientists discover that the explosion which, in the Bible, signals the divine 
message, was effectively a visual trace of a terrible catastrophe that destroyed a 
flourishing alien civilisation.’ A truly ‘political’ comedy (which nods towards 
some sort of sociopolitical efficacy) provides a countervailing function to the 
illegitimate, exclusive or restrictive uses of the disjunctive synthesis by 
generating disparate meanings that reveal the inconsistencies of a dominant or 
exploitative ideology, in such a way that these are not resolved but instead held 
without the possibility of resolution within the existing symbolic order. We 
might define the former as (drawing on my analysis of comedy in relation of 
ideology) satirical, and the latter as nonsensical. As demonstrated throughout 
this section, nonsense need not carry connotations of silliness or madness, a 
thread I will follow in the following close-reading of Melville’s Bartleby.
  Case study: Bartleby, the Scrivener; a Deleuzian sense of 
humour13
In a conversation with Miranda Joseph, Associate Professor of women’s studies 
at the University of Arizona, whose work I draw on in the second and third 
chapters of this thesis, I defended a ‘Bartlebeian politics’ of disengagement. 
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13 The reader will note that Bartleby’s formula is incorporated into both the live performance 
submitted with this thesis as well as the accompanying documentation. These specific instances 
in performance are further discussed in Chapter 6.
‘Why is it,’ Joseph argued, ‘that the left today celebrates Bartleby so much? Just 
simply disengaging, or saying no isn’t an option available to everyone.’ I 
responded: ‘It’s not so much the idea of disengaging that should be celebrated, 
but the way Bartleby disengages, his particular formula for saying no. The 
interesting thing about “Bartleby” is that it works; the employer goes along with 
it.’14 In other words, Bartleby’s ‘I would prefer not to,’ is a comic statement that 
Bartleby employs in order to liberate himself from his employer’s demands. I 
will now examine Bartleby’s ‘formula’ at length as a case study. While, I admit, ‘I 
would prefer not to’ is not a punchline calculated to generate gales of laughter, it  
is a piece of ‘nonsense,’ in the form I have outlined above, which counters the 
restrictive disjunctive syntheses of social authority in late 19th century America.  
Many theorists have commented on the political implications of Herman 
Melville’s novella ‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’ in their work, however, I will focus on 
the discussions in Deleuze’s essay ‘Bartleby, or, the formula’ and Žižek’s The 
Parallax View. For Deleuze, the work is a ‘violently comical text,’ though the 
nature of this comedy is not elaborated further. Building upon the concepts I 
have developed throughout this chapter, we might begin to precisely interrogate 
the enigmatic comic quality of this mysterious and disturbing novella. The 
narrator of the text is an owner of a copywriting firm, an ‘elderly man,’ who 
employs a small staff. One day he hires our eponymous anti-hero as an extra 
scribe. While the working relationship begins well, the employer soon finds that 
Bartleby refuses every demand or order with an unsettling passivity; ‘I would 
prefer not to,’ he says. In the following scene, which I quote at length, we see 
that his formula takes on multiple, humorous dimensions through repetition.
At last, familiarly drawing my chair behind his screen, I sat down and 
said: ‘Bartleby, never mind then about revealing your history; but let me 
entreat you, as a friend, to comply as far as may be with the usages of this 
office. Say now you will help to examine papers tomorrow or next day: in 
short, say now that in a day or two you will begin to be a little reasonable:
—say so, Bartleby.’
‘At present I would prefer not to be a little reasonable,’ was his mildly 
cadaverous reply.
Just then the folding-doors opened, and Nippers approached […] ‘Prefer 
not, eh?’ gritted Nippers—I’d prefer him, if I were you, sir,’ addressing 
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14 The above took place in a private exchange after a research seminar at Queen Mary, 
University of London, 24 March 2010.
me— ‘I’d prefer him; I’d give him preferences, the stubborn mule! What 
is it, sir, pray, that he prefers not to do now?’
Bartleby moved not a limb.
‘Mr. Nippers,’ said I, ‘I’d prefer that you would withdraw for the present.’
Somehow, of late I had got into the way of involuntarily using this word 
‘prefer’ upon all sorts of not exactly suitable occasions. And I trembled to 
think that my contact with the scrivener had already and seriously 
affected me in a mental way […] As Nippers, looking very sour and sulky, 
was departing, Turkey blandly and deferentially approached. 
‘With submission, sir,’ said he, ‘yesterday I was thinking about Bartleby 
here, and I think that if he would but prefer to take a quart of good ale 
every day, it would do much towards mending him, and enabling him to 
assist in examining his papers.’ 
‘So you have got the word too,’ said I, slightly excited.
‘With submission, what word, sir?’ asked Turkey […] ‘What word, sir?’
‘I would prefer to be left alone here,’ said Bartleby, as if offended at being 
mobbed in his privacy. ‘That’s the word, Turkey,’ said I— ‘that’s it.’ 
‘Oh, prefer? oh yes—queer word. I never use it myself. But, sir, as I was 
saying, if he would but prefer—’
‘Turkey,’ interrupted I, ‘you will please withdraw.’
‘Oh certainly, sir, if you would prefer that I should.’ (Melville 1997, p. 24, 
original emphasis).
Superficially, the scene (published in 1853), is similar enough to modern 
workplace farces such as television sitcom The Office, or Mike Judge’s (1999) 
film Office Space, which is perhaps why the scene is retained along with much 
of its language, in Jonathan Parker’s 2001 modern-day film adaptation of the 
story. The scene’s comic potential is also superficially explained—there is a 
chaos of stock character types crashing around Bartleby; the angry, violent clerk 
Nippers who uses preferences as a synonym for bruises; the meek Turkey with 
his refrain of ‘with submission,’; and the reasonable, ‘everyman’ employer who 
nevertheless begins to question his own sanity and acts as the reader’s line into 
this world. Structurally the piece employs a classic, simple joke structure. 
Bartleby gives the premise in his line ‘At present I would prefer not to be a little 
reasonable,’ the ensuing conflict acts as a set-up and builds anticipation, 
escalating the stakes as in slapstick comedy, and finally, Turkey’s great line ‘Oh 
certainly, sir, if you prefer that I should’ acts as a punch-line. 
But is there not something intriguing about the repetitive nature of this scene? 
We might attribute Melville’s comic sensibility to the ridiculous multiplicity of 
senses the office-mates find in the word prefer. For example, in Nippers’ angry 
exclamation: ‘I’d prefer him, if I were you, sir […] I’d prefer him, I’d give him 
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preferences, the stubborn mule! What is it, sir, pray, that he prefers not to do 
now?’ contains not one but three senses of ‘prefer.’ In the ensuing melee of 
preferences the word appears to lose its sense entirely. At first Nippers uses 
‘prefer’ in a contradictory sense, sarcastically. Then, by rendering the verb 
prefer into the plural noun preferences, he infuses the word with a new 
meaning, incongruous with its preceding context: ‘I’d give him…’ He then 
returns to Bartleby’s original usage. ‘Prefer’ has no identity for itself, opening 
onto the mad absurdity behind the screen of common language. Repetition is 
intrinsically connected with the comic, and with my project more generally. 
‘Over-identification,’ for instance, is a repetition of the dominant expressions of 
ideology, and stand-up comedy itself, which often consists entirely of retelling 
stories, is a repetitive form. Karl Marx, of course, diagnosed this comic mode of 
repetition first, in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon: ‘Hegel remarks 
somewhere that all great events and characters of world history occur, so to 
speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as 
farce’ (Marx 1973, quoted in Žižek 2009, p. 1). Zupančič elaborates: ‘Marx’s 
main concern […] is not the relationship between repetition and farce but the 
question whether, and to what extent, a repetition is also a place or bearer of 
something new—that is to say, to what extent it can constitute a break (with the 
given, or with the past)’ (Zupančič 2008, p. 150). In other words, repetition 
reveals difference in itself, the conditions of the ‘new.’ Žižek explicitly makes the 
connection with the comic: ‘Crucial for the proper comical effect is not 
difference where we expect sameness, but rather, sameness where we expect 
difference’15 (Žižek 2004, p. 220). Another Marx Brother’s joke is quoted by 
Žižek to illustrate this point: ‘This man looks like an idiot and acts like an idiot; 
but don’t let this fool you—he is an idiot!’ The comedy of this moment is in full 
agreement with Deleuze’s concept of difference: ‘When, instead of a hidden 
terrifying secret, we encounter behind the veil the same thing as in front of it, 
this very lack of difference between the two elements confronts us with the 
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15 To illustrate this, we might take the example of Toto the dog, in Frank L Baum’s The Wizard 
of Oz, pulling back the Wizard’s curtain. The scene, in which we encounter difference, is full of 
pathos. A more comic version of this scene appears in Matt Groening’s animated television 
series Futurama: in a parody of Baum’s story, the crew of Planet Express imagine themselves in 
a version of Oz, with Professor Farnsworth taking the role of the Wizard. With the Professor’s 
enormous head looming above the crew, Leela/Dorothy’s pet alien, Nibbler (in place of Toto), 
pulls back the curtain. What is revealed is not another version of the Professor, manipulating 
the illusion as in the original story, but the very same Professor—his huge head is balanced on 
top of a normal sized body. 
“pure” difference that separates an element from itself’ (ibid. original emphasis)
16. This is what we find in all of Melville’s uses of the word ‘prefer.’
But what of the famous ‘I would prefer not to?’ For Deleuze, this comic formula 
operates in a ‘minor’ way, within the major language. He writes: ‘I PREFER 
NOT TO is also a trait of expression that contaminates everything, escaping 
linguistic form and stripping the father17 of his exemplary speech, just as it 
strips the son [Bartleby] of his ability to reproduce or copy’ (Deleuze 1997, p. 
77). This quotation requires careful examination. Essentially, this statement is 
an ‘act.’ ‘I would prefer not to,’ Deleuze argues, ablates the symbolic authority of 
the ‘father.’ The employer stands in the symbolic position of the ‘father’ in this 
scenario, drawing on the big Other for his authority (conventions dictate the 
employer’s demands must be obeyed). But the ‘son,’ the symbolic position of 
whom Bartleby occupies, pays his own price. In saying he ‘would prefer not to,’ 
Bartleby, having ruptured the authority of the symbolic order, must maintain, 
as Alain Badiou might say, a ‘fidelity’ to this event, he must continue ‘not to.’ 
Bartleby’s fidelity to the event leads to his ever-increasing abjection; eventually, 
his ‘I would prefer not to’ taking on obscene and blackly comic dimensions, 
Bartleby dies, starving, in prison. What is key to Melville’s story is the precise 
linguistic form that the subject’s ‘act’ takes. For Deleuze, the key is not to return 
to a pre-Lapsarian state before language, or enter a psychotic state outside of 
linguistic meaning, but to ‘deterritorialise’ language. Melville’s earlier character 
Billy Budd deterritorialises language through a physical trait, his stutter; 
Bartleby does so through a comic formula. 
 ‘I would prefer not to’ captures the form of Ideologiekritik that performance 
comedy best takes, that is to say, a breaking with the symbolic order that takes 
place through and in the symbolic, as Žižek might say, a ‘traversing of the 
fantasy.’ In other words, it counters an illegitimate use of the disjunctive 
synthesis. Take for example, the following short passage: 
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16 Repetition in this sense is perhaps key to Andy Kaufman’s terrifying comedy. If the ideological  
fantasy is a ‘mask,’ behind the mask we expect to find something different (the subject who 
doesn’t really believe, who maintains a distance to the mask). Instead, in Kaufman’s case we find 
the mask again. 
17 Deleuze is referring here to Lacan’s concept of the Master’s discourse as opposed to a father 
character, which does not appear in the text. 
“Bartleby,” said I, “Ginger Nut is away; just step round to the Post Office, 
won’t you? (it was but a three minutes walk,) and see if there is any thing 
for me.”
“I would prefer not to.”
“You will not?”
“I prefer not.”
The employer-narrator’s advanced age and saintly patience should not concern 
us — Bartleby’s formula counters the disjunctive synthesis qua ideological 
domination, rather than any personal domination. This passage highlights an 
either/or between ‘will and will not,’ which at first appears sensible or natural, 
but when countered by Bartleby is revealed to exclude a huge number of 
possibilities, not merely ‘prefer not,’ but even more importantly, ‘should not,’ 
and ‘cannot.’ The employer-narrator’s ‘will not,’ is thus revealed as yoked to a 
kind of capitalist individualism that frames all decisions as ‘free,’ even in 
situations of coercion; Bartleby’s ‘prefer not’ is a comic punchline that reveals 
an even deeper ranges of excluded possibilities. 
Žižek writes:
In his refuse of the Master’s order, Bartleby does not negate the 
predicate; rather he affirms a non-predicate: he does not say that he 
doesn’t want to do it; he says that he prefers (wants) not to do it. This is 
how we pass from a politics of ‘resistance’ or ‘protestation,’ which 
parasitises upon what it negates, to a politics which opens up a new space 
outside the hegemonic position and its negation (Žižek 2006[2009], pp. 
381-382, original emphasis). 
‘Affirming a non-predicate,’ is a Kantian idea best illustrated by the difference 
between the phrases ‘He isn’t dead!’ (i.e., he is alive), and ‘He is undead!’ The 
unheimlich nature of ‘he is undead’ is not related solely to the horror film 
connotations of zombies and vampires, but also to the fact that ‘un-dead’ breaks 
from the symbolic universe opened by the dialectic proposition dead/alive. 
Recalling Deleuze’s assertion that in addition to right and wrong answers there 
are also right and wrong problems, in ‘I would prefer not to’ Bartleby poses a 
new question of the order sustaining his world—Wall Street, New York, financial 
capitalism. He also demonstrates that to either play the capitalist game or 
withdraw from it is fundamentally a forced choice. ‘I would prefer not to’ reveals 
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and sustains the tension of the false binary, and the employer’s flummoxed 
reaction is the deliciously comic payoff. 
While Melville’s novella is a very particular example, it is exemplary of a larger 
function that performance comedy in general may be able to harness. It is here I 
most take issue with many theorists’, including Miranda Joseph’s, 
characterisation of Bartlebeian politics as a politics of ‘withdrawal.’ It should be 
clear from the context of the original novella, that Bartleby’s ‘act’ is hardly 
withdrawal in the traditional sense; if anything, it is potent because of his 
refusal to withdraw. Witness his employer’s fury as he discover that far from 
withdrawing from his job after refusing to do any work, Bartleby has made the 
office his home. Žižek, in his characterisation of Bartlebeian politics as a politics 
of passivity, of ‘wait-and-see,’ gets it quite wrong. In my view, Bartleby’s little 
joke is not passive at all, but defiantly, desperately active. 
  
 2.5 - Conclusions: ‘Fighting comedy with comedy…’
In this chapter I have attempted to refine the relationship between performance 
comedy and sociopolitical efficacy, and question whether performance comedy, 
in the era of the postmodern, might still contain the potential as a revolutionary, 
emancipatory, or subversive praxis. I begun by re-examining ideology as a vital 
category for political thought. I concluded that a contemporary theory of 
ideology, derived from the work of Žižek, is incompatible with arguments for 
comedy’s subversive potential based in a model of comedy as the ‘obscene 
double’ of official culture. This ‘obscene double’ is discernible in arguments 
about comedy’s potential to ‘transgress boundaries,’ which, for the most part, I 
define as inherent or Carnivalesque transgressions, which is to say, already 
contained by the dominant order. I argued that a majority of comic practices, 
including many forms of satire and humorous activist practices (which is to say, 
practices directly involved in transforming sociopolitical reality), are supported 
by a Carnivalesque logic, which is responsible for their diminished efficacy in 
the light of the hegemony of global capital. Continuing to draw on a Lacanian 
framework, I proposed that a subversive comedy must in some way undo the 
‘symbolic order,’ in other words, the comic enunciation must attain the status of 
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the ‘authentic act.’ I then examined comic strategies of over-identification and 
postmodern irony through this Lacanian lens. Noting that certain concepts of 
the work of Gilles Deleuze, particularly those of difference, repetition, and 
sense/nonsense, had an affinity with my original Lacanian framework, I finally 
explored comic ‘formulae,’ and their particular effects in breaking with 
ideological or hegemonic discourse. I have sought, throughout this chapter to 
elucidate in clearest terms, the theoretical and philosophical methodology that 
will enable and support my experimental practice.
We should now return to what I described earlier as the two propositions of 
Carnival, that in this thesis I hoped to refine. The present chapter has explored 
the first proposition, that through a ‘performance’ of sorts the symbolic order 
can indeed be broken. The remainder of the thesis, and my experimental 
practice will explore the second, related, but far trickier proposition: through 
performance, a community of equals can be formed. The two propositions are 
deeply related; while demonstrating through theoretical argumentation that 
comedy can perform valuable critiques of ideology, the next step is to consider 
how the subject becomes ‘attached’ to the moment of critique. Or, how might 
both performer and audience maintain a fidelity to the event of breaking with 
the symbolic order? I have briefly noted a few instances of attachment, but 
before proceeding, we might organise these instances as follows: (1) passive 
attachment—which might also be called ‘preaching to the converted’ (2) 
paralysis—as in over-identificatory strategies, where the forced choice is thrown 
back onto the place of power (3) perverse—overt psychological investment in a 
moment, as in campaigns of ‘being offended’ and (4) hysterical—violent reaction 
in response to a moment of ideological break, as in Kim Noble’s work Kim Noble 
Will Die (see Chapter 5). 
 In the following chapters I will detail my experimental practice, which explores 
this question through alternative modes of audience engagement. This entails a 
radical shift from my stand-up practice, detailed earlier, incorporating modes of 
gallery and exhibition display, participatory art, and ‘talk-events.’ Throughout 
this forthcoming discussion I will build on my Lacanian/Deleuzian framework 
with two further sources: curator and theorist Nicolas Bourriaud’s theory of a 
Relational Aesthetics, which serves as the formal basis of much of my 
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experimentation,  and Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’s concepts of 
hegemony, radical democracy, and social antagonism, which I will argue move 
Lacanian political philosophy into a place of concrete action. 
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CHAPTER 3: ATTACHMENTS AND RELATIONAL AESTHETICS
 3.0 - The Social Turn: Attachments, Affects, and the Relational
Carnival is bound by an aporia of ‘licensed transgression.’ At the same time, it 
makes two desirable propositions. The first of these is that official discourse can 
be broken through the performance of parody, satire, mockery, grotesque, 
iconoclasm, in other words, comedy. This attractive proposition nonetheless 
requires scrutiny in the present postmodern logic. Following Žižek, I argued for 
a return to the concept of ‘ideology’ in critical political thought, consequently, 
comedy as part of a radical political project must itself take the form of 
Ideologiekritik. I elaborated on this concept of ideology through Lacan’s 
concept of the Borromean knot of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, drawing 
especially on Žižek’s elaboration of the concept of the big Other (‘the collective 
fiction, the symbolic structure, presupposed by any social field’) (Fisher 2009, p.  
44). So, if Carnival proposes that official discourse can be suspended or even 
broken, within my Lacanian and later, Deleuzian, framework, a radical comic 
event must approach the condition of those powerful events of radical 
transformation of the social field designated by the term ‘act.’ Elaborating on 
the concepts of over-identification, irony, nonsense, and repetition, I examined 
several examples in which comedy might be read as an ‘act.’ 
The second proposition made by Carnival is that through an event of parody/
satire/mockery/grotesquerie, a group, or community of equals may arise. The 
day of misrule levels social positions and installs a false king of the people—but 
more than this, it is a communal celebration, a gathering of bodies as a ‘public.’ 
It is to this second proposition and its correlative elements of comedy in 
performance (the relationship between performer and audience, representation 
of social formations, context) that I now turn. In other words, I will consider the 
question of ‘attachments.’ After the break, or rupture, of the comic ‘act,’ how do 
subjects create and maintain an attachment to the radical proposition made by 
the moment of Ideologiekritik? Furthermore, what is the best form of 
performance for this attachment to take place? Without losing sight of the 
theoretical arguments of Chapter 2, this thesis, along with my experimental 
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practice-as-research, will explore various aspects of this question. The project 
will necessarily expand to encompass notions of affect, collectives, and groups, 
and what I will begin to term ‘the relational.’ The practice increasingly explores 
open, relational, and dialogic modes of spectatorship and participation in 
comedy performance, all of which fall under the larger rubric of exploring the 
conditions for attachment to the break of Ideologiekritik. As Alain Badiou 
would have it, how does the subject maintain fidelity to the truth of the ‘Event’? 
Badiou writes: ‘[…] to be faithful to the event [a radical exteriority; a break with 
the limits of a certain situation] is to move within the situation that this event 
has supplemented, by thinking […] the situation ‘according to’ the 
event’ (Badiou 2001, quoted in Hallward 2003, p. 128). But ‘faith’ in this sense 
should not be taken in to mean dogmatism or blindness, but rather to think 
with the violent shock to thought effected by the ‘event.’ The reader will note the 
closeness of Badiou’s thought here to Lacan’s. While I will periodically draw on 
Badiou’s terminology when it is technically most appropriate, I will primarily 
use the terms ‘break’ (for rupture with the situation) and ‘attachment’ (for 
fidelity) to avoid the confusions with the term ‘event’ when discussing 
performance, and to avoid any theological overtones in the word ‘fidelity.’ 
‘Attachment’ also carries a valuable affective sense, so that we might think 
together intellectual, emotional, and affective fidelity. 
Formalised performances are sites of social investment. Performance is never 
neutral, but embedded in a context it is productive of and produced by. I agree 
in principle with the view of theorist Miranda Joseph, who, like Michael Hardt 
(2007, in Clough & Halley 2007), expands the Marxist category of production to 
encompass a greater range of practices, including affective labour, sex, and 
performance (Joseph 2002). Performance’s ephemeral nature, she argues, has 
been viewed as antithetical to production—for example, Phelan’s ontology of 
performance, in which ‘performance becomes itself through 
disappearance’ (Phelan 1993, p. 146). But Joseph views production and 
performance as complicit, not opposed: ‘The notion that performance is 
unproductive because it is live, because it is produced and consumed at the 
same moment […] is simply wrong: performance is just as well able to bear 
value (use, exchange, surplus, status) and to produce subjects and social 
formations as any material commodity’ (Joseph 2002, p. 66). This is the 
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‘productivity of performance’; performance produces relationships, affects, and 
social imagination(s). Joseph argues that ‘rather than attempting to escape 
production [e.g. through ‘liveness’ and performance], emancipatory projects 
need to undertake a critical engagement with capitalist production’ (ibid.), 
which, as I have shown, is precisely why an engagement with our ideological 
circumstances is important. In place of uncritical celebration of communal 
pleasure as a form of interstitial unity (what Critchley values as laughter’s 
resistant potential), communal pleasure should be interrogated for its specific 
relationship to an event of emancipatory truth18. 
Ideology is not static, and is tied to investment and affect, and these ‘embodied’ 
qualities must be considered as well. In her analysis of ‘National Fantasy,’ 
Lauren Berlant defines the suggestively Lacanian concept of ‘fantasy’ as both ‘a 
set of forms and the affect that make these forms meaningful’ (Berlant 1991, p. 
4). In other words, the images, ideals, and symbolic structures that make up, in 
this case, national ideology/fantasy, are nothing without some affective 
investiture: ideology is a set of collective practices. This relationship between 
forms and affects makes the site of the comedy event both useful and 
problematic. Žižek makes clear that the ‘act’ retroactively structures its own 
causes: it is recognised in looking back. So as comic artists, how do we bring 
about the conditions for the ‘act?’ In Tarrying With The Negative, Žižek gives 
the example of the dissolution of the Shah’s reign in advance of the 1979 Islamic 
revolution in Iran; the moment the edifice of power began crumbling, it is said, 
is traceable to single instance. The ‘“beginning of the end” […] took place at a 
certain Tehran crossroad where a common citizen refused to obey a policeman’s 
order to go away. The news spread like fire, and, all of a sudden, people ceased 
to “believe in the big Other”’ (Žižek 1993, p. 233).  For this event to be 
recognisable as an ‘act,’ two elements must be present, firstly, the enunciation 
(or, in this case, lack thereof) that breaks with the symbolic order, and secondly, 
fidelity to the event, that is, a free decision to maintain an investment or 
attachment to the moment of the break. 
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18 Truth might be defined here in Badiou’s terms, as opposed to judgment, not resulting from it: 
‘What transmits, what repeats, we shall call knowledge. […] A truth appears in its newness 
because an eventful supplement interrupts repetition. Examples: The appearance, with 
Aeschylus, of theatrical tragedy. The eruption, with Galileo, of mathematical physics. An 
amorous encounter which changes a whole life’ (Badiou 2002, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/
alain-badiou/articles/on-the-truth-process/).
Therefore, with regard to the question of attachments, it becomes clear that the 
artist’s practice must take into account its social and contextual circumstances, 
and attempt to rupture the already socially productive situation. The linguistic 
circumstances of the joke qua critique of ideology are only half of the puzzle, the 
other half is the social and ‘relational’ circumstances of its situation. An 
experimental practice must approach the social with a sense of experimentation, 
repetition, and willingness towards failure, much in the way that Kaufman’s 
‘symbolic deaths’ opened the true traumatic ‘act’ of his comedy. In this way, my 
experimental practice pushes the co-authoring dimension of stand-up comedy, 
in which both audience and performer produce the performance text, to its 
limit. Engaging with multiple dialogues, conversations, moments of chance and 
contingency, I encourage attachments and investments by the audience in the 
moment of the event. 
 3.1 - Case Study: Laughing in a Foreign Language
The question that arose immediately as I began my experimental practice was: 
what form of audience engagement best attaches subjects to the moment of the 
break? The improvisatory and semi-participatory form of stand-up comedy 
(detailed in Chapter 1), suggested curator and theorist Nicolas Bourriaud’s 
theory of a Relational Aesthetics, based primarily not in performance, but in the 
visual arts. Before elaborating on Bourriaud’s theory, I would like to examine 
The Hayward Gallery’s February 2008 exhibition Laughing in a Foreign 
Language, and its sister work-in-progress showing, Marc Horowitz’s 
installation/performance/video ‘The Centre for Improved Living’ as both pieces 
were a direct influence on the development of my practice.
Curated by Mami Kataoka, Laughing in a Foreign Language was an exhibition 
of humorous visual art by international artists. It questioned whether a shared 
background or context was a necessary condition for humour, or if indeed there 
was some dimension of universality to ‘laughter.’ As Charles Darwent’s review 
in The Independent points out, Laughing… is often more about the failure of 
laughter than laughter itself: ‘There’s nothing like not getting a joke to make you 
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feel alienated, and alienation is the punch-line to much of the work’ (Darwent 
2008: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/reviews/
laughing-in-a-foreign-language-hayward-gallery-london-777365.html). In other  
words, the theme of the exhibition is mistranslation more than it is humour qua 
lubricant for cultural understanding—a sense of humour, that most inalienably 
human of qualities, is deeply problematic in the face of globalisation. What 
Darwent misses, of course, is the degree to which mistranslations and 
misreadings are a comic procedure in themselves. In fact, they are a clear 
example of what I will later call a ‘frontier of exclusion,’ a bar to common sense 
that produces the incongruity of the joke.
But for my part, Laughing… featured several works that were genuinely funny. 
It also demonstrated a particular relationship between laughter and the form of 
audience engagement found in the museum/exhibition space. As I begun my 
trip around Laughing… laughter seemed deeply problematic: the environment 
of the Hayward Gallery seemed non-conducive to the expression of laughter. 
With its grey, concrete walls, hushed foyer, and silent gallery attendants, the 
Hayward seemed to actively stifle laughter. As I wandered through the 
exhibition (on a quiet, weekday afternoon), I noticed a number of other visitors 
contemplating various works, alone, or in pairs. At times I heard outbursts of 
laughter, quickly muffled with a hand over the mouth. It seemed the rarified air 
of the museum space, even one as experimental as the Hayward, was difficult to 
overcome.
But it can be argued that the form of these artworks produced the failure of 
laughter, by remaining within a single-spectator, ocular mode of contemplation. 
Take for instance, Julian Rosefeldt’s Clown, a series of self-portraits in which 
the artist appears in traditional circus clown costume and make-up in the 
middle of the Brazilian rainforest. Placing the figure of the clown in an 
unfamiliar environment away from spectators, Rosefeldt can be said to be 
deconstructing the laughing relationship—as if, all the signifiers of laughter are 
there, without the mode of transmission. BBC critic Helena Merriman agrees: 
‘No-one here is laughing. Instead, the exhibition audience now looks on 
suspiciously, unsettled by this traditional figure of fun being so out of 
place’ (Merriman 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/
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7215354.stm). Marcus Coates’s Journey to the Lower World, later featured as 
part of Bourriaud’s Tate Triennial, Altermodern, is a video work in which the 
artist (self-portraiture is heavily featured here, a thread I will later pick up in my  
own exhibition work) is depicted in a Liverpool tower block, performing a 
‘Siberian Shamanistic ritual’ for bemused residents. As I stood watching Coates, 
in full head-dress replete with fur and antlers, I genuinely chortled. Coates 
performs the ritual with deadpan seriousness for the residents of the tower 
block; as such, the work seems to engage with issues of class and cultural 
translation in a humorous way. But what is gained by placing the work in an 
exhibition space, of which, it seems to me, the free movement of visitors is by far  
the most interesting aspect?
It was those works that did engage in some pointed way with the communal and 
perhaps ‘relational’ nature of exhibition display that, to my mind, were most 
conducive to laughter, and led to a number of interesting and unexpected 
scenarios. Martin Walde’s Key Spirit, consists of a locked door, behind which 
can be heard the mewling and scratching of a cat, pleading to be let in. In front 
of the door is a large pile of keys. Following the example of other viewers, one is 
encouraged to try key after key in order to rescue the poor cat. Of course, none 
of the keys work, and soon the chuckling of other viewers tells the unlucky feline 
rescuer that is is they who are now providing the comic spectacle for the other 
viewers. As I met eyes with the other viewers now attempting to muffle their 
laughter, I blushed with embarrassment, then laughed myself as I realised the 
absurdity of the situation. Walde uses a number of strategies to increase the 
work’s comic potential: the keyhole is positioned too low, so that the viewer 
must bend over in an unsightly way to insert the key; and the pile of keys is too 
large, so the burden is truly Sisyphean, with the ever-present possibility that the 
next key is the key. As I came away from the door I shared a knowing glance 
with another group of visitors (I had come alone, and they were strangers). 
Interestingly, another woman from the group then went to the pile of keys, and 
tried them herself, while the rest of the group, myself included, laughed at and 
with her, in a strange repetition of the performance. I am reminded here of the 
Deleuzian distinction between surface effect (event) and depth; Walde’s concern 
is the ‘event,’ the surface effect of comedy. The group knows there is nothing 
behind the door, no hidden depth (hidden cat), yet all the same is compelled to 
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participate in the event. This compulsion and attraction to the participatory 
event suggests a ambiguous manifestation of the idea of ‘attachment.’
Doug Fishbone’s Joke Machine works are more directly ‘comic’ than many of 
the other works in Laughing… while at the same time, more unsettling. The 
Joke Machines are shaped like clown faces, with a large red button in place of 
red nose. When the button is pressed, the machine barks out one of 200 ribald 
jokes. So far, so stand-up. But just as the stand-up event is both disrupted and 
sustained by moments of chance (hecklers and so on), Joke Machine engages 
with the situation of the exhibition space to produce unexpected moments of 
comedy. Darwent writes:
As instructed by its label, I press the button on Doug Fishbone’s Joke 
Master Jr. 2. After a second’s pause, an American voice—much, much too 
loud—growls, ‘How do you get your wife to scream for an hour after sex?’ 
There is no way of stopping the thing: the two other people in the room, 
tiny and Japanese, turn to look at me. ‘Wipe your dick on the curtains!’ 
hollers Fishbone’s scabrous clown. I smile weakly and make a show of 
scribbling notes on my pad. The couple, expressionless, leave. (Darwent 
2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/reviews/
laughing-in-a-foreign-language-hayward-gallery-london-777365.html). 
Darwent takes this as an example of the failure of laughter in this exhibition 
(‘Perhaps the Japanese are laughing on the inside, though I think not’) (ibid.). 
But it seems to me the interest of Fishbone’s work are not the jokes (which are 
standard dirty joke-book fare), but the uncomfortable scenario generated by the 
relationship between viewer, other viewers, and artwork. This is suggested by 
several elements of Joke Machine, including the over-loud voice, the 
appearance of the machine, which resembles a child’s toy, and the vulgarity of 
the jokes. The work seems to produce an ambiguous relationship of power. 
Darwent’s later comment about Candace Breitz’s Aiwa to Zen seems more 
appropriate here: ‘who, precisely, is laughing at whom?’ (ibid).
Best of all is Japanese artist Shimabuku’s Born as a Box. As the viewer nears the 
exit of the gallery, heading for the ubiquitous gift shop, they pass what appears 
to be an innocuous, medium sized cardboard box, which appears to have been 
discarded by staff. As the viewer passes, however, it begins to speak. ‘I am a 
cardboard box,’ it says. ‘Hello, I am a box.’ The box has a strong sense of self: ‘Of 
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course, there are some things I don’t want people to put inside of me, but 
basically I am happy that I am a box.’ On my visit to Laughing in a Foreign 
Language a group of visitors, myself included, congregated around this 
introspective piece of cardboard to listen to its musings; this sense of absurdity 
was compounded by the intrusion of the ‘real world’ in the form of the bored gift  
shop attendant, whose bemused expression suggested his job description did 
not include being stuck for eight hours beside a talking box.
It was those works that played with the open form of the exhibition that most 
suggested a practical answer to the question of attachments (what is the best 
form to attach the subject to the event of critique?). The works detailed above 
back up Critchley’s suggestion that humour is a form of sensus communis: ‘the 
tiny explosions of humour we call jokes return us to a common, familiar domain 
of shared life-world practices, the background of meanings implicit in a 
culture’ (Critchley 2002, p. 90). On three occasions the gathered crowd became 
the site of a common, shared ‘sense’ of humour. For Critchley, if humour is 
sensus communis it also follows that ‘humour might be said to project another 
possible sensus communis, namely a dissensus distinct from the dominant 
common sense. In laughing at a joke I am also consenting to a certain ideal 
image of the world’ (ibid.). Yet Critchley is unclear on how the passage from 
sensus to dissensus might come about. Therefore we must draw on Chapter 2—
the passage from sensus communis to dissensus communis is effected by the 
critical break with ideology, which, with the possible example of Coates’s work, 
was absent from this exhibition. 
  3.2 - Traces and Programmes → relational aesthetics 
and participatory performance
The more interactive works in Laughing in a Foreign Language are influenced 
by a set of practices grouped under the rubric of Relational Aesthetics by 
Nicolas Bourriaud, theorist and curator of the Palais de Tokyo in Paris. The 
theoretical basis of relational art draws upon performance, installation art, 
happenings and Fluxus. In developing my practice-as-research, pushing my 
comedy practice into alternative modes of audience engagement, I began to 
experiment with modes and forms derived from my readings of Bourriaud, 
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therefore it is critical we examine his work and the movement of Relational 
Aesthetics in some depth. 
 
  A practical paradigm
In the conclusion of the previous chapter I elaborated three possible paradigms 
for subjective attachment to the break with ideology proposed by certain 
formulations of comedy performance. In the first instance, for example, in the 
discourses of offense that surround ‘postmodern irony,’ there is a gathering 
around an incommensurable point of antagonism; while highlighting a point of 
social antagonism, this attachment usually progresses no further. In 
psychoanalytic discourse might be said to be ‘perverse.’ In the second instance 
there is the reversal of forced choice back onto a structure or institution of 
power, as in the instances of over-identification. This attachment results in a 
deadlock. There is the third form of a violent, over-determined attachment, as in 
instances when Carnival tips into riot, or the reaction to Kim Noble Will Die at 
the Edinburgh Festival 2009, where spectators were compelled to rip down his 
posters in an act of hysterical erasure. From the discussion of Laughing in a 
Foreign Language we might now add a fourth instance of attachment: the 
formation of a group, which might hold both a sensus and a dissensus 
communis. In other words, the production of a place of safety that can hold the 
antagonistic moment of rupture with ideology; based in the mutual agency of its 
members. My experimental practice thus concerns this fourth mode of 
attachment through the invention of new forms of comedy performance that 
engage with mutual agency and audience participation.
The turn to participation in theatre, performance, and the visual arts has been 
well documented and debated in recent times, by art theorists such as 
Bourriaud, Bishop, and Kester, and theatre scholars, including Kershaw (1999), 
Bayly (2009), Read (2008), and Dixon (2007). Jacques Rancière’s text The 
Emancipated Spectator has problematised these debates as well as contributed 
a philosophical vocabulary with which to discuss them. I am also aware that 
openly ‘participatory work’, at the time of writing, is enjoying a renaissance of 
sorts, from large scale environmental works by Shunt or Punchdrunk to 
intimate, often one-to-one performances under the umbrella of the Forest 
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Fringe. In other words, participatory art/performance is an umbrella rather too 
big (for example, Melanie Wilson’s monologue Iris Brunette has little in 
common with Blast Theory’s SMS game Day of the Figurines bar a concern with  
the increasingly empty signifier of ‘audience engagement’). It lies outside the 
word-length of this thesis to include a comprehensive survey of the field. As 
well, as I will demonstrate below, (traditional) stand-up comedy as a mode of 
performance already disrupts the binary between passive spectator and active 
participant that much of this work is predicated on. Instead, my concern will be 
with the theoretical framework provided specifically by Relational Aesthetics, as 
a means of further interrogating my experimental practice. This is supported by 
a ‘Review of Relevant Practices.’
My focus is the relationship between participatory modes of audience 
engagement and attachments. Turning away from a pedagogical or didactic 
model of critical art, Relational Aesthetics shifts its focus to affects and mutual 
agency; while I believe Bourriaud’s readings of the politics of Relational 
Aesthetics are based in a ‘micro-topian’ world-view I consider far too simplistic, 
this shift in practice is better placed to deal with what Rancière identifies as the 
aesthetic rupture, which renders didactic art (and thus critical art-makers) 
obsolete.
  The Aesthetic Rupture
We can distinguish two independent, albeit (sometimes) interrelated vehicles of 
efficacy in ‘art’: content and form. Either content (a particular image, story of 
trauma or suffering, or satirical juxtaposition) is privileged as the thing that 
acts, or the form of its arrangement of particular relations around the art object 
is. In her essay ‘The Subject of True Feeling,’ Lauren Berlant critiques what she 
calls a politics of ‘feeling’ in the United States, in which action follows from an 
encounter with a narrative or image of suffering or exploitation; this ‘true 
feeling,’ ‘organises analysis, discussion, fantasy, and policy’ (Berlant 1999, p. 
58). What follows from the ‘feeling politics’ of confrontation with a ‘wounded 
image’ of say, the exploited child, are steps to limit direct, subjective violence, 
while leaving the systemic violence that produces the wounded image intact: 
‘Yet only “voluntary” steps are ever taken to control this visible sign of what is 
Chow, D.V.B.
97
ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism […] privatise the atrocity, 
delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign’ (ibid. p. 52, original emphasis). 
The politics of feeling can therefore be deeply counterproductive: ‘Sentimental 
politics makes […] these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the 
centrality of interpersonal identification and empathy to the vitality and 
viability of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to 
overwhelming structural violence’ (ibid. p. 54). I might add to Berlant’s thesis 
that the connection between the ‘wounded image’ of pain, exploitation, or 
subaltern identity is in no way direct. The politics of feeling are a 
sentimentalised version of Levinas’ ethics; from the encounter with the image of 
the Other’s face the individual is constituted as an ethical subject, through what 
Critchley would call an ‘infinite demand.’ But what of the deluge of wounded 
images we see today? Should these not overwhelm the subject to the point of 
collapse? What such a reading of Levinas misses is the dimension of fetishism, 
which I identified in the first chapter: the ‘voluntary acts’ Berlant identifies are 
partial objects of the totality of systemic violence, allowing the subject to bear 
the inconsistencies and horrors of the structure (and these are everywhere 
today, from buying Fair-Trade coffee to the ultimate painless act of goodness, 
the two pound direct debit extracted by charity street fundraisers—‘you won’t 
even notice it!,’ they assure us). So much for the efficacy of content. 
Rancière describes this paradigm of critical art thus: ‘Underlying these forms is 
the assumption that art compels us to revolt when it shows us revolting 
things’ (Rancière 2010, p. 135). On the other hand we have critical art as ‘ethical 
immediacy,’ which takes in practices from the festivals of Ancient Greece to 
Fluxus and Relational Aesthetics. I will pursue this point further in Chapter 5. 
Apart from the polemic, however, relational art, much like theatre, exists on the 
intersection between ethical immediacy, representational mediation, and 
aesthetics, in other words, between form, content, and reception. Against the 
pedagogy of the efficacy of content and the efficacy of form, Rancière posits the 
efficacy of the aesthetic rupture, which is the efficacy of dissensus. The specific 
formulation of dissensus here is important: ‘Dissensus is a conflict between a 
sensory perception and a way of making sense of it’ (ibid., p. 139). As politics 
‘invents new forms of collective enunciation, it re-frames the given by inventing 
new ways of making sense of the sensible’ (ibid.). In other words, the lack of 
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direct causality between content/feeling → action, or form/doing → action, is 
not a problem for critical art, but the source of its efficacy: ‘What comes to pass 
is a rupture in the specific configuration that allows us to stay in “our” assigned 
places in a given state of things. These sorts of ruptures can happen anywhere 
and at any time, but they can never be calculated’ (ibid., p. 143). Rancière is of 
course not far from the idea of the ‘act’ qua break or rupture with ideology, 
however, in his formulations I detect a resignation that is far from ideal for a 
practitioner of ‘critical art.’ While his concept of the efficacy of dissensus is 
useful, and fairly close to my own position, his argument that dissensual 
ruptures cannot be calculated might be taken by some as relieving the critical 
artist of responsibility for the signifying possibilities of his/her content and 
forms. While the vocabulary Rancière introduces is useful and compatible with 
the framework I have identified previously, it is both too specific (bracketing off 
other possible and useful interpretations of ‘police’ order or even ‘politics,’ for 
example), and not specific enough. While I agree that performance comedy can 
be political in as much as it enacts a ‘redistribution of the sensible,’ this gives no 
possible indication of how this redistribution might be effected or what its 
effects might be. I have effectively introduced Rancière’s theoretical framework 
on the efficacy of art here in order to show that my Lacanian position on the 
artwork qua ‘act’ or rupture does not exist in isolation. 
  Comedy and Relational Aesthetics
Three elements of stand-up comedy performance appear already sympathetic 
with the discourse of relational aesthetics: the directly ‘relational’ mode of 
performer-audience engagement; its anti-representational character; and its 
focus on the event. Firstly, stand-up comedy bypasses the active/passive binary 
that often defines the distinction between ‘participatory’ and ‘traditional’ 
theatre. As noted by Lockyer and Pickering (2005[2009], p. 11) ‘in many 
instances what is accepted as a joke, and so funny on that account, has first to 
be negotiated as a joke. Its meaning has to be accepted as comic, either in 
intention or consequence, and then evaluated as comic […],’  which suggests a 
type of ‘joking relationship’ between all parties, which is crucial for humorous or 
comic exchange. If this breaks down, or one party refuses to play their role, the 
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joke fails. Stand-up, therefore, is an immanently relational form, directly 
complicating the idea of an aesthetic break as elaborated by Rancière. 
Historically, stand-up is defined by its break from theatre qua ‘theatron,’ that is,  
a ‘place of seeing.’ Even in 1888, critical discourse around front-cloth comedians 
noted their ability to directly ‘relate’ to the audience. Double analyses a 
recording of performer Nellie Wallace: ‘she acknowledges the audience and 
talks directly to them. She goes on to ask them to join in with the song’s chorus 
(which closes the act) [...] T.S. Eliot remembered seeing her being jeered and 
heckled: “I have seen her [...] make some quick retort that silenced her 
tormentors for the evening”’ (Double 2005, p. 33). 
Secondly, stand-up comedy is, for the most part, anti-representational. The use 
of this term requires some elaboration; in the relating of stories or anecdotes in 
the first-person past-tense, stand-up comedy might be said to have the same 
representational character as certain novels. Additionally, the issue of the 
comedian’s ‘persona’ complicates matters; what is the persona but a 
representation of a particular facet or facets of the comic’s subjectivity? By ‘anti-
representational’ I mean that stand-up is a task-oriented and game-oriented 
performance form: the task is to make the audience laugh (a task that the 
audience is similarly complicit in), the game is based in the risk and chance 
involved in completing the task. The form is anti-representational inasmuch as 
the mechanisms of the task/game are transparent. 
Finally, stand-up comedy is ‘event’ focused. This is perhaps related to stand-up’s 
unique relationship with temporality. Eschewing narrative time, stand-up might 
be said to exist in the time of the event. In the stand-up event, the collective 
awareness of audience and performer is directed to the present. Both audience 
and comedian are unbearably assertive of their ‘being-there,’ from interruptions 
such as heckles or self-reflexive comments by the comedian, to the smiles and 
‘corpsing’ that may overcome the comic as a routine is going well. These three 
interrelated elements of stand-up comedy practice demonstrate a paradigmatic 
break with the conventions of theatre practice that have, through repetition over 
time, evolved into a coherent practice of their own. Similarly, the experimental 
practices in the visual arts from the 1990s onwards, gathered by Bourriaud into 
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a (debatably) coherent ‘movement’ known as Relational Aesthetics, also show 
such a paradigmatic break. 
  Traces and Programmes
Maintaining a critical distance from the ‘utopian’ claims for a relational art 
made by champions of the theory and form, I will now provide a concise 
exegesis of Bourriaud’s text and related theoretical work. This is intended to 
provide a critical background for my project of experimental practice. While my 
hypothesis is that the formal practices of relational art (that is to say, 
deconstructing the stand-up event in space and time) may suggest a further, 
efficacious form of subject attachment to the break with ideology effected by 
jokes and joking, conversely, I can also suggest that comedy can provide the 
knife-edge of antagonism that rescues relational art’s radical-emancipatory 
politics from becoming what Bourriaud himself describes as ‘Nokia 
Art’—‘producing interpersonal relationships for their own sake and never 
addressing their political aspects’ (Bourriaud 2004, quoted in Bishop 2004, p. 
68).  The synthesis of comedy and relational art might be doubly productive.
The term ‘Relational Aesthetics’ designates both a theory and a practice, which 
has led to a certain degree of misinterpretation. The key features of Relational 
Aesthetics are its open form, interactivity, and the fore-fronting of viewer/
audience reception. In simplest terms, Relational Aesthetics might be 
characterised as an alternative framework for aesthetic reception: the viewer 
completes the artwork, but as opposed to the individual response, his/her 
response is to be read as part of the viewer’s social circumstances in the 
presence of the work (I am 28, male, standing in the Tate Modern, there are 
three people around me, one has asked me about the painting, we might go for 
coffee and discuss it further, and so on…). The work is a locus of ‘transitivity,’ a 
‘forever unfinished discursiveness, and a never recaptured desire for 
dissemination’ (Bourriaud 2002[1], p. 26). So far, so post-structuralist. But 
Relational Aesthetics is made interesting by the ‘possibility of a relational 
art’ (ibid., p. 14, original emphasis), an ‘art taking as its theoretical horizon the 
realm of human interactions and its social context rather than the assertion of 
an independent and private symbolic space’ (ibid., original emphasis). The 
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innovation of Relational Aesthetics, separating it from post-structuralist 
theoretical arguments as previous visual arts movements including Fluxus and 
performance art (to which it is heavily indebted), is its execution. For the most 
part, relational art is a shift from the social circumstances of the viewer as a 
fundamental condition of viewer’s response to the art object to those same 
social circumstances taking the place of the object itself. The ontology of the 
relational artwork is, in a way, productive: it produces a scenario, an event, a 
series of social relations. The artwork is processual or even provisional—and 
transparently task-oriented, in the manner ascribed above to stand-up comedy. 
In contrast to participatory or environmental theatre, the mechanisms of the 
relational art event are not shrouded by fiction or illusion. The work aims not at 
making the spectator feel part of an unusual environment or narrative, but 
instead draws attention to the viewer’s social circumstances in the present. 
That, at least, is the idea. 
In truth, Bourriaud’s writings are often little more than a series of observations 
on an emergent social turn in contemporary art. As such, Relational Aesthetics 
documents a transition from a critical art of the industrial economy to a critical 
art of the service economy; or, to use the technical terminology, from Fordism 
to post-Fordism. In an interview with George Barker, artist Pierre Huyghe, one 
of Bourriaud’s recurring references, notes: ‘In the 1960s, it was important for 
artists to deal with the product and the object […] but today this former 
economy of industrial products has shifted to an economy of service. Human 
relations are directly involved in such an economy’ (Huyghe/Barker 2004, p. 
100). Bourriaud writes: ‘Because art is made of the same material as the social 
exchanges, it has a special place in the collective production process […] This 
quality is its (relative) social transparency’ (Bourriaud 2002[1], p. 41). Thus, 
while emerging from the conceptual art of the late 1960s, relational art is a 
significant update of this oppositional practice, and the theoretical model of 
Relational Aesthetics can be read as a materialist criticism in the era of 
‘immaterial production.’ In the 1960s, what Lucy Lippard denoted as the 
‘dematerialisation of the art object’ was an immanent critique of modes of 
production and the devaluation of what Benjamin calls the unique ‘auratic’ 
quality of the work. The shift to a service economy means many individuals 
might be engaged with what philosopher Michael Hardt calls ‘affective labour,’ 
Chow, D.V.B.
102
which might include ‘health care workers, flight attendants, fast food workers, 
and sex workers—all strongly gendered activities that, to a large degree, produce 
affects’ (Hardt 2007, in Clough and Halley 2007, p. xi). This, he argues, forms a 
large proportion of waged and unwaged economies—see both the well-
documented turn to ‘service economy’ in the UK and the way in which a 
household is structured along lines of gender and ‘roles.’ With a turn to affective 
labour comes a change in our theoretical conception of production; Hardt 
writes: ‘The challenge of the perspective of affects resides primarily in the 
syntheses it requires. This is, in the first place, because affects refer equally to 
the body and the mind; and, in the second, because they involve both reason 
and the passions’ (ibid. p. ix). In a certain sense, the ‘affective turn’ (Clough and 
Halley 2007) in the social sciences takes into account the break between sense 
and sense identified by Rancière; in thinking the affect of the piece we might 
(arguably) conceive of the feelings it evokes along with how these feelings are 
synthesised and ‘made sense of.’ If we are to take historical context into account, 
relational art might also be described as ‘affective art,’ and it would not be 
unreasonable to ascribe to it a certain potential for resistance. Relational 
Aesthetics and relational art might be described as an artistic intervention using 
the framework of immaterial production or affective labour to produce a new 
scenario or set of relations. 
While the affective turn in Relational Aesthetics is where one might locate the 
political dimension of this work, Bourriaud’s own conception of relational art’s 
transformative or resistant potential is simultaneously too optimistic and too 
resigning. It leaves no space for an emancipatory politics of systemic 
transformation, but overstates the potential of interstitial pockets of resistance. 
Relational Aesthetics, he argues, moves away from ‘utopian,’ modernist politics 
of wholesale transformation to simply ‘learning to inhabit the world in a better 
way’ (Bourriaud 2002[1], p. 13). ‘It seems more pressing to invent possible 
relations with our neighbours in the present than to bet on happier 
tomorrows’ (ibid., p. 45). The resignation of this statement recalls what Žižek 
describes as the first reaction of the contemporary Left to the ‘full hegemony of 
global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal democracy’: ‘full 
acceptance of this framework: continuing to fight for emancipation within its 
rules (Third Way social democracy)’ (Žižek 2008[2009], p. 337). Significantly, 
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Bourriaud uses the term ‘interstice’ to designate art (2002[1], p. 16), echoing 
Simon Critchley’s argument that an emancipatory politics must operate from 
within the interstices of state power, bombarding it with impossible demands. 
But without the moment of the ‘break,’ the possibly of an ‘act’ of ‘traversing the 
fantasy,’ does the artwork qua interstice not reproduce the structures of power 
it seeks to overturn? The transition from industrial economy to service economy  
is not merely a problem in theory but a more total and global expansion of 
capitalism itself. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we have, as Mark Fisher 
(2009, p. 16) argues, entered a period of ‘capitalist realism’—without a really-
existing alternative as an imaginary reference point, we begin to see the 
invented, reified relations of global capital as ‘natural.’ ‘Capitalist realism,’ he 
writes, ‘can only be threatened if it is shown to be in some way inconsistent or 
untenable; if, that is to say, capitalism’s ostensible “realism” turns out to be 
nothing of the sort’ (ibid.). In the most brutal terms, the argument we must 
raise against Bourriaud’s ‘micro-utopianism’ is simply the place of ideology—
does the invention of new relations in a particular work break with  ideological 
conditions, or does it simply enable us to live more efficiently and comfortably 
under them? 
These questions of critique will be investigated in Chapter 5. For now, in 
keeping with the narrative structure of this thesis I will now detail several works 
by artists Rirkrit Tiravanija, Liam Gillick, and Pierre Huyghe, in a review of 
relevant practices. I will also examine the related theoretical model of dialogical 
aesthetics documented by Grant Kester. 
  3.3 - Review of relevant practices
A relational artwork typically features an artist-led social scenario, activated by 
the presence and/or participation of viewers/visitors. These may take the form 
of parties, discussion groups, ateliers, or inhabitable installation pieces. In the 
following review of relational art practices my aim is not to engage in an art-
historical reading of Relational Aesthetics, but rather to identify some key 
formal features that will prove useful for my practice-as-research. 
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   Interactivity and objectivity: Rirkrit Tiravanija 
untitled (Aperto, 1993), untitled (tomorrow is another day) 
(Cologne, 1996).
Tiravanija is an Argentinian artist of Thai origin practicing in New York who 
creates interactive, participatory works often held as representative of relational 
art as a whole. Untitled (Aperto, 1993) at the Venice Biennale is an installation 
consisting of a gas stove, a cooking pot filled with boiling water, camping gear, 
and cardboard boxes, most open, containing ‘dehydrated Chinese soups’19 
(Bourriaud 2002 [1], p. 25).  Visitors were free to add boiling water to the 
noodles and eat them, while enjoying the social atmosphere. For Bourriaud, this 
piece ‘remains around the edge of any definition: is it a sculpture? an 
installation? a performance? an example of social activism?’ (ibid.), which 
suggests he is wrestling with an emergent, ‘social’ form. Three years later 
Tiravanija presented the viewer with not only a makeshift kitchen, but an entire 
living quarters, a recreation of his apartment in New York City (untitled 
[tomorrow is another day], Cologne, 1996). The viewer was permitted to 
inhabit the installation, using the working kitchen, bathroom, bedroom and 
lounge. In both these pieces, the artist is present. In untitled [tomorrow is 
another day], Tiravanija inhabits his simulated apartment 24 hours a day, and 
the hours of the museum are also extended to allow the artist to receive ‘guests’ 
at any point. In his cooking pieces it is the artist himself who cooks for his 
viewers. How are we to read these pieces? 
One account of Tiravanija’s exhibition at 303 Gallery reads: ‘The gallery became 
a place for sharing, jocularity and frank talk. I bumped into [David Zwirner] on 
the street and he said, “nothing’s going right today, let’s go to Rirkrit’s.” We did, 
and he talked about the lack of excitement in the New York art world’ (Saltz 
1996, quoted in Bishop 2004, p. 67). This account suggests that conviviality is 
Tiravanija’s primary concern. Bourriaud (2002 [1], p. 49) describes a relational 
artwork as displaying ‘[not] its construction (or dismantlement) process, but the 
presence of its form amid an audience.’ The intersection therefore, of 
installation and dematerialised ‘event’ renders both the focus on the object of 
traditional criticism and the discourse of performance (as ephemeral, as 
‘disappearing’) problematic. Bourriaud writes (2002 [1], p. 54): ‘A Tiravanija 
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19 ‘Pot noodles,’ in layman’s parlance. 
show, for example, does not dodge materialisation, but deconstructs the 
methods of making the art object into a series of events,’ which is to say, it shifts 
the logic by which  an object comes to be a representative of a process so that it 
is an always-unfinished process that is on display. To follow this thread to its 
end, the relational artwork qua ‘event of art’ functions as an inherent critique of 
commodification/capitalism. This inherent critique is highly contestable, and 
later I take up this thread through Martin Stewart’s 2007 article for Third Text. 
The most useful way to approach Tiravanija’s work is, perhaps, by considering 
the status of affect. Bourriaud conceives of the work in terms of its potential to 
disrupt relations of reification and commodification in the art world. However, 
it is perhaps more interesting to consider the rupture effected by the serving of 
free food in a gallery. What new relation is created when the artist takes the role 
of donor or patron? What dissensual reorganisation is created by the sense 
(tasting, eating) of free food in the light of ideological discourses of poverty or 
starvation? What is the role of the affective space that this action produces—the 
smells, the tastes, the conviviality, do these effect a form of ‘attachment?’ 
Crucially, Tiravanija’s work lacks contextual reference beyond the ‘art world,’ 
and so may be said to reinforce existing structures or groups. Formally, 
however, Tiravanija’s work is groundbreaking in its casual and convivial 
approach to the event, and I will incorporate a number of elements of his works 
into my own experimental practice, particularly the exhibition/studio space The 
Centre for Dangerology with painter Thom Glen.
   Reprogramming the status of the object: Liam 
Gillick Prototype Erasmus Table #2 (Ghent 1995), Instructions/Il 
Mistero dei 100 Dollari (Milan 1992)
Unlike the convivial installation-events of Tiravanija, Goldsmiths-trained 
British artist Liam Gillick creates architectural forms and sculptures that draw 
on household design, though their relational nature challenges the finished 
status of any art object. For Prototype Erasmus Table #2, Gillick created a large 
table filling nearly one entire room in the ON-LINE gallery, Ghent. It was given 
a use; the table is conceived of as a working space for Gillick’s book Erasmus is 
Late. According to the catalogue (2000): ‘[…] the table was also made available 
to other people for the storage and exhibition of work on, under and around 
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it’ (Gaensheimer/Schafhausen 2000, p. 36). The table becomes a palimpsestic 
display of artistic activity. Each engagement by the viewer invites interaction 
with the artist through a plastic materiality. Gillick’s table invites 
reconsideration of the viewer’s relationship to the art object; which, in this case 
is not fixed, but expresses a programme for more activity. The work of other 
artists displayed on the table does not feel parasitic, but collaborative, as if the 
existence of the table as an artwork is itself contingent on the encounters with 
other artworks, and so on. Gillick’s work in this way represents a move from 
conviviality to collaboration. This ‘collaborative’ mode of working is also 
apparent in Instructions/Il Mistero dei 100 Dollari (Milan 1992), in which 
Gillick invited other artists to fax in sets of instructions for the creation/
construction of artworks, directly to the receiving gallery. The instructions were 
completed by Gillick and the works were exhibited as a group show. The 
possibilities for collaboration on a material level in Gillick’s work is useful, and 
is incorporated in several pieces of my experimental practice. Furthermore, 
while less directly interactive, perhaps, than Tiravanija’s pieces, Gillick seems 
more broadly aware of the importance of context—the pieces I have referred to 
above respond and document the network of relations that form their context. 
   Material interventions into social space: Pierre 
Huyghe Chantiers Barbes-Rochechouart (Paris 1994) and 
Streamside Day Follies (Dia Centre, NYC, 2004)
French artist Pierre Huyghe’s work demonstrates a further complication of the 
relational paradigm in his use of film and documentation. But the film produced 
is rarely the simple end-point of a process of artistic labour. In an interview with 
George Barker (2004, p. 89), Huyghe notes: ‘[…] art objects should be seen as 
transitory, they are in-between, they are not ends in themselves. They have an 
outside.’ Huyghe’s artworks also responds more directly to larger social 
conditions as well as issues of labour and capital, to a greater degree than either 
Tiravanija or Gillick. I wish to focus my discussion on Huyghe’s use of 
‘proposition’—the ideas of ‘score,’ ‘screenplay,’ and the Situationist 
‘ritournelle’ (time-score) appear frequently. There is a particular relationship 
between activity and object, between screenplay and film, in Huyghe’s oeuvre, 
which disrupts patterns of progress and labour. For Chantiers Barbes-
Rochechouart (Paris 1994), Huyghe photographed a group of construction site 
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workers (chantiers, French for ‘building works’) on the Rue Barbes-
Rochechouart, and erected the enlarged photo as a billboard a few yards from 
the building site. This remained in place for the duration of the workers’ project, 
was documented by still images and video, and taken down. Bourriaud writes: 
‘[Huyghe] organizes his work as a critique of the narrative models offered us by 
society’ (Bourriaud 2002 [2], p. 47); what Chantiers Barbes Rochechouart 
critiques is the accepted narrative of progress, or even process, which Huyghe 
shuns: ‘It is less a question of ‘process’ which is too linear, but of a vibrating 
temporality’ (Huyghe/Barker 2002, p. 88). We generally accept that labour 
happens somewhere in the background, and a large structure is built. Huyghe’s 
intervention disrupts this narrative; it is a real-time representation, obliterating 
the ‘social falsification’ of ‘delayed representation’ (a building as representative 
of a period of human labour) (Bourriaud 2002 [2], p. 51). The co-presence of 
representation and process is a dissensual aesthetic object. 
Streamside Day Follies (Dia, NYC, 2004) takes the idea of production of a new 
scenario further. Streamside Knolls is a new, fabricated village in upstate New 
York. In this project, Huyghe created Streamside Day, a new celebration. Acting 
as ‘project manager’ for the celebration, Huyghe allowed it to happen, 
documented it, and exhibited his video and still images in a multimedia 
installation. Huyghe says of Streamside: ‘What interested me was to investigate 
how a fiction, how a story could in fact produce a certain kind of reality. An 
additif of reality’ (Huyghe/Barker 2004, p. 82). Huyghe’s ‘score’ or ‘screenplay’ 
explores the production of social reality. In the almost absurdist setting of the 
planned community Huyghe catalyses a fictional ‘tradition,’ the documentation 
and potential repetition of which creates a new social reality. In his interview 
with Barker Huyghe likens this to the celebration of Halloween (an American 
import) in France: ‘We used to import products, and now we import traditions, 
invented traditions… Mainly planting a custom is about setting up a stable 
repetition’ (Huyghe/Barker 2004 p. 85). However, if anything, Streamside 
seems to undermine the idea of a ‘stable repetition.’ The juxtaposition, in the 
visual documentation, of participants wearing rabbit heads, with anonymous, 
vinyl sided manufactured homes, is profoundly destabilising of the empty 
signifier of community, evoking a strong sense of melancholy. The ‘score,’ or 
proposition in this case thus holds a potential for a new mode of living as well as 
Chow, D.V.B.
108
an embodied critique of actual circumstances of living. 
   Dialogical Aesthetics
Grant Kester’s concept of a ‘dialogical aesthetics’ draws from and then departs 
from Relational Aesthetics. The practices that serve as Kester’s points of 
reference take place almost exclusively outside of the museum or gallery and are 
much more akin to the discourse of Applied Theatre or Community Arts. Kester 
aligns the process of ‘dialogue’ with transformative potential—where Bourriaud 
discussed creating micro-utopias, the ‘dialogical projects of WochenKlausur, 
[Suzanne] Lacy and others’ work through a form of Brechtian alienation, 
‘challenging fixed identities and perceptions of difference’ (Kester 2004, p. 
84-85). Whereas, for the most part, the artists collected under the aegis of 
Relational Aesthetics generate or produce social relationships, often among 
strangers, using the ‘free’ discursive medium of the art gallery or museum, a 
dialogic artist intervenes in an existing community. Whereas Tiravanija and his 
peers tended to view the gallery as a ‘neutral space’ for the event, an artist 
working dialogically might contend that no space is ‘neutral,’ and that the 
existing context (cultural, social, political, and economic) must be forefront in 
the collaborative process. Kester cites artist Stephen Willats’ diagram ‘A Socially  
Interactive Model of Art Practice,’ which triangulates ‘Artist-Audience-Context’ 
around the produced thing, ‘Artwork’ (Kester 2004, p. 92). Writes Kester: 
‘Willats argues for a form of aesthetic exchange in which the artist’s own 
presuppositions are potentially challenged by the viewer’s response through a 
process of direct collaboration and feedback’ (ibid). 
Take for instance Austrian artist’s collective WochenKlausur, who created a 
piece of design-art with the students of a school20, in a collective and 
collaborative process leading to a visual redesign of existing social space within 
that school. In Willats’s terms we have a relationship of potential ‘challenge’ in 
the dialogue effected by the collaborative model of the collective’s practices with 
participants. The role of the artist is of considerable importance here. In the 
Lacanian ‘act’, as I have detailed in Chapter 2, the actor in some way ‘abjects’ 
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20 WochenKlausur, Intervention in a School, University of Applied Arts, Vienna, Austria (Nov 
1995-Jan 1996).
herself, changing her position within the community and in some cases 
excluding herself entirely (Antigone). Within the frame of (comic) performance 
this positioning holds, as we can see in the work of Andy Kaufman, and as I will 
demonstrate in my later discussion of artist Kim Noble. The position of the 
artist in a dialogical aesthetic process is almost precisely the opposite, as in the 
majority of cases the process begins with the artist in a position outside the 
community and through collaborative work the artist becomes increasingly 
included, in a sort of ethnographic artistic practice. A good example is artist Jay 
Koh, whose laudable practice is documented by Kester: 
For Koh an art practice that privileges dialogue and communication 
cannot be based on the serial imposition of a fixed formal or spatial motif 
(as in Tiravanija’s ‘cafes’ and ‘lounges’). Rather, it must begin with an 
attempt to understand as thoroughly as possible the specific conditions 
and nuances of a given site. Only then can one devise the most effective 
and responsive formal manifestation, gesture, or event. (Kester 2004, p. 
107).
In September 2009, I also worked with Koh, inviting him to organise and 
facilitate a workshop as part of the colloquium Zombomodernism: The Ends of 
Practice-as-Research. Koh presented his work in a round-table format, 
discussing and debating the problems associated with socially engaged art. 
From our discussions it became clear that Koh’s mode of working privileged 
permanence; that is, revisiting the site of the artist’s intervention should, 
ideally, show a continued independent development by the community. For 
Koh, the problem was not how to intervene, having created through his projects 
methods of working based on principles of absolute transparency (for example, 
when working in Burma, Koh was as open as possible to government officials 
about his projects, paradoxically, remaining continuously visible afforded him 
and his collaborators a greater degree of resistant freedom) and cultural 
sensitivity. The problem, was how the process could be aestheticised. This is not 
a problem for so-called relational artists, for whom the very framing-as-art of 
‘process’ formed an emergent aesthetic. In this way, Koh’s practice, as well as 
other dialogic artists, has a great affinity with the practices of applied theatre. 
These practices are commendable, but as the numerous discussions in the field 
of applied theatre have shown, far from ‘challenging’ fixed identities, they might 
often strengthen the identity of community. ‘Strengthening community’ is in no 
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way a priori bad, however, as Joseph writes, it is in no way an unequivocal or 
self-evident good, either. For all of Kester’s departure from Bourriaud, these 
practices tend towards the same problem as Tiravanija’s cooking pieces or 
Gillick’s showrooms: they privilege the interstitial distance without offering the 
possibility of larger, systemic critique. Both Kester and Bourriaud are perhaps 
equally trapped by ideology. 
I will end my discussion of Kester’s dialogical aesthetics at this point as the 
scope of this study and its word count cannot begin to encompass such a related 
but divergent practice. I am by no means critiquing the good work done by Koh, 
Lacy, WochenKlausur, or other applied artists. It is rather my argument that 
these practices must be supplemented by practices that aim at progressive 
ideological critique—as David Harvey argues, anti-capitalist struggle requires 
both structural change as well as the transformation of mental conceptions of 
the world (Harvey 2010). From another angle, Bishop (2006) summarises my 
objections:
What serious criticism has arisen in relation to socially collaborative art 
has been framed in a particular way. The social turn in contemporary art 
has prompted an ethical turn in art criticism. This is manifest in a 
heightened attention to how given collaboration is undertaken. In other 
words, artists are increasingly judged by their working process—the 
degree to which they supply good or bad models of collaboration—and 
criticised for any hint of potential exploitation that fails to “fully” 
represent their subjects, as if such a thing were possible… (Bishop 2006: 
http://www.artforum.com/inprint/issue=200602&id=10274)
This privileging the process over the product (and keep in mind by way of 
contrast the complication and enmeshing of process and product in the 
Relational practices I have detailed above), Bishop argues, is based on a 
resistance to the commodification of the art object, a critical stance previously 
occupied by conceptual art. But lacking the provocation(s) of conceptual art 
(which seemed to all ask ‘is this art?’), the discourse of socially-collaborative art 
ceases at the termination of the process: ‘the urgency of [the] political task has 
led to a situation in which such collaborative practices are automatically 
perceived to be equally important artistic gestures of resistance’ (ibid.). In other 
words, the process becomes unknowable, specific to the community in which it 
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has taken place21. Furthermore, while Kester rejects the way in which Relational 
Aesthetics ‘preserves the idea that the artist is a superior being, able to 
penetrate the veils of mystification that otherwise confuse and disorient the 
hapless modern subject’ (Kester 2004: 88) (leading to ‘orthopaedic art’), he 
seems not to recognise the way in which his model is based on a similar artist → 
community binary. While Bourriaud’s ‘micro-topian’ assumptions that the artist 
is in a privileged position to create awareness, transform society, and build 
communities are indeed objectionable (as Kester writes: ‘bring[ing] the 
orthopaedic aesthetic into surprising proximity to the rhetoric of advertising, 
which promises viewers access to a more prestigious or enlightened social 
identity if they engage in the requisite act of consumption’)(ibid.), how, 
precisely, does the dialogical artist evade this trap? In other words, how is the 
dialogical artist placed in a (privileged) position to recognise a community 
needs fixing? In such a binary relationship, the artist is always-already outside. 
This reveals the presence of a social antagonism, the exclusionary position 
which I will further explore in Chapter 5. For the moment, I would like to 
propose a reorganisation of Willat’s triangular model, to read ‘Artist-Audience-
Artwork’ around ‘Context,’ with Context being the thing produced. This returns 
to the event-based theoretic of both Relational Aesthetics and performance, in 
which the artwork is a transitional object. 
  3.4 - Conclusions: Is it an ism? 
The essays that would eventually make up Relational Aesthetics were first 
published in French in 1994. Since then, Bourriaud’s curatorial practice and 
theoretical model has moved on. The follow-up text Postproduction built on the 
idea of an ‘unfinished discursiveness’ from the practices of Relational Aesthetics 
and focused on the art of collage, edit, and remix. In 2008 Bourriaud coined the 
term ‘Altermodernism,’ a neologism that foregrounds diversity, alterity, and 
translation as central concepts of the present ‘modern.’ Altermodern was also 
the name of the popular 2008 Tate Triennial, curated by Bourriaud. Within the 
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21 The thing that is ignored, of course, is audience. Illustrations of WochenKlausur’s Intervention in a 
School or Intervention to Improve the Conduct of Public Debate tend to leave me, as a viewer, cold, 
suggesting state-funded graphic or architectural design, with none of the frisson of liveness or potential 
suggested by even still photos of Tiravanija’s Untitled (Aperto 93) (Venice Biennale), an artist induced 
relational machine. 
intentionally piece-meal curatorial impulse of the exhibition, traces of what we 
might refer to as a relational aestheticism remained. Immersive installation was 
much in evidence (Nathaniel Mellors’ large-scale walk-through installation 
Giantbum was the flagship work). The main hall featured an installation of 
cushions, arranged around a cluster of television screens—visitors could lounge 
on these cushions to watch video work, including Spartacus Chetwynd’s 
Hermito’s Children. And a great deal of work engaged with actually existing 
social structures, including, most notably, Walead Beshty’s work, which 
featured a series of glass boxes, revealing their damage after having been 
shipped via Federal Express to various locations in the world. These curatorial 
decisions highlighted the processes of both ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing-with.’ Among 
strangers, an invitation was extended to form a sort of community in shared 
viewing. Ultimately, while interesting in its own right, the downsizing of 
Relational Aesthetics to a Relational Aestheticism in a way diminishes any 
arguments for social transformation or political efficacy. If the prime concern is 
simply an aesthetics of participation or conviviality, is Bourriaud simply 
‘theatricalising’ the spectator experience in the fine arts? 
The most effective way, therefore, to treat this important movement in the 
visual arts is as a ‘bricolage’ of concepts capturing a particular historical 
moment, irreducible to a common form or aesthetic. In this chapter I have 
raised the issue of ‘attachment’ to the break, shifting the discussion from the 
philosophical situation of comedy and the means by which it performs 
Ideologiekritik, to the artistic situation in which the subject can form an 
attachment to the break (in Harvey’s terms; transform mental conceptions). 
Building on three instances of attachment identified in Chapter 2, I proposed a 
fourth, the formation of an affective space, and a group. I then examined the 
theoretical framework of Relational Aesthetics and reviewed a number of 
relevant practices. A number of formal elements may be drawn from Relational 
Aesthetics and applied to my experimental practice. Hence, I have conceived of 
the following three keys to relational art practice:
1.Participation, encounter and engagement
2.Art as intervention into an existing social network
3.Art as open space and proposal for production/encounter/interaction
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Taken together, these three concepts sketch a possible model of art as producer 
of social and cultural conditions, or context. My experimental practice is, at this 
point, supported by a theoretical framework of the break with ideology from 
Chapter 2, and a theoretical/formal framework of encounter and mutual agency 
from this chapter. In the following chapter I will detail the first proper phase of 
my experimental practice, which led to two outcomes, two exhibitions of visual 
and conceptual art (The Centre for Dangerology and Dangerology) that 
attempted to expand my stand-up comedy practice under the rubric of the 
relational. It is important at this point to note that my practice-as-research 
progresses as a narrative. Within this first phase, I now acknowledge, my 
embrace of Bourriaud’s theory of Relational Aesthetics was far too uncritical. 
These problems in theory also lead to problems in practice (for example, not 
only were my assertions of the transformative power of relational aesthetics 
misguided, but in practice the very idea of ‘comedy’ was compromised). In the 
course of my work, my practice less and less resembled performance comedy; 
which led me to conclude that the practice lacked ‘antagonism.’ This is 
addressed in later chapters with a synthesis of the Lacanian framework with 
Mouffe and Laclau’s concepts of hegemony and antagonism, and an ultimate 
return to performance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXPERIMENTAL PRACTICE - DANGEROLOGY
 4.0 - Dangerology: an experimental practice in context
In this chapter I analyse the first instances of my experimental practice proper 
in the context of the methodological and theoretical framework I have now 
developed. The two ‘finished’ projects examined in this chapter, The Centre for 
Dangerology (Central School of Speech and Drama) and Dangerology (Alsager 
Arts Centre Gallery) are experiments into the formal practices of relational and 
participatory aesthetics. In this ‘phase’ of experimental practice I broadly 
interrogate ‘open’ forms (here I draw on Eco’s terminology from The Open 
Work, 1989) of audience-performer engagement as sites of attachment to the 
political ‘acts’ of Ideologiekritik. Seen in the macro, this phase is the first of a 
double-movement. In the previous chapter, I proposed that relational or 
participatory engagement might create a particular mode of attachment. This 
attachment might be defined as a relationship of empathy and conviviality, 
while all the same maintaining fidelity. In a simultaneous movement, I also 
proposed that comedy may contribute antagonism itself, the very break required 
for any social efficacy or transformation. My experimental practice is therefore a 
synthesis between two divergent practices. In doing so I am expanding the idea 
of performance comedy to encompass other practices (interactive performance, 
participation, environmental theatre) that are already well-established. 
The first consideration when attempting to synthesise (this word is intended in 
a Hegelian fashion) two antithetical practices is their superficial opposition. In 
the discourse of stand-up the performer is often said to ‘control’ the audience: it 
is common to hear a comedian speak of ‘doing some “crowd control,”’ a term 
generally reserved for scenes of riot police and protestors). The goal in this form 
is sustained and collective outbursts of laughter. On the other hand, relational 
art is characterised by an injunction to relax, converse, and enjoy a convivial 
atmosphere. On one level, these two practices could not be more different. As 
such, this phase of experimental practice tests which aspects of my existing 
comic practice would endure a radical shift in form. If one were to attribute the 
adjective ‘comic’ to any of these practices it would be qualitatively different than 
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its traditional usage. Characterising the look, feel, sound, and general aesthetic 
experience of these works is a softness, safety and ease in participation. 
Laughter, and therefore the pleasure of comedy, was felt in moments of 
intimacy, rather than communal solidarity. 
It is important, however, to read the practice under this phase of research as a 
waypoint. Although these works were crucial to my mastery of formal 
techniques of participatory practice, the misstep of both presentations is their 
presumption that a particular form of engagement is by its very nature, 
politically engaged. While ‘comedy’ was meant to provide the ‘break,’ in this 
phase it fell to the wayside as I grappled with the particular challenges of this 
new form. The pieces themselves could then be said to be trapped within the 
same viciously circular argumentation for which I will come to criticise 
Bourriaud, that is to say, the sociopolitical efficacy of the form is only 
guaranteed if one accepts, axiomatically, that interstitial distance from the 
state/dominant power is by definition, socially and politically efficacious. This 
axiom is coloured by a particular set of ideological presumptions, already 
characteristic of the logic of late capitalism. So while the experiments with 
affects and relationships in the performance event were useful, they also 
necessitated a more critical return to the theoretical framework of Relational 
Aesthetics and an eventual return to stand-up comedy as my primary practice. 
This ‘return to stand-up’ resembles in its look/feel/sound, my original, more 
conventional stand-up practice, yet it contains a far more nuanced reading of 
the audience/performer relationship, as well as a number of ‘relational 
mechanisms,’ informed by this phase of practice-as-research. 
Therefore the synthesis or sublation of stand-up and Relational Aesthetics 
eventually returns to stand-up, but not without having produced greater 
knowledge of both practices. In a properly Hegelian movement, ‘comedy’ must 
be read as the ‘determining factor’ of this dialectic; as the greater, generic 
element, it has determined the purpose of this research. What is concluded, 
through experimental practice as well as reading, is that its potential for critique 
and revolt may be best helped and managed by alternative modes of audience-
performer engagement and, as such, performance comedy must be willing to 
relinquish certain of its formal characteristics. The two projects detailed here 
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should be seen as engaging with two different activities—the first, collaborative 
authorship (or ‘building’), and the second, collaborative deconstruction (or 
‘reading’). 
  4. 1 - The Centre for Dangerology 
In relation to my larger research questions, The Centre for Dangerology was a 
modest experiment, though a radical departure in terms of form. I aimed to 
employ an alternative mode of spectator/audience engagement in order to build 
moments of sensus communis such as those found in the more successful works 
featured in Laughing in a Foreign Language. At this point in my theoretical 
reading and thinking, I perhaps agreed uncritically with Critchley’s (and by 
extension Bourriaud’s) suggestion that a dissensus communis (that is to say, a 
better way of living, or ideal expression of the community will) follows directly 
from a sensus communis. As my theoretical thinking grew more sophisticated I 
saw the argumentative flaw in Critchley’s model; a true dissensus must follow 
from some fissure, a rupture, which is to say, an authentic ‘act.’ It must be noted 
at this point that this shift in theoretical positions followed from the discomfort 
that my work was growing too whimsical or easy, lacking, in other words, 
antagonism. It is this antagonism that I later suggest is the grounds for the dis-
ease, or unnerving of the relational moment, which is where the political 
dimension of performance comedy is located. It is important to note that this 
shifting of positions was prompted by practice. 
Created in tandem with painter and illustrator Thom Glen, the exhibition/
installation-style work was included in In/Scissions, a festival of performance 
work. My persona as a performer faded significantly into the background of the 
work, which, inspired by the tactics of invitation and the non-coercive ways in 
which crowds or communities would form around certain works in Laughing…, 
explored audience participation (to put it bluntly), without coercion or 
compulsion. The three primary questions addressed were:
1) How can the artist create a collective, participatory experience 
spatially? 
2) How does the artist create a collective, participatory experience 
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through action, and how can this action remain non-coercive?
3) What is the effect on the viewer when encouraged to participate in, 
produce, or discuss the work while simultaneously receiving that 
work?
The installation was open for nine days, and took place in a large, high-ceilinged 
studio space. Three walls were devoted to large-scale paintings created by Thom 
Glen, while the floor space was filled with trestle tables and chairs, while 
masking tape demarcated spaces of various functions. There was a ‘kitchen,’ in 
which viewers could make themselves coffee or tea or, in a nod to Rirkrit 
Tiravanija, instant noodles, paid with an ‘honesty box’ that accepted secrets, 
rather than money. There was also an ‘office,’ ‘reading room,’ and a stage space 
used for events, discussions and lectures (more of which to follow). The Centre...  
functioned as a container or scrapbook of encounters; a work continuously 
creating its own documentation. Glen’s paintings interacted with the palimpsest 
of the white walls and trestle tables: viewers were given pens and freedom to 
write on the walls, similarly, the trestle tables were covered with large sheets of 
white paper, and soon filled with a glut of audience expression, writing and 
drawing forming an uncontrolled “biomass.” 22 As can be seen in the 
photographic documentation (DVD appendix, disc 2), the overall visual style of 
the resembles the ‘provisional’ aesthetic spaces of Tiravanija. Glen’s paintings 
were nailed directly into the wall and consisted of acrylic and ink on corrugated 
cardboard, while the furniture was either found in the space or recycled/
salvaged from dumpsters and skips. In a gentle subversion of the conventions of 
the gallery, the artists’ notes which greeted viewers were not typed and printed 
onto the wall but rather hand-written onto the wall in marker-pen. The was 
beside another wall with the function of a guestbook, on which viewers were 
asked to ‘tag’ their name, height, favourite artist and ‘the highest thing you’ve 
ever jumped over.’ 
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22 I have borrowed “biomass” as a term from the fourth film of the Alien Quadrilogy, however I 
think it is a fitting description of the uncontrolled and often unlovely but endlessly interesting 
material generated through unlimited encounters, as Hardt and Negri might use the term 
“biopolitical production”: “When the flesh of the multitude is imprisoned and transformed into 
the body of global capital, it finds itself both within and against the processes of capitalist 
globalisation. The biopolitical production of the multitude, however, tends to mobilize what it 
shares in common and what it produces in common against the imperial power of global 
capital” (Hardt and Negri 2004[2005], p. 101). 
  Spaces: smooth and striated
How did The Centre… actualise the experimental principles of this phase of my 
research? Let us begin with the question of space. The gallery or exhibition 
space poses a difficulty for the relational artist interested in comedy: the 
artworks most conducive to laughter are those that break apart the space of 
individualised viewing. The space of The Centre… was one-room, large and 
cavernous. While not subject to the maze-like compartmentalisation of the 
Hayward, it was large enough to afford the viewer a free path through the space. 
With multiple viewers in the room, how might the assemblage of individuals, a 
series of singularities, form a group? Through some form of determining 
catalyst, a point around which the group might coalesce. The question of spatial 
organisation of the group is therefore a political question. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of smooth and striated space (1987) is helpful in 
understanding this aspect of the work. ‘Space’ here refers to both a conceptual 
state and actual geomorphological process. Deleuze states: ‘We are deserts, but 
populated by tribes, flora and fauna. We pass our time in ordering these tribes, 
arranging them in other ways, getting rid of some and encouraging others to 
prosper’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, p. 9). The ‘desert’ is an example of ‘smooth’ 
space, a shifting space of nomadic movement, as opposed to the ‘striated’ space 
of the fortress or settlement. Deleuze uses the geomorphological analogy to 
describe a process of subjectivity, simply put, individual subjects have the 
capacity for nomadic thought, yet are given to arrangement and organisation. 
Encounters with a singularity are inevitably referred to an existing structure of 
thought. Yet it is also the case that striations of thought can be ‘smoothed.’ 
Deleuze writes, with Guattari (1987, p. 474): ‘ the two spaces in fact exist only in 
mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated 
space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space.’ 
Something escapes from the striated space, smoothing it. To put this in the 
terms of the first chapter, the striated space is analogous to Lacan’s concept of 
the symbolic (and as Deleuze’s essay ‘How do we recognise structuralism?’ 
suggests, may draw heavily from it); as with the Symbolic Order, there must 
always be something that escapes symbolisation, a stain of the Real that can 
never be fully symbolised/striated. 
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To analyse the tactics or uses of space that Thom Glen and I employed in The 
Centre…, in order to create a ‘collective, participatory experience’ we must first 
draw a connection between the internal ‘spatial’ organisation of the subject 
(Lacan’s famous dictum, for instance, that ‘the unconscious is structured like a 
language’) (1966) and the external activities of space. If smooth and striated 
always exist in mixture, then the fold of the inside and the outside of the subject 
is a similar mixture. Thus the internal striations of the unconscious , which 
manifest themselves in habitual lines of movement, prejudices, or ways of 
living, can be disrupted by the practices of the artist’s material gestures. As 
Simon O’Sullivan suggests, an encounter with art ‘[…] operates as a rupture in 
our habitual modes of being and thus in our habitual subjectivities’ (O’Sullivan 
2006, p. 1). For myself and Glen, the spatial organisation of The Centre was a 
similar mixture, an uneasy equilibrium between providing as much creative 
freedom (‘smooth’ blank space) to viewers as possible while simultaneously 
providing enough stimulus to satisfy and spark what in previous chapters, pace 
Huyghe, I have called ‘the production of a new scenario.’ In other words, the 
formation of a new group, collective, a sensus communis. Hence, the 
conventional white walls disrupted by the unconventional, participatory process 
of ‘tagging.’ For Glen and I, a space for participatory, collective action could only  
be determined through as few instructions as possible; while the centre of the 
room was filled with arrangements of tables and chairs, these were utilised by 
the viewer, in his/her own way, who determined his/her own route around the 
space. Some viewers dropped by and left straight away, others reacted with 
disdain at the idea of being asked to write on a wall, others stayed for hours, 
searching, exploring and chatting. 
A similar mixture of the smooth and striated can also be seen in the process of 
building the installation itself (in museum terms, the ‘hang’). Beginning with an 
empty studio populated with a few trestle tables and chairs, Glen and I had no 
formal plan, not even for the content of the paintings he would shortly be 
executing. Aesthetic elements were determined by dialogues and encounters 
outside the space (how much cardboard we could collect being a major factor). 
In short, the space was built (in two intensive weeks) through a series of 
dialogues, which mirrored the encounters with viewers when the space was 
made public. As it was always the intention of the space that it would serve as a 
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container for ‘encounters’ with the viewer/audience/spectator, the spatial 
practices were only one determining factor of The Centre…’s principles of 
experimentation. The other factor was simply, ‘what do you do,’ and thus the 
difficult question of my role in the piece was raised. In the radical shift from 
comic artist to interactive artist, what survives?
  Actions: indeterminacy and passivity
As stated earlier, The Centre… was part of In/Scissions 2008, predominantly a 
festival of performance; thus my role was challenged frequently, not least in 
conversations with puzzled viewers who wondered why I was not putting on a 
‘show.’ In the end I solved this indeterminacy of ‘role’ by designating myself as a  
sort of docent. This gave me a repeatable action to return to (greeting, 
explaining), but left the content of the encounter to chance. By the second week 
of The Centre’s opening, I felt I had exhausted the possibilities of this repeated 
action (in other words, it had become habitual), and therefore I scheduled and 
facilitated a number of ‘talk-events,’ more of which to follow. To begin with, as 
visitors entered the space I greeted them, directed them over to the gallery 
notes, and showed them where pens and art supplies were kept and what they 
could do in the space. In keeping with our aim of a non-coercive participatory 
experience, there were few instructions. The ‘guestbook’ wall followed a formula 
as previously mentioned, though the constraints actually seemed to spark more 
imaginative answers – favourite responses to the fourth question on the list 
“what is the highest thing you’ve ever jumped over” included ‘My own ego,’ ‘My 
mate Tim’ and ‘From finance to arts’. However, the paper covered tables were 
left freer – one contained the instruction ‘help draw a map of the city as you’d 
like to see it,’ and another the injunction put your ideas here, and the third no 
instruction at all. I would also offer visitors coffee or tea, to be paid for with 
anonymous confessions of secrets.
  
  Events: talking creatures23
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23 The idea of ‘The Talking Creature’ is derived from Darren O’Donnell and Mammalian Diving 
Reflex’s performance piece of the same name, in which strangers were invited from the street to 
a central, public meeting in order to engage in ‘unstructured, unagendaed 
conversation’ (O’Donnell 2006, p. 53). 
In the second week of the run I would begin the day by preparing a 
‘provocation,’ handwritten on a sheet of card. These provocations took the form 
of an instruction, or a simple statement, and were meant to catalyse further 
conversation or engagement. These formed the basis of a number of ‘talk-
events,’ which I will next discuss. In the initial conception stages of The Centre… 
these talk-events formed a much greater focus of the work. However, the 
overwhelming majority of viewers chose to utilise the space individually, coming 
into the space alone, or at most, in groups of three, thus these events were 
confined to instances when audiences were invited at specific times (as one 
might schedule an artist’s talk in an gallery). Circumstantially, this led to a 
curtailing of the research in some sense, as the very act of scheduling 
‘compelled’ an audience to assemble. Nevertheless, these script-less (though not  
exactly structureless) events worked as a whole towards a better understanding 
of the principles of chance, encounter, safety and power, all integral to both the 
progressive development of my practice. 
  Let’s write a movie in 15 minutes
This event took the form of a light-hearted workshop, in which a group of 
people would gather together to write a film, or rather, a treatment of a film, in 
the above-mentioned, very short space of time. The intention was to create an 
experience of collaborative creativity without slipping into the realms of ‘work.’ 
The event began with me, as facilitator, relaying some ideas about creating one’s 
own cultural experience, introducing myself to the group, and then asking 
everyone in the workshop to introduce themselves. Each member of the group 
of around 12 was also asked to name their favourite type of film. The 
collaborative ‘work/play’ involved a discussion that would lead to filling in a 
simple template that I had described as required by every movie. Making 
connections between ideas in the ensuing discussion and jotting them down, the 
group created a treatment for a movie called La piano dans le fenêtre, a quiet 
thriller starring Audrey Hepburn as a composer whose music her conductor 
sister plots to steal away. This having being written, I switched off the lights and 
turned on the overhead projector and together we ‘watched’ the opening credits 
of the film (an audience member scrawling the title onto an acetate sheet laid on 
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the projector). Due to the comparatively higher complexity of the instructions of 
this talk-event compared with the others, my role was considerably more 
central. Additionally, I was the only person in the group with control over the 
paper upon which the ideas were being written. One audience member 
commented that my presence during this talk-event was not dissimilar to my 
onstage persona when performing stand-up comedy. Can this work, or type of 
work, then, be seen as a modification of the content of my work as a comedian, 
rather than a radical reconfiguration of its form? In a sense, the fact that this 
was the only talk-event that could be described as ‘funny,’ would support this 
conclusion; on the other hand, it began to determine the limits of the comic 
form in my work. If this is a modification of an existing practice, then, what 
precisely was different? For one, the focus of the event shifted from the limited 
feedback system of the stand-up event to a collaborative system, necessitated by  
the goal-oriented nature of the event. As opposed to the activity of relating jokes 
and anecdotes to an audience whose desired response comes in the form of 
communal, ‘crowd’ laughter, this talk-event required a greater response of 
verbal participation from the audience (as well as the corresponding mental 
‘work’), in order to direct the group towards a common, albeit frivolous, goal. 
  …is freedom
In our dialogues while devising The Centre…, Thom Glen and I drew, for 
inspiration, on familiar spaces of sociality: the living room, the local pub, even 
historical spaces such as the Viennese coffee-shop of the 1890s. It was this last 
social space that provided the template for the final two ‘talk-events’ of The 
Centre… Drawing on the famous ‘salons,’ I proposed two ‘discussions,’ with the 
intention that my role as ‘performer’ would fade into the more neutral role of 
‘facilitator.’ Each discussion was framed by a short question or provocation; in 
the first—‘What is your idea of a free space?,’ and in the second—‘Comedy is 
freedom / all freedom is coercive.’ There were no further instructions or 
limitations bar duration and the audience create its own experience. 
However, these discussions were approached with a certain trepidation – 
participants were unsure whether they were meant to be watching a 
performance or whether they themselves were somehow performing. And with 
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no performance “score,” these talk-events relied purely on the expressive 
potential of the audience. It is important to note that the atmosphere of these 
latter talk-events tended towards the serious, almost ‘downbeat,’ as one viewer 
commented, which suggests that production of shared context without a strong 
central expressive locus is not conducive to humour. This is an important idea 
to be developed in further experimental practice.
  Consequences: situations and roles
Before moving onto the second piece of work, let us recapitulate the guiding 
principles of The Centre… and attempt to draw some conclusions. I began by 
exploring audience as the grounding principle from which a political comedy or 
politics of comedy might develop. But at this point my reading of audience was 
split into a very naive binary between ‘active’ and ‘passive,’ a binary Rancière 
identifies as historical and traditionally grounded and then begins to demolish 
in his essay ‘The Emancipated Spectator.’ In this binary, the ‘active spectator,’ I 
believed, would be driven to form, with his/her fellow ‘active spectators’ a new 
group, basically what Critchley calls a sensus communis, reveling in their new-
found, liberated, ‘activity.’ To formulate this hypothesis, I drew on an tradition 
in the history of art with its origins in Fluxus, Happenings, the Situationist 
Internationale and the writings of Debord, of which Bourriaud and his 
Relational Aesthetics is but the most recently influential manifestation. 
According to Bishop (2006, p. 13), Debord saw ‘situations’ as a ‘logical 
development of Brechtian theatre, but with one important difference: they 
would involve the audience function disappearing altogether in the new 
category of viveur (one who lives).’ But this category of ‘living’ (as if the choice 
to participate in a situation itself were not a proof of ‘life’) threatens to do away 
with the notion of ‘art’ itself. In the dialectic art/life, it is precisely the ‘audience 
function’ that donates ‘art’ its being and consistency. Based on my experience of 
Laughing in a Foreign Language I modified Debord’s argument—the goal then, 
would be to create a work that would pass from the audience function to a 
community of viveurs. In the analysis of this work, it must be concluded that I 
attacked this process in the wrong way. In the event, The Centre... was overall 
coloured with an injunction to freedom, that functioned, much in the way that 
direct repression does, as its opposite. What I, as a facilitator, failed to do was to 
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recognise the already-active role of the spectator or audience member, in other 
words, that fact that the choice to engage with a work is an expression of 
‘freedom,’ and that in entering The Centre… they were not in any desperate 
need of liberation. From the slogans and provocations (‘Comedy is freedom’) 
and invitations to ‘have a discussion’ or to write or draw whatever they saw fit, 
the spectator was immediately bombarded with an injunction of ‘participate, or 
else.’ What was missing was what Kester (2004) calls the ‘expressive locus’ of 
the work as the catalyst for the sensus communis. In the case of The Centre… 
there was even a strange disconnect between the visual spectacle of the space 
(Glen’s paintings) and the various participatory mechanisms (though there was 
a thematic, that is to say, representational, link). Instead of building 
participatory mechanisms that took the spectacle itself as their expressive locus, 
my role as facilitator began to resemble Žižek’s description of the modern figure 
of authority: 
The traditional figure of authority (boss, father) insists on being treated 
with proper respect, following the formal rules of authority; the exchange 
of obscenities and mocking remarks has to take place behind his back. 
Today's boss or father, on the contrary, insists that we should treat him 
as a friend; he addresses us with intrusive familiarity […] For the 
subordinated, such a constellation is much more claustrophobic than 
traditional authority: today, we are deprived even of the private space of 
irony and mockery, since the master is on both levels: an authority as 
well as a friend. (Žižek 2004, pp. 203-204).24
In treating the spectators according to the (false) binary of active/passive, I 
invited this ‘claustrophobia,’ as it were, as the spectators were unsure of how 
they should regard my role in the work. This can be evidenced in the trepidation 
the audience approached the talk-events, which demonstrate the quite obvious 
fact that the injunction ‘let’s have a conversation,’ can be the thing least 
conducive to a good conversation.
Let us also briefly return to the idea that theoretically frames this project, the 
Lacanian notion of the ‘act’ as a break with the symbolic order. We should keep 
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24 Though I am viewing this ‘modern figure of authority’ in a negative light in this passage, it is 
also a useful concept. The figure of the ‘cool dad’ is now a standard comedic archetype (e.g. the 
symbolic authority of the Master in the guise of the fantasy), seen in characters such as David 
Brent (Ricky Gervais) on British sitcom The Office, and Phil Dunphy of American sitcom 
Modern Family. The change in register from repressive to comedic lies in the degree to which 
we perceive the character ‘over-identifies’ with the level of ‘friend.’  
in mind the temporal quality of the act. Žižek writes: ‘An act is never fully 
“present,” the subjects are never fully aware that what they are doing “now” is 
the foundation of a new symbolic order—it is only afterwards that they take note 
of the true dimension of what they have already done’ (1991, p. 222). Therefore 
it may be said that the only authentic act, within symbolic ‘laws’ of The Centre… 
would be to sidestep these entirely. Perhaps the most authentic response, then, 
was the one visitor who, ignoring the instructions, the spaces for participation, 
and my role as docent/facilitator, simply said: ‘I have this space booked in two 
weeks. I’d like to know what you are planning to do with the walls when you’re 
done.’
While it can be concluded that The Centre for Dangerology approached the 
questions of my research through practice in an incorrect way, it was useful as a 
rethinking of my existing practice. Also invaluable was the idea of building an 
affective space through food, drink, music, and other convivial mechanisms. But 
to move on from this experiment, I developed the following principles that were 
put into effect in my next projects.
1) Acknowledgement of the spectator as an already active participant in the 
work by his/her choice to receive the work. In this way the spectator need 
not be coerced into participating, but may or may not accept the offer to 
do so.
2) A single ‘expressive locus’ for the purpose of comedy through transitional 
status and power, confidence and embarrassment. 
The first principle shows a developing subtlety in approaching the category of 
‘spectator’ or ‘audience,’ which emerged through experimental practice. This 
experiment led me to conclude that a range of ‘affects,’ and more importantly, 
an ‘attachment,’ arises from this work of intersubjective building. The element 
missing is, of course, the element of performance, the element that ultimately 
separates this exhibition from previous comedy/art hybrids such as Horowitz’s 
The Centre for Improved Living, Kataoka’s Laughing in a Foreign Language or 
When Humour Becomes Painful at the Migros Museum für Gegenwartskunst, 
Zurich. In the next project, at the Alsager Arts Centre Gallery, you will see that 
despite my role as performer becoming almost non-existent, I have nonetheless 
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redoubled my presence within the space as an ‘expressive locus.’
  4.2 - Dangerology: Alsager Arts Centre Gallery, 
February 2009
  Curating Knowledge
In February 2009, the Curating Knowledge project at Manchester Metropolitan 
University (Cheshire) provided a ideal space and forum to engage with my 
practice as research outside of the frame or mechanisms of the university 
theatre or drama department, liberating me, in a way, from the burden of 
performing. Programmed by Jane Linden, course convenor of the BA in Art, 
Media and Performance and the MA in Contemporary Arts at MMU Cheshire, 
Curating Knowledge is based at the Alsager Arts Centre Gallery, a large white 
space purpose built for the display of visual art. The project is a season of work 
comprising seven week-long artist residencies, from various disciplines, all of 
whom are currently engaging in practice as research. Each residency is 
accompanied by a research seminar, and elicits a short written response from 
one or more senior academics including Professor Allen Fisher, Professor Robin 
Nelson and Dr Ric Allsopp. Documentation of the material is published in an 
online archive. While the remit of the project seeks to work with artists who use 
alternative media (including new media, durational work, performance and 
interactivity), my personal response to the intimidating starting point of the 
bare, white cube was to highlight the visual side of my work. The exhibition 
consisted of a series of digital prints, each involving a ‘relational mechanism.’ 
The content of these prints was primarily self-portraiture with text. Some of the 
prints referenced ‘lifestyle magazine’ layouts or home furnishings catalogues. 
Throughout the gallery I had also hung a number of small drawings. In the 
largest room I projected another series of self-portraits. The floor of three rooms 
was littered with colourful balloons; in the fourth I had scattered a number of 
paper ‘fortune-tellers’ on the floor. This fourth room featured a short film, as 
well as two other digital prints. In the second room I set up a ‘desk,’ upon which 
I would work as ‘artist-in-residence,’ drawing, writing, and digitally editing 
photographs and video. A number of trestle tables were set-up throughout the 
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space, upon which art supplies such as marker pens and paper as well as 
photocopies of the self-portraits, were laid. 
Overall, the space of Dangerology AAC was far less ‘provisional’ and more 
polished; therefore the emphasis of the relational engagement with the space 
shifted to the group process of interpretation rather than collaborative 
authorship or building. In a more focused way than The Centre…,  Dangerology 
AAC engaged with the prospect of producing artwork that intertwined 
relationality and humour. The relational mechanism in this work facilitates the 
production of comedy through a process of defacement/effacement/tagging, 
similar to graffiti. The viewer is invited to engage in this mechanism; this 
invitation is made attractive but undemanding and non-coercive through the 
strong visual language of the space. For viewers who choose to engage with the 
relational mechanism of the work, the production of comedy is predicated on 
the complex and uncomfortable presence of the artist both as the repeated ‘face’ 
of the works and as a non-matrixed presence within the space. Additionally, this 
exhibition explored the theme of perception of self—this can be seen as the 
addition of an expressive locus, which ideally, would provided a necessary 
antagonism and tension to the work that gives any comedy its productive 
backbone. Whether or not Dangerology AAC fulfilled the aims of my research 
fully, especially with regard to ‘antagonism,’ will be examined later in this 
chapter. 
  On comedy and movement
During my AAC residency, at least, I never ‘performed’ within the traditional 
frame of performance, however, the work, as was commented on by Rory 
Francis, a lecturer at MMU Cheshire in the contemporary arts department, was 
explicitly, and over-consciously ‘aware of its audience.’ This awareness of 
audience and heightened performativity of the static works, combined with the 
overall theme of effacement/defacement of self was not dissimilar to my 
practice as a comedian. There was an overabundance of text: each photograph 
was accompanied by writing, two works were simply enlargements of written 
letters, and the lone film was a stuttering edit of an interview sequence. The 
participatory mechanisms, while simple and undemanding, proposed a 
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feedback loop from the viewer to the artist/artwork; this stands in contrast to 
participatory work that leans towards the environmental, in which the artist 
creates an experience for the viewer (such Carsten Höller’s slides at the Tate 
Modern’s Turbine Hall, or Gregor Schneider’s The Schneider Family at Home, 
in which the viewer enters and wanders around one or both of two identical 
houses in East London). As the manner of installation was comparatively 
conventional, the viewer was left to navigate the gallery independently. 
Participation and audience response was elicited by the 
way in which the material works themselves seemed to self-consciously 
performed a sort of neurotic narcissism.
Fig. 2 - ‘I’m the most popular boy in the room.’ (2009) Digital Print. Chow, Broderick. Alsager. 
At: Alsager Arts Centre Gallery.
 
Take for example, ‘I’m the most popular boy in the room,’ one of many self-
portraits hanging in the space (Fig 2). The self-portrait works were displayed 
over large, institutional tables, on which were scattered photocopied 
reproductions of the works, and a large number of permanent markers. The 
invitation, intentionally subdued (primarily subtextual but also buried in the 
artist’s statement, if a viewer were to read this first), was for the viewer to 
deface, comment on or otherwise mark the reproduction. On the second day of 
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my residency, I entered the space to discover that the words ‘ the most popular’ 
had been struck out of one of the copies, leaving ‘I’m the most popular boy in 
the room.’ The edited phrase strikes one as comic not for the new meaning (‘I’m 
the boy in the room,’) nor the original phrase, but for the trace left of the 
movement between the two, a movement achieved in a shared place that is 
nonetheless heterochronic. Let us recall Zupančič’s assertion that ‘...irresistible 
motion is one of the key features of comedy, which is why it seems so difficult to 
Fig. 3 - ‘I’m the most popular boy in the room.’ (2009) Photocopy, marker. Chow, Broderick. 
Alsager. At: Alsager Arts Centre Gallery.
pin it down with concepts and definitions… comic subjectivity does not reside in 
the subject making the comedy, nor in the subjects or egos that appear in it, but 
in this very incessant and irresistible, all-consuming movement’ (Zupančič 
2008, p. 3). What ‘movement’ does she mean? In her discussion of comedy in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology, this movement is the short-circuit from the particular 
to the universal. But there are other comic ‘movements,’ such as the movement 
in comedy from one meaning to the next. In this case, movement is 
demonstrated through a movement of agency; from artist to spectator (and 
again to spectator, repeat ad nauseum). Later in the week I found myself 
chatting to a group of visitors in an adjacent gallery space, while part of their 
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group busied themselves in the room containing ‘I’m the most popular boy in 
the room.’ The viewer (Dan) to whom I was speaking me told me his friends 
‘wanted to interact with the work,’ but were intimidated of doing so in front of 
me. ‘They want to be witty,’ he said. While my intention was never to place that 
kind of onus on the viewer, I found this interesting: is this not functionally 
similar to the heckle in the comedy club (welcome if it’s funny, but quickly shot 
down if it’s not), demonstrating a similar fluctuation of power relations? Later, 
after the viewers had gone and I was left alone in the space, I found the same 
reproduction further defaced. It now read, simply, and absurdly, ‘I’m in the 
room,’ a bizarre non-sequitur that is amusing only for its last vestiges of 
movement. This final image (no one defaced the same reproduction further), 
captures a stages of movement between the activities of writing and reading, so 
that the great joke of the piece (though admittedly we are not dealing in belly 
laughs) is revealed as only actualised through a multiple engagement by 
multiple subjects (see Fig 3).
  Themes: other selves, perceptions, followings 
Although Lacanian psychoanalysis has contributed a great deal to the 
methodology of this PhD project, the response, from a viewer, that Dangerology 
AAC was ‘very Lacanian’ was somewhat unexpected. In retrospect, however, the 
work compellingly played with ideas of the symbolic order and subject. The 
digital prints, for example, drew inspiration from two main sources. The first is 
Renaissance portraiture, in which a subject is represented not only through her 
image (face), but through a series of object symbols: book, bell, ferret. In a sort 
of modern updating, I created a series of photographs in which the object-signs 
of my everyday life were arranged and rearranged into multiple configurations; 
some hidden, others highlighted, each photograph presenting a new ‘version of 
myself.’ Though the clothes, signs, location and body presented in the portraits 
are mine, ultimately (and intentionally) I feel absent from the images. This 
absence can be attributed to a process of self-fictionalising, a word I repeatedly 
used to describe the process of making these works, and which, the reader will 
recall, is also the process I employ to write comedy material. It is as if, in 
making the images I am consciously determining the arrangement of sign-
equipment, as in Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis (1990), to create a 
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Front, but without the knowledge of the situation in which this Front is to 
appear. Thus, in its apprehending by the camera lens, this dramatisation is 
always-already inappropriate, unable to respond to the interactions in the 
moment. Comments from viewers supported this suggestion of ‘absence;’ one 
noted that taken together, a profile of a character began to emerge, which is 
unexceptional but for the fact that this comment was said directly to me, as if 
this ‘character’ were an entirely separate entity.
I also suggest that what I was creating was a ‘signifying chain,’ a symbolic order 
that is ‘constitutive of the subject’ (Lacan 1966[2006], p. 6-7). Systematically 
employing signs and symbols into the work made visible the intersubjective 
nature of the encounter with the art object. Kay (2003, p. 20) writes, in relation 
to Lacan’s theory of subjectivity as ‘mutual recognition’: ‘I position myself as a 
result of the way I am already recognised by the other, while the other who 
recognises me is himself in a position to do so because he is already recognised 
by me’ (original emphasis). Inviting the viewer to leave his/her mark on the 
material form of signification is to invite him/her to reposition himself within 
this scheme of recognition, allowing, perhaps, for moments of humorous 
incongruity. 
This absence of self under a flurry of signs and symbols, compliments the 
relational mechanism of the work, which was partially inspired by the 
experimental social reportage and documentation of French artist Sophie Calle. 
Calle’s work is often described as operating between the public and private, fact 
and fiction (Calle 2004: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5CLplquFCg). 
Returning to France after her studies, directionless, a bored young woman, 
Calle began devising simple social games, involving other people, which she 
would document. She notes these games, in their early stages, contained no 
overt artistic gestures. It was only after she had followed a man to Venice, 
photographing him and taking notes, that she decided to make a book; only 
after a series of strangers had slept in rotating shifts in Calle’s bed that a friend 
suggested she exhibit the photographs. Calle’s primary interest is the game or 
ritual. In her lecture for the European Graduate School in 2004, Calle notes that 
her work uses ‘arbitrary situations… and just by the strength of the obedience to 
the ritual, they become important and necessary’ (ibid.). In one of her later 
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works, Calle became interested in how she was perceived by others, and hired a 
private detective to follow her and document her movements during a single 
day. The resulting images and exhibition suggest a strange obsessive 
relationship, a ‘caricature of a passionate relationship’ (ibid).  My own work for 
the AAC was similarly interested in exploring perception by the other. In my 
work, however, the game or ritual (‘relational mechanism’) is inverted, and 
begins with the object on display and examines the ‘real’ relationships that 
emerge from the artificial situation. In this way this work has developed from 
The Centre… in its use of relationality to explore a particular theme (in this case, 
the self and its multiple perceptions). 
  ‘Fifth Floor drawing 2’: Dan Perjovschi
Dangerology AAC drew comparisons to another relational/participatory 
artwork that also involved its viewers in drawing and marking, ‘Fifth Floor 
drawing 2’ by Dan Perjovschi. This work was shown as part of the exhibition 
The Fifth Floor at Tate Liverpool, which had run for two months and ended only  
a week before my hang at the AAC. The Fifth Floor, subtitled ‘Ideas Taking 
Space,’ drew together a wide variety of relational, participatory and socially 
engaged artworks to engage directly with the people of the city at the end of 
Liverpool’s year as European Capital of Culture. Contributors to the programme 
of essays included Bourriaud, Bishop, Kester and Lars Bang Larsen. Romanian 
artist Perjovschi’s piece comprised a large wall covered in chalk-board paint, on 
Fig. 4 - ‘Fifth Floor drawing 2.’ (2008) Perjovshi, Dan. Liverpool. At: Tate Liverpool
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which the artist had drawn some of his cartoon-like drawings (see Fig 4). 
Viewers were encouraged to do the same, and in the installation views published 
in Peter Gorschluter’s catalog, there is a sense of conviviality and friendly 
socialising as viewers set to a shared activity. However, Perjovschi’s work carries 
a sort of internal control mechanism. Perjovschi’s drawings remind the viewer 
of political or editorial cartoons, which, like my own defacings of my self 
portraits, suggests the artist desires a specific quality to the material 
participation. As I learned with both the self-portraits, as well as the talk-events 
of The Centre, this imperative to participate in a ‘certain way,’ however implicit, 
is intimidating, and leads to either a reluctance to participate (in my case), or a 
rebellion against the artist’s imperative (Perjovschi’s)25. While discussing the 
piece with several different visitors (‘Fifth Floor drawing 2,’ owing to its 
thematic and functional similarities, not to mention its similar time-frame, 
came up a number of times as a reference point while discussing Dangerology 
with visitors), it arose that Perjovschi intended the viewer drawings to develop 
from the visual and textual languages of social comment he had begun. But 
faced with the injunction ‘be witty!,’ many viewers had begun ignoring 
Perjovschi’s drawings completely, and scrawling unrelated things, such as ‘Elly 
(hearts) Shane.’ Two visitors to Dangerology AAC reported that they were ‘told 
off’ by the gallery attendant while getting on one another’s shoulders to draw in 
the free space higher on the wall, because ‘that space was reserved for the artist.’ 
Later, a docent told them that the artist ‘had been very disappointed by what 
people had drawn.’ What is most interesting about ‘Fifth Floor drawing 2,’ 
however, is not the supposed organic generation of ideas and social comment in 
free collaboration but the way in which the artist’s own intentions disappear 
among the chaos of visitor’s drawings: use of the same colour medium (white) 
on a uniform backdrop creates a homogenous sea of voices in which Perjovschi’s 
marginally distinctive style of drawing struggles to be heard. While Perjovschi 
notes that ‘humour is (his) main tactic,’ he seems unaware of the comic 
multiplicity his participatory mechanism encourages. While his cartoons of 
veiled women asking each other ‘how do I look,’ for example, are near-the-
knuckle humorous, the expectation that all visitors would create similar jokes is 
unrealistic. Far better is the comedy that arises from movement and ambiguity: 
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25 In many ways, this second scenario is far more comic.
the phrase ‘Croxteth Rules’ in a child’s unhand scrawled over the work of an 
international artist is both funny and uneasily ambiguous. Contained within it 
are multiple lines of argument and interpretation; it is funny and disturbing, 
considering the implications of Croxteth’s gang problems with nearby Norris 
Green and the murder of Rhys Jones, yet the incongruity of this irruption of 
‘feral youth’ within the frame of the Tate makes this a dark, if unintentional, 
joke. Bourriaud elaborates on the ‘fragmentation’ of the work of art: ‘No longer 
can a work be reduced to the presence of an object in the here and now; rather, 
it consists of a significant network whose interrelationships the artist 
elaborates, and whose progression in time and space he or she 
controls’ (Bourriaud 2009, p. 13). While the network of significant interrelations 
of ‘Fifth Floor drawing 2’ are elaborated through the material developed on the 
blackboard, the artist has not set the means of controlling its progression in the 
way it would seem he wanted to (save the presence of grumpy docents or 
guards). Surely, though, this is the point of the blackboard (tabula rasa), and 
the fragile, ephemeral quality of the marking medium (chalk)26. What ‘Fifth 
Floor drawing 2’ achieves, though, is an overlaying play of frames of languages 
that evokes a comedy of wildness through visitor’s resistance to, rather than 
collaboration with, the artist’s expressive locus.
 In The Centre for Dangerology, the reader will note, I provided a similar tabula 
rasa to Perjovschi’s chalkboard: viewers were encouraged to mark on walls and 
large sheets of white paper in POSCA markers and acrylic paint. For 
Dangerology at the AAC I ‘decontextualised’ this material archive of visitor 
traces by cutting around the drawings, texts and scribbles on paper and 
mounting these, in a random fashion, on the walls of the gallery. These were 
interspliced with (my own) new drawings, cut directly out of my sketchbook. 
The effect of this was of an assemblage of nonsense: a quotation, in French, 
from Sartre’s Being and Time took its place beside the words ‘Holy shit 
remember Street Fighter?’ over a drawing of Street Fighter avatar Guile saying ‘I 
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26 It is interesting to speculate on the difference in affect of the marking media in both projects. 
While Perjovschi’s chalk is impermanent and, in a way, frivolous, my visitors were provided, as 
in The Centre for Dangerology, with POSCA pens, which distribute an opaque, intense liquid 
closer to acrylic paint than ink. The permanence of this medium could possibly account for the 
slow thaw to the idea of participation in the AAC exhibition. On the other hand, this medium 
might also be seen as part of a specific affective space, which produces a slower, more 
considered participation from viewers.
don’t.’ As a result of the AAC being a gallery space, there were restrictions on the 
marking of walls. But far from falling into the old trap of active/passive 
spectatorship simply for being on a wall, this chaotic display forms, images and 
languages reveals the ‘activity’ of spectatorship itself: the viewer is constantly 
struggling to read meaning. If the overarching atmosphere of the exhibition is 
one of over-conscious communication, this awareness of audience can be read 
as an invitation to make meaning, the invitation to produce new contexts and 
solutions to the problem of nonsense.
 
  Conviviality and Spectator Activity
As noted above, the exhibition was comprised of three adjoining gallery spaces. 
Despite some shared scenographic elements, each was designed as a unique 
relational space. Room 1, the largest room, was dominated by a looping 
projection of six self-portraits (‘Mot d’ordre’). Having taken these photographs 
in the same space as the gallery while installing the rest of the works, the effect 
was of the balloons which decorated the entire space spilling off the virtual 
projection and into the actual space. Additionally, Room 1 contained pieces of 
the interactive series of self-portraits as well as a CD player rotating a mix of 
popular music. Atmospherically, this room somewhat suggested a dance floor 
(through the music, dimmed lights). Importantly however, the room was 
dominated by my neurotic presence, as my image, life-size, shifted and 
fluctuated, ghost-like, on the wall. Although there was no determined path for 
the visitor, this was, it seemed, the room most entered first, and thus their first 
contact with the work. During my residency I was mostly present in Room 2, 
which was laid out like a studio or workshop. I tended to work at a makeshift 
desk, writing or drawing, with my back to the rest of the exhibition. The room 
also contained a television with VCR, on which viewers could choose to watch a 
selection of films. On the walls were more interactive self portraits as well as 
‘magazine layouts’ of portrait and text. Balloons also littered the floor of the 
space, and, in a nod to artist Felix Gonzales-Torres, a large plinth was set up in 
the centre of the room, upon which was a colourful pile of un-inflated long 
balloons. Finally, Room 3 had a decidedly different atmosphere. This room 
contained a single large table, upon which was a ream of blank white paper and 
a black pen. A looping film was projected against the facing wall, an interview 
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with comedian Helen Arney interspliced with half-second frames of popular 
films; the sound of this film was played through a pair of headphones resting on 
another plinth. To either side of the projection were two enlarged ‘open letters,’ 
written by Helen Arney and another comedian, Chris Boyd, addressed to friends 
the authors had not seen since elementary or secondary school. Upon the floor 
of this room were scattered a large number of ‘fortune tellers,’ folded from 
sheets of newspaper. 
 
Use of the AAC gallery as a social space was more hesitant, and it could be said, 
more tense than in The Centre…. With the room divided into three spaces, it 
often came as a surprise to visitors to find the artist, myself, working in Room 2,  
and reactions ranged from avoiding Rooms 2 and 3 entirely, to making reluctant 
conversation, to fully taking up the invitation of the space and a indulging in a 
playful engagement with myself, others, and materials in the space. As the week 
progressed, I speculated that my presence was an imposition into the free 
movement of the viewer, pulling him/her from private, solitary contemplation 
of the visual language of the exhibition into an alternative, potentially 
uncomfortable, form of engagement. However, when large groups visited the 
exhibition together it interaction and conviviality emerged in unexpected forms. 
Single visitors tended to carefully avoid the balloons on the floor, as if these 
themselves were ‘an artwork,’ despite the conscious choice of balloons as 
dispensable, fragile objects, with an uncontrollable movement (the physical 
properties of non-helium balloons meant that the air currents produced by 
visitors merely walking by them would cause them to tremble and scatter, in 
this simple way the space itself became responsive to the presence of visitors). 
However, one day I was pleasantly surprised to see a makeshift game of ‘balloon 
football’ develop between two young male visitors, and later returned to the 
space to see that, in a manner that would have pleased Felix Gonzalez-Torres, a 
number of long balloons had been removed from the plinth (it is important to 
note here the traditional role of the plinth in museum culture: it often supports 
a sculpture and is surrounded by two foot barrier of velvet rope or even social 
agreement— ‘do not touch’), inflated, and fashioned into balloon models. On 
another occasion another visitor sat down in front of the television and watched 
the remaining hour of the film Jurassic Park, which I had put on earlier that 
day, fascinated by Spielberg’s world of animatronics and computer graphics.
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  Enjoy! your libidinal bribe
At times it seemed that Dangerology AAC functioned as intended—responding 
to the visual stimulus or precise relational mechanism of the work (the 
expressive loci), enabled the formation of a temporary conviviality or 
momentary group. But what emerged as troubling from this phase of my 
practice-as-research is another, related ‘injunction,’ this time not an injunction 
to participate, but to enjoy. As we have previously seen with regard to Carnival, 
the excessive enjoyment of ‘misrule’ is the ‘obscene double’ of the law or 
prohibition. It is experienced as an internal transgression. Žižek writes: ‘[…] 
enjoyment itself, which we experience as “transgression,” is in its innermost 
status something imposed, ordered—when we enjoy, we never do it 
“spontaneously,” we always follow a certain injunction’ (Žižek 1991, p. 9). In the 
case of Dangerology AAC this injunction was suggested strongly by the 
celebratory nature of the decorations, the popular music, the competing noise of 
the VHS films, and (in the case of the gallery’s open evening) presence of food 
and alcohol, in other words, the affective space of the exhibition. One comment 
left in the visitor’s book confirmed this perception—to this viewer, the project 
transformed the gallery into ‘a space for enjoyment.’ What are the consequences 
of an aesthetic space that carries such as suggestion? Firstly, ‘enjoyment’ is 
strongly linked to both comedy and the idea of art generally, so it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to escape. At the same time, if the aim of this project, from a 
theoretical perspective, is to create, in practice, a form of comedy that escapes 
the logic of the transgressive or the Carnivalesque, the idea of a free enjoyment 
concealing a deeper coercion is incompatible with such a critical frame. 
The question here is one of differences and equivalences: enjoyment is relative, 
therefore the implication that the viewer must enjoy a certain way contains a 
sinister, authoritarian undercurrent. Secondly, as Žižek argues, it is often the 
injunction to Enjoy! that carries the ideological message; it: ‘“bribes” us 
libidinally into accepting the ideology of the story’ (Žižek 1992[2008] p. xvii). 
Let us consider this further with specific reference to the gallery space created in 
Dangerology AAC. The overwhelming scenographic ‘feeling’ of the gallery was 
of the aftermath of a party, or, even, as one viewer noted, a ‘child’s party.’ The 
riot of colour provided by the balloons, the confetti and decorations all 
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contributed to a feeling of over-the-top cheerfulness. As an artistic gesture, I felt 
that this visual statement was done ‘knowingly,’ which is to say, with a certain 
sense of irony. As an artist, I was stating ‘we can all see through this.’ But to 
what, exactly? This sense of ‘knowing, yet all the same, still doing,’ is of course, 
how ideology functions today, and, as Barbara Ehrenreich (2009) reminds us, 
cheerfulness, positive thinking, and an injunction to happiness form a very 
pervasive and damaging ideology in themselves. 
  Antagonism (or lack thereof)
The difficulty, of course, with this reading (viz., the ‘libidinal bribe’)  is that, as 
the artist, I am quite unaware of concealing ideological coercion in the work. 
But it is notable that the problems of both The Centre for Dangerology and 
Dangerology AAC stem from a lack of antagonistic relations. There is a direct 
connection here to trends in comedy particularly the trend in recent British 
stand-up comedy (as noted in Chapter 1) for ‘whimsy.’ The tendency is to frame 
comedy whimsy as an oppositional practice, creating alternative communities 
and hence modes of living. However, in its cheer, its friendliness, its injunction 
to ‘enjoy this alternative item/object/practice’ (‘child’s toy/Revolutionary 
Road/knitting’), it is inculcated into the ideological terms of late capitalism. In 
place of the imperative to consumption the alternative proposed is not ‘don’t 
consume,’ but rather ‘consume differently.’ Whimsy isn’t bad, of course, but it 
can be coercive and misleading when the form, atmosphere or spectacular 
surface of the performance contains such an injunction. Mutatis mutandis, the 
equivalent in a piece of relational art is the space itself. The danger being that 
when the space of inter-human relations in such an artwork is delimited by the 
very terms of the society it is meant to refuse, it can no longer be considered 
oppositional. The ‘social interstices’ proposed in the early writings of Bourriaud 
must be renegotiated, into spaces of critical work. For me, one of the most 
notable moments of this exhibition did not seem to involve conviviality at all, 
but rather an interaction based on contemplation and solitary engagement. On 
the Thursday night gallery opening, which was billed as a ‘party,’ I observed one 
young female visitor sitting alone at the table in Room 3, concentrating over a 
sheet of white paper with the pen provided. The implicit invitation of this room 
was to use the desk as a space to compose your own open letter, like the 
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enlarged versions hanging on the walls. The next day, I discovered one sheet of 
paper missing, but no completed letter. This suggests that either that viewer was 
not happy with the letter they had composed, or that, possibly, the public/
private nature of the work was such that they did not want their letter shown. 
Either way, it suggests an ‘authentic’ spectator activity, that is not coerced by a 
participatory ‘script’ or an imposing injunction to enjoyment.
  4.3 - Conclusions: The space of attachment
With all this in mind, I tentatively returned to my role as performer, in the 
hopes of bringing some of the ‘antagonism’ of my comedy performance to a re-
enervated practice, charged with a greater understanding of audience and 
performer/audience relationship. In this section I have detailed two pieces of 
experimental practice, which extend my performer-centered stand-up comedy 
practice into the medium of interactive and participatory art practice. This 
practice aimed at deriving a form that would best result in the ‘attachment’ of a 
subject to a moment of ideological break. As a result of this experimental 
practice I have found that participatory practice enables attachment through 
means of creative of shared context, affective space, and a libidinal injunction to 
enjoyment. However, none of these things can be taken as in-themselves 
politically efficacious, and far less progressive or critical.
Or, in other words, where were the jokes? While the intersubjective nature of 
relational work acts as a ‘set-up,’ the crucial moment of the break, or the ‘punch-
line,’ was rarely to be found. In the following two chapters I explore this 
problem both theoretically and through practice. Firstly, I will perform a critical 
reading of Bourriaud’s claims for efficacy, bringing in the crucial category of 
‘antagonism,’ through the work of Mouffe and Laclau. I argue that in order to be 
a critical force, the formation of a group must be negotiated around a ‘demand,’ 
which arises through the moment of a break with ideology. In the final chapter, 
as well as the live submission that accompanies this thesis, I will attempt to 





CHAPTER FIVE: HEGEMONY, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICAL 
ARTICULATIONS
 5.0 - The Frontier of Exclusion: articulations and 
antagonisms
As we have seen in the preceding analysis, I have engaged explicitly with the 
concerns of audience engagement through a radical shift in form partially 
inspired by the theoretical frame of Relational Aesthetics. These practices were 
intended to uncover a form best suited to forming a ‘suspended’ or ‘safe’ 
attachment to the break with dominant ideology. While contributing to a greater  
practical understanding of how to negotiate alternative modes of audience/
performer relations, ‘Comedy,’ the object of my thesis, seemed to fall into the 
background. As identified in Chapter 1, my comedy, if it can be said to have a 
singular defining characteristic, attempts to identify the dominant logic of a 
particular situation, and then break from it. While the open forms of 
Dangerology were good for identifying, or rather, producing, a situational logic 
(i.e. a ‘shared context’), the break itself (that is, the punch-line), rarely arrived. 
My concern with negotiating a convivial space in fact sometimes seemed to quell 
the very possibility of the break. That is to say, it aimed at limiting antagonism. 
This did not manifest itself in an overt way, but in what I have referred to as the 
libidinal bribe of the space, which, above all, shouted ‘Enjoy!’
In this chapter, which marks a synthesis of the dual theoretical positions in this 
text, I will formulate a model for a practice that holds an antagonistic break in 
‘suspension,’ allowing the subject to assume the break from an ambiguous 
position. This requires us to examine the practical basis of my experimental 
practice (Relational Aesthetics) in a more critical light. I first examine criticisms 
of Relational Aesthetics, specifically criticisms of Bourriaud’s (2002) claims for 
its political and social efficacy. Here, I focus primarily on well-known texts by 
Martin Stewart (2007) and Claire Bishop (2004). I argue that though the formal 
mode of relational art is useful in its production of relations and affects, the 
suggestion that a relational work is immanently efficacious draws too heavily 
from an outmoded ‘postmodern reason.’ Following Bishop’s critique that 
relational work lacks ‘antagonism,’ I employ the concepts of hegemony, 
articulation, and antagonism from the work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto 
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Laclau (1985)  to draw together my practical methodology with the Lacanian 
framework detailed in Chapter 2. The chapter concludes with a detailed case 
study of comedian and artist Kim Noble’s highly controversial work Kim Noble 
Will Die. This work points to a mode of ‘interactive’ practice that holds the 
antagonistic break in a moment of suspension, and therefore forms the basis of 
the experimental practice in the final chapter.
  5.1 - Critique of postmodern reason
Relational Aesthetics captures a historical and art-historical moment in which 
communication, conviviality and inter-human relations were of prime concern. 
But does the overdetermination of the form and theory by what I call 
‘postmodern reason’ negate Bourriaud’s claims for socio-political efficacy in his 
works, namely, the production of interstitial spaces of conviviality and dialogue? 
In his most recent book, The Radicant, Bourriaud responds directly to 
conditions of globalisation, mass networked communication, and 
multiculturalism. These conditions present a problem to which contemporary 
art and art criticism must respond: 
The numerous aesthetic theories born of the nebulous alliance of cultural 
postcolonialism have failed to elaborate a critique of modernist ideology 
that does not lead to an absolute relativism of to a piling up of 
‘essentialisms.’ In their most dogmatic form, these theories go so far as to 
obliterate any possibility of dialogue among individuals who do not share 
the same history or cultural identity. […] If I am a Western white man, 
for instance, how can I exercise critical judgment on the work of a black 
Cameroonian woman without running the risk of inadvertently imposing 
on it an outlook corrupted by Eurocentrism? (Bourriaud 2009, p. 25). 
As we can see, Bourriaud is situated in what might be called a post-postmodern 
framework, despairing of postmodernism’s inability to formulate theoretical 
means for dealing with the increasing globalisation of the planet, that do not 
reduce it to mere dogmatic plurality of multiple identities. Proponents of this 
outlook include a number of authors already mentioned in this text, including 
Žižek (2000, 2008), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), Chantal Mouffe 
and Ernesto Laclau (1985), and Simon Critchley (2008)—each of whom have 
strikingly different responses to the same problem. Bourriaud follows Hardt and 
Negri’s thesis of Empire and the Multitude here: ‘“Postmodernism […] is indeed 
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the logic by which global capital operates,” for it constitutes “an excellent 
description of the ideal capitalist schemes of commodity consumption” through 
notions such as difference, cultural multiplicity, mixture and diversity’ (Hardt 
and Negri 1994, quoted in Bourriaud 2009, p. 26). The uncritical diversity of 
postmodern theory, it follows, is analogous to the globalisation of the planet 
under corporate capital, with its accompanying exploitation of labour and 
natural resources, increasing divisions of wealth, and threats of war and 
violence in the authoritarian schema that organise globalisation. Art and art 
criticism have their own role to play in opposing this theoretical frame, 
Bourriaud argues, by addressing the crucial problem: ‘[…] how can we 
simultaneously defend the existence of cultural singularities yet oppose the idea 
of judging works by those singularities, that is to say, refuse to judge them only 
in keeping with their traditions?’ (Bourriaud 2009, p. 40). Bourriaud argues for 
a move away from ‘postmodern aesthetic courtesy, an attitude that consists of 
refusing to pass critical judgment for fear of ruffling the sensitivity of the 
other’ (Bourriaud 2009, p. 27) to ‘translation.’ The idea is to embrace 
radicantity, as a kind of postmodern radicality. A radicant is a form of plant, 
like ivy or couch-grass, that develops roots laterally as it progresses along above 
ground. As opposed to the radical tactics of ‘pruning, purifying, eliminating, 
subtracting, returning to first principles […] the adjective “radicant” captures 
[the] contemporary subject, caught between the need for a connection with its 
environment and the forces of uprooting, between globalization and singularity, 
between identity and opening to the other. It defines the subject as an object of 
negotiation’ (Bourriaud 2009, pp. 44, 51). Eschewing the similar Deleuzian 
botanical term ‘rhizome,’ which famously refers to an amorphous, shifting form, 
Bourriaud chooses ‘radicant,’ which has a progressive, forward movement. The 
radicant subject is akin to his earlier term ‘semionaut,’ which imagines the artist 
as a navigator and re-arranger of signs. Bourriaud is characteristically 
speculative here of what a radicant practice of translation precisely is: ‘The 
transfer: a practice of displacement, which highlights as such the passage of 
signs from one format to another’ (Bourriaud 2009, p. 138). He cites the 
collaborative project Ann Lee, in which over a dozen artists (including Huyghe 
and Parreno) purchased the copyright to a Japanese anime character. The 
artwork, in true relational style, was/is provisional and processual, an 
assemblage of multiple actualisations or translations of a virtually ‘empty’ sign, 
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the ‘character’ of Ann. At the same time, it is difficult to discern this semionautic 
process of translation from the traditions of pastiche, montage and especially, 
collage. Rancière notes that collage, or the ‘clash on the same surface of 
heterogeneous, if not conflicting, elements’ is an old technique: 
In the days of surrealism, the procedure served to express the reality of 
desire and dreams repressed under the prosaic character of bourgeois 
quotidian reality. Marxism then seized on it to render palpable, through 
the incongruous encounter of heterogeneous elements, the violence of 
the class domination concealed beneath the appearances of quotidian 
ordinariness and democratic peace. (Rancière 2009, p. 27). 
Yet far from this being a ringing endorsement of the technique we must tread 
with caution; Rancière knows, to quote Fredric Jameson, that ‘one of the most 
significant features or practices in postmodernism today is pastiche’ (Jameson 
1988[2009], p. 4). In fact, such a project of combining diverse elements could 
also be seen to reproduce the logic of global capitalism tout court. There is, in 
the radicant, a sense of ‘having it both ways.’ That is to say, a postmodern 
diversity yoked to a modernist notion of forward progress. Ann Lee is in no 
sense anti-productive, rather it is the form of late capitalist cultural production. 
Bourriaud’s post-postmodern position is problematic. Firstly, Hardt and Negri’s 
general thesis that a radical-emancipatory politics (for they do indeed use the 
term radical) must operate as a redoubling of the production of relations in 
postmodern society, creating an alternative to the dominant, commodified 
relations under global capitalism seems to negate the idea of ‘emancipation.’ If 
the goal is the production of new relations, within the logic of global capital, 
from where do we derive a radical discontent? Hardt argues (speaking in 
Taylor’s 2009 documentary Examined Life) that ‘biopolitical production’ may 
serve as ‘the basic for instituting the training in democracy […] providing a 
springboard or a standpoint for imagining an anticapitalist or postcapitalist 
alternative’ (Hardt 2009 in Taylor 2009, pp. 150-151). Therefore, the old 
revolutionary site of the factory is relocated to those modes of work that 
produce ‘social relations’: flight attendants, call-centre workers, and artists. 
Hardt and Negri’s argument celebrates this ‘immaterial production’ for its 
‘possibility of “absolute democracy” […] because it is immediately, in itself, the 
form (and practice) of social freedom’ (Žižek 2008, p. 356, original emphasis). 
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But biopolitical production is already well incorporated into the machine of 
capitalism. Is it not a part of what Žižek designates as ‘biocapitalism,’ ‘the 
immense field of new capitalist investments into the direct production of new 
forms of biological life’? (ibid., p. 357). The assertion that the interstitial sphere 
of relations is a place for the production of resistance or opposition is therefore 
somewhat thin. We must also consider the efficacy of interstitiality itself, to 
which we might turn to Martin Stewart’s critique of Relational Aesthetics. 
  5.2 - Micropolitical disengagements: production or 
subtraction? 
Stewart focuses primarily on Bourriaud’s claim that the relational artwork 
operates as a social interstice in the Marxian sense, a community of exchange 
that disengages from capitalist economies by ‘being removed from the law of 
profit’ (Bourriaud 2002 [1] in Stewart 2007, p. 371). Is this, Stewart asks, 
referring to Hardt and Negri’s concept of a new global proletariat, ‘a manifesto 
for a new political art confronting the service economies of informational 
capitalism—an art of the multitude’? (Stewart 2007, p. 371, emphasis mine). Or, 
is it not ‘a naive mimesis or aestheticisation of novel forms of capitalist 
exploitation’? (ibid.). Which is to say, is the art world the proper place for the 
production of new social relations? Stewart appeals to Adorno’s modernist 
notion of an ‘autonomous art,’ that is, the possibility of an art outside exchange 
value; valuable in itself, which, as Stewart explains, does not mean ‘art is 
actually autonomous from its social constitution’ (Stewart 2007, p. 375). Rather, 
autonomous art becomes critical art by immanently criticising an ideological 
illusion; ‘that nothing is valuable independently of its exchange value’ (ibid.). 
Bourriaud, on the other hand, succumbs to the opposite extreme, heteronomous 
art, where the market becomes all-encompassing—the acts of translation and 
remix in his book Postproduction and Altermodern ‘are defined by the 
manipulation of already marketed elements’ (Stewart 2007, 377). As Stewart 
says, ‘the issue is not just the internal social relations of art, but how it relates to 
capitalist exchange as, supposedly, something outside it’ (Stewart 2007, 378). In 
producing immaterial relations, relational art is meant to oppose the logic of the 
art market that privileges the collector—the ‘event’ cannot be collected in the 
same way. However, as Hardt and Negri themselves have shown in their book 
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Empire, global capitalism has now, in its omnipresence, moved into the very 
business of producing social relationships in the service economy. Stewart’s 
reading of Bourriaud’s claims echo with Peggy Phelan’s (1993) idea of an 
‘ontology of performance’ based in disappearance; their ephemerality has not 
stopped theatre nor performance from being incorporated into a heteronomous 
system of exchange.
  5.3 - The Question of Antagonism
Academic and art critic Claire Bishop’s (2004) main objection to Bourriaud’s 
theories is what she sees as its utopian impulse. The shift from the radical (that 
is, utopian) to the radicant is supported by a discourse of micro-utopias: ‘Social 
utopias and revolutionary hopes have given way to everyday micro-utopias and 
imitative strategies’ (Bourriaud 2002 [1], p. 31). Bishop argues that these micro-
utopic politics are equally problematic as the modernist utopian project. 
Furthermore, she rejects the accompanying suggestion that participation and 
conviviality are in themselves democratic—a criticism that is echoed in 
discourse surrounding audience participation in theatre. This is her summary of 
the relational aesthetics rubric: 
 
The interactivity of relational art is […] superior to optical contemplation 
of an object, which is assumed to be passive and disengaged, because the 
work of art is a ‘social form’ capable of producing positive human 
relationships. As a consequence, the work is automatically political in 
implication and emancipatory in effect. (Bishop 2004: 62)
In which case, Relational Aesthetics is allied to a long tradition of suspicion of 
the spectator; see Simon Bayly’s note that ‘Throughout political, philosophical 
and artistic history, the production of spectators […] has been regularly 
condemned, from Rousseau to Situationism to the current and “relational” turn 
in contemporary art practice’ (Bayly 2009, p. 20). That is to say, the 
‘emancipatory effects’ of interactivity are predicated axiomatically, on the 
supposition that spectatorship is necessarily passive and suppliant, which as we 
have earlier established, is a quite false premise. Bishop also argues that at 
worst, works such as Pad Thai by Rirkrit Tiravanija, the intended social event or 
machine reinforces negative in-groupings or social systems; recall Jerry Saltz’s 
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engagement with Tiravanija’s work, in which conviviality seemed to revolve 
purely around discussions of the New York contemporary art scene. What 
Bishop does not take issue with is the form of relational art. Bishop alternatively  
proposes as ‘good’ interactive practice the art of Santiago Sierra and Thomas 
Hirschhorn, whom she believes have been ignored by Bourriaud, yet have since 
been featured prominently in his curatorial and critical practice. Bishop argues 
that when Sierra and Hirschhorn make use of a relational form, the work is 
‘marked by sensations of unease and discomfort rather than belonging, because 
the work acknowledges the impossibility of a micro-topia and instead sustains a 
tension among viewers, participants and context’ (Bishop 2004, p. 70). She 
connects this tension to Chantal Mouffe and Ernest Laclau’s reading of ‘radical 
democracy’ (1985), in which a functioning democratic society is ‘not one in 
which all antagonisms have disappeared, but one in which new political 
frontiers are constantly being drawn and brought into debate’ (Bishop 2004, p. 
66). I would argue that Bishop is suggesting that the convivial artwork must 
itself be a space of some undefined transformation, something akin to Victor 
Turner’s concept of the liminoid (1969). Bourriaud has since suggested 
similarly: ‘Thomas Hirschborn’s work,’ he writes, ‘relies not on spaces of 
exchange but places where the individual loses contact with the 
social…’ (Bourriaud 2002 [2], p. 31). 
How does antagonism manifest in the relational practice? Sierra’s work, 
including 160 cm Line Tattooed on Four People (2000) and Ten People Paid to 
Masturbate  (2000), for example, consists of ‘actions’ involving paid 
participants, and is, according to Bishop, ‘organized around relations that are 
more complicated – and more controversial – than those produced by the 
artists associated with relational aesthetics’ (Bishop 2004, 70). Most interesting 
for our analysis is Sierra’s Eight people paid to remain inside cardboard boxes 
is more intriguing for its ambiguous suspension of the social (and legal) order. 
As the title suggests, in 2000 Sierra recreated a piece that had initially taken 
place in Guatemala City at the ACE gallery in New York, remunerating a series 
of ‘workers’ for the labour of remaining inside a cardboard box, for the 
government minimum wage of ten dollars. The workers were migrants of 
Mexican origin, with questionable right to remain in the United States. Utilising 
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a legal loophole (naming these workers ‘extras’27) the presence of these unseen 
persons approaches a radical break with the symbolic order because they 
literally ‘break the law;’ their presence calls the law to either intervene or 
transform itself. Incidentally, as Sierra describes in his ‘list of materials,’ ‘the 
public did not see the workers when they were places in the boxes’—which 
cannot but call to mind Lacan’s analysis of Antigone sealed alive in her tomb. 
Her living/dead status corresponds with the legal/illegal status of the workers; 
in this work Sierra is bringing making sensible what Giorgio Agamben calls 
Homo sacer, the figure of the human who has biological life, but no life in the 
symbolic order, which is to say, no ‘legal’ life (Agamben 1998). Bringing this 
excluded figure into the form of relational aesthetics creates an antagonism 
that, much like the over-identification described in Chapter 2, produces an 
attachment of ‘paralysis.’ Because of the legal loophole, it calls on the law to act, 
while simultaneously acknowledging the powerlessness of the law to act without 
putting itself into a compromising position. Because of the directly political 
content of this piece, it can be said that this attachment raises a possible, ethical 
choice for the viewer, meaning the work creates an ethical experience. The 
acknowledgement of deep, structural antagonism gives Sierra’s work a 
particular efficacy. 
  5.4 - The impossibility of closure
Before examining Kim Noble’s work as paradigmatic of a form of comedy 
performance that brings antagonism back into the relational field, I will first 
examine the concept as it appears in the work of Mouffe and Laclau (1985). 
Drawing on Lacan, Foucault, and linguistic structuralism, Mouffe and Laclau 
argue that the ‘totality’ of the social is both its condition of possibility as well as 
its condition of impossibility. Which is to say, every attempt to describe the 
fullness of ‘the social,’ or ‘society’ is an impossible attempt to suture a field of 
differences. Every social formation is thus ‘discursive’, a ‘hegemonic’ 
articulation that draws together plural and divergent interests into a single 
ideological operation. This represents a dialectic between a ‘logic of difference’ 
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27 The word ‘extras’ performs an interesting doubling. Literally, the word refers to the category 
of supernumerary non-speaking actor on film sets, serving to disguise the Mexican workers’ 
status. At the same time, it actually draws attention to the fact that these illegal immigrants are 
‘extra-legal.’ This is an over-identificatory strategy.
and a ‘logic of equivalence.’ Individual persons are particularities that are held 
in a ‘logic of difference,’ that is, they are defined in relation to each other. But 
politics (and by extension the social) operates through drawing differences into 
a logic of equivalence, the formations of groups around demands. As Laclau 
writes ‘[…] equivalence is precisely what subverts difference, so that all identity 
is constructed within this tension between the differential and equivalential 
logics. […] What we have, ultimately, is a failed totality’ (Laclau 2005[2007], p. 
70). Such a tension produces a fundamental antagonism, for example, an 
element that cannot be represented within the identifying operation: ‘[…] it is 
through the demonisation of a section of the population that a society reaches a 
sense of its own cohesion’ (ibid.). This antagonism is visible in the pacts and 
concessions of American bipartisan politics: at the time of the 2008 American 
election it seemed the Democrats would have to concede on gay rights in order 
to get Barack Obama elected. Later, to keep Obama in office the Democrats 
would have to concede on health care. The very operation of the 
politicaltherefore, is bringing the excluded element, the antagonism of a 
particular hegemonic subjectivity, to bear on the demands of the collective. For 
Jacques Rancière (1999, p. x) it is ‘disagreement,’ in his definition ‘[…] a 
determined kind of speech situation; one in which one of the interlocutors at 
once understands and does not understand what the other is saying,’ that is the 
very condition of politics proper, and by extension this is how art functions 
politically, in being a certain ‘distribution of the sensible’ of what is seen and not 
seen, understood and not understood. 
How does this relate to comedy? In advancing Mouffe and Laclau’s concepts of 
hegemony and antagonism I do not mean to simply add to an already 
overcrowded theoretical framework  but to in effect bring the Lacanian concepts 
of Real and Symbolic to the social field. ‘Society’ is ‘symbolic’: ‘The incomplete 
character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain of 
analysis, the premise of “society” as a sutured and self-defined totality […] There 
is no single underlying principle fixing—and hence constituting—the whole field 
of differences’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985[2001], p. 111). Thus we can 
(theoretically) bring the latent potential of the joke for an ideological break 
directly to the articulated field of ideological attachments and investments. Let 
us return to the fissure in meaning at the heart of the joke as speech act, the gap 
Chow, D.V.B.
150
between the first and second meaning, the void between sense and nonsense. Is 
this disagreement or antagonism not the proper name for the incommensurable 
gap in meaning in the joke itself? Joking itself draws a frontier of exclusion 
between ‘getting it’ and ‘not getting it.’ Davis (2000, p. 64) writes, drawing on 
Lyotard: 
A giving laughter, then, serves to kick loose what Lyotard calls the 
“disjunctive bar” that separates the terms in a binary opposition. The bar 
stands as gatekeeper, as guardian of the binary order, signaling an “either 
this or not-this” mode of thought […] The disjunctive bar is the very 
foundation of rationality and identity, of (phal)logocentrism) [...]
Comedy thus proceeds from a place of exclusion or barring. This bar is 
‘antagonistic,’ and this antagonism is immanent to comedy as a form; for the 
possibility of laughter, to get it, there must also be the possibility of not getting 
it. I locate ‘the political’ in comedy precisely in the void or antagonism between 
difference and equivalence. The passage from serial individuals to ‘laughing 
group’ is an equivalential operation that always has the potential to exclude. It 
never fully captures the series in its infinite potential for differentiation. 
Comedy trades in antagonisms and tensions, and so a truly agitating political 
comedy in performance must hold this antagonism without resolution. It is not 
the ‘punchline,’ but the ability of the event to hold the audience between 
meanings. This comedy has a traumatic dimension, embodied in the 
performance of Kim Noble, which I will now discuss. 
  5.5 - Kim Noble: Kim Noble Will Die
Kim Noble won the Perrier Award, with partner Stuart Silver in 2000. Both 
studied fine art at Sheffield Hallam University, and their work together treads 
the line between comedy and live art: ‘situational’ shows at London’s 
Beaconsfield gallery (2001), multimedia collages at the Edinburgh Festival 
(which are now de rigeur for comedians) and the experimental E4 sitcom Noble 
and Silver: Get Off Me! In 2004 Noble suffered a breakdown and was diagnosed 
with manic depression. Kim Noble Will Die, staged at the Soho Theatre in April 
and December 2009, as well as the 2009 Edinburgh Fringe, is a deeply 




The show unnerved critics and audiences alike. Both the Times and the 
Guardian (in positive reviews) described the work as ‘a multimedia suicide 
note.’ Time Out gave the show an outlandish 6 stars despite being deeply 
distressed by its content. The Scotman’s Kate Copstick enthuses: ‘This is 
visceral, graphic stuff; a kind of wonderful the like of which I have never seen 
before. It totally obscures the line between comedy and tragedy. I remember 
laughing, crying, gasping, but I don’t remember breathing. […] This is an hour I 
will remember for all of my life.’ (Copstick 2009, http://www.edinburgh-
festivals.com/viewreview.aspx?id=962). Audiences responded in kind; 
Copstick, again describes her collective experience: 
Around me I hear sometimes roars of laughter, sometimes bottomless 
silence, occasionally a cry of “oh no!” or a sharp intake of breath. As we – 
all except three of the audience – are ejected shortly before the end of the 
show, a lone voice in the silence shouts out: “You’re a c**t !” but no-one 
else seems to agree. (ibid.).
Around Edinburgh, Noble’s posters were being ripped down by a (presumably) 
lone, furious viewer, while another viewer at the Soho Theatre wrote a letter 
threatening legal action; Noble responded by inviting him to Ben-Hur at the o2 
Arena. This reaction can be described as an hysterical or neurotic attachment; a 
furious acting out in full knowledge that nothing will be changed. 
The show’s content is partially responsible for this reaction, as it includes a 
multimedia parade of graphic images. In one particularly gruesome filmed 
scene images of Noble and an unidentified woman in his mental institution self-
harming are intercut with scenes Noble staging a musical about meat in a 
supermarket. There are also films of Noble ejaculating into various containers, 
and in one scene Noble’s ‘dead’ body, struck by a car, is urinated on by a 
woman. The atmosphere of the show was nervous and disquieted, but it must be 
emphasised that the work still functions as comedy. And while it explores a 
personal narrative of mental illness, Kim Noble Will Die also functions as 
embodied political critique. This is a) signalled in its content and b) actualised 
through Noble’s staging of ‘exclusion’ with the audience. Firstly, a large part of 
the work consists of filmed pranks with consumer products. Take, for example, 
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the video ‘Improving on Ivar,’ played during his show, an instructional video in 
which Noble ‘improves’ an IKEA chair by adding a series of useless safety 
features (high-visibility jacket, assault whistle), then returns it to IKEA’s 
shelves. Or Noble’s vendetta against Paul McKenna (he purchases a book by the 
hypnotist, makes his own version of the enclosed CD, and returns it to the 
shelf). These pranks are parodies of self-help or health and safety regulations, 
but they also telegraph a particular way of reading the work. Their presence in 
the everyday also begins to complicate matters. A video of Noble throwing £5 
notes into a Job Centre as an ‘act of charity’ begins to make things more uneasy. 
The target of the joke becomes unclear. Are we meant to be laughing at the 
unfortunate unemployed? Or Noble himself, that is to say the disturbed 
individual who thinks that such a demeaning action is charity? But if it is the 
latter, the non-representational quality (this is clearly happening) pulls it out of 
the realm of satire. There is a ‘disagreement’ here, to use Rancière’s term, 
highlighted by Noble’s intervention in the everyday. The use of the everyday 
forecloses the ‘just kidding’ mechanism of the punchline we come to expect. If 
he is really doing this, he isn’t just kidding. Here we encounter a frontier of 
comedy as ambiguity; there is a sense that this is funny, but the movement into 
why it is funny is suspended. The ‘why’ is an antagonism that cannot be fully 
symbolised; to look at it directly (that is, to explain it) is traumatic, as 
demonstrated by the charity scene, which is troubling to watch. Nor is this 
antagonism simply affective; it is actually correlative to the antagonism that 
escapes symbolisation in the content of the video. The drawing together of an 
ideology of individual self-determination, along with the concept of social 
welfare into a hegemonic totalisation raises the uneasy question ‘what is 
charity?’ 
It is Noble’s use of moments of exclusion that most interest me, as these take 
place in the live event of performance. As the audience enters the room, Noble 
gently asks one individual of to come onstage. He then asks the person to stand 
on a particular mark, and places a bucket on his head. As the show begins, a 
projection of the head of Noble’s mother, foul mouthed and disappointed in her 
son, appears on the bucket—Noble will interact with this projection/human 
hybrid for the remainder of the show. While his interactions with the mother are 
very funny, the figure’s (always male) torso and legs serve to remind us, the 
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audience, that one of our ranks is suffering at our expense. He has been 
excluded. Later in the piece, another audience member is brought onstage and 
excluded in the same way, so that there are three figures: Kim, a second Kim 
and Kim’s mother. These figures become a constant visual reminder of the 
exclusion in the audience’s ranks. 
For me the most radical use of audience exclusion is also the funniest. Noble 
stages an eviction, telling us that this is a popular form of entertainment. He 
chooses three random people, and interviews them each in turn, as a compère 
would: they are asked their names and occupations. The rest of the audience is 
then forced to vote, though it is never made clear what exactly they are voting 
for—whether the person they have their hand up for will be going, or staying. 
After the hands are counted the losing person is asked to leave. They do not get 
to see the remainder (more than 30 minutes) of the show, nor are their tickets 
refunded. As a parting gift, however, they are given a microwave (which, it 
transpires, they are allowed to keep).  This moment is ‘political’ in two ways. 
Firstly, it is a ‘vote,’ a transaction that evokes the basic principle of 
parliamentary democracy. However, knowing nothing of what our votes will do, 
nor how the candidate names and occupations should influence our vote draws 
us into making a ‘false choice.’ Secondly, in a larger sense, the tragicomic nature 
of this act embodies what I call the ‘terrible laughter of community.’ For while 
the sight of the poor victim, staggering out of the venue with his or her new 
microwave is undeniably funny, there is no positive resolution available. 
Through the act of exclusion, the audience passes from series to group with the 
important awareness that in doing so there is a ‘founding crime’ that gives the 
group its consistency, a comic version of the stoning that concludes Shirley 
Jackson’s ‘The Lottery.’ We pass from being spectators of the same event 
(series) to a group defined by our active exclusion of one of our ranks. Thus, 
Kim Noble Will Die is a critique of the ideology of global capital not through the 
satirical tactic of confronting the ideology with its perverse underside, nor 
through an ‘over-identification’ with the ideology, but, by using the 
paradigmatic qualities of stand-up as a performance form (liveness and direct 
address) to stage the very act that produces the ideological text. In this way 
Noble’s work is political, though it is not directly satirical, nor does it politicise 
the act of participation in performance. The logic of global capital encourages 
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the serialisation; the free play of differences and the passage to groups based on 
divergent ‘interests,’ rather than, as perhaps before, based on a ‘wrong’ or 
injustice. Hardt and Negri write: ‘The structures and logics of power in the 
contemporary world are entirely immune to the “liberatory” weapons of the 
postmodernist politics of difference.’ As Mouffe and Laclau suggest, it is not that 
antagonism is the consequence of an exclusion between difference and 
equivalence, but rather that this is the very essence of politics. Kim Noble Will 
Die is comedy that confronts the audience with this politics at play in the real, 
and reveals that, while it is entertaining, the antagonism of the group is also 
deeply traumatic. 
  5.6 - Conclusions: Sensus communis or dissensus 
communis? Yes, please!
In this chapter I have argued that Bourriaud’s claims for the political efficacy of 
Relational Aesthetics are founded on a set of unsupportable positions. 
Therefore, I have isolated what features of relational work are accurate and 
valuable today, specifically the (politically neutral) ability to produce affects and 
attachments. Following Bishop, I have argued that the work takes on a political 
efficacy when it incorporates a critical position through the use of ‘antagonism,’ 
a concept I then pursued through Mouffe and Laclau’s theory of radical 
democracy (1985). At this point we can conclude that Relational Aesthetics, as a 
neutral form, produces shared context and affective space. Freud’s concept of 
‘joke work,’ a specific proposition which must be accepted by the receiver for the 
joke to be, demonstrates that shared context is an important part of comedy 
performance. We might posit the following axiom: Shared context is a necessary  
condition for comedy performance. Three principles follow: (1) A ‘relational 
machine’ can produce shared context through the creation of affective space in 
which new relations may be formed. (2) Context is hegemonic, constituted 
through an exclusion of a certain party, which enables dialogue or community to 
exist. (3) Making that exclusion visible (or sensible) within a suspended 
ambiguity is a comic procedure as well as a practice of politics. I propose our 
first, tentative conclusion: that comic-antagonistic practice reveals a systemic 
exclusion, and through the production of an affective space, attaches itself to the 
subject as a disquieting ethical-political demand.
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In the next chapter I will examine the final phase of my experimental practice in  
which the disjunction between the experimental practice, based on the 
participatory practice of Bourriaud, and ‘comedy’ is resolved as far as possible. 
The principles identified above are pursued through my practical work. The aim 
of this final phase is to create a model of comedy in performance that privileges 
aleatoric moments of suspension, in which an antagonism (that is, the break), 
can be made sensible. Which is to say, my intention is to model performance 
comedy around the articulation of the political.
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CHAPTER SIX: EXPERIMENTAL PRACTICE - EASY, TIGER!
! 6.0 - Easy, Tiger! (a) and (b): analysis of practice-as-research
In the previous phase of my practice-as-research (Chapter 4), I explored open 
forms of participation, interactivity, and audience engagement in order to 
determine a form for generating an attachment, a relationship of fidelity 
between the audience subject and the moment of ideological rupture, having 
hypothesised on the nature of this form in my critical reading of the 
Carnivalesque (Chapter 2). From these experiments, I concluded that the ‘open’ 
form (derived from, among other things, Nicolas Bourriaud’s theoretical 
framework of Relational Aesthetics), is able to create an attachment through the 
production of a shared context and a space of affect. What the majority of 
relational work misses, however, is the critical dimension. Without a clear 
‘expressive locus’ (Kester 2004) to generate a fissure or critical antagonism, in 
this middle phase of experimental practice this work seemed far more focused 
on the formation of an interstitial community. But is such interstitial distance or 
indeed community always positive? Or should it be read as far more politically 
ambivalent? Joseph’s (2002, p. xxxiii) critique of the ‘romance’ of community 
(‘[…] community is complicit with capitalism and […] communities are, through 
capitalism, complicit with each other’) seems particularly apt.
In the preceding chapter, therefore, I began with a critical re-reading of 
Bourriaud’s (2002) position on the social and political efficacy of relational 
work, finding that while relational work is undeniably valid as an art-historical 
development, much of Bourriaud’s ‘micro-topian’ thinking is predicated on 
somewhat spurious reasoning. Drawing on Claire Bishop’s (2004) criticisms, I 
took up the political philosophy of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) as 
a further clarification of the Lacanian framework I had earlier employed. It 
became apparent that the ‘act’—rupturing the symbolic order to reach the 
dimension of the Real—was somewhat correlative to their concept of 
‘antagonism,’ the Real which escapes every social formation. This antagonism 
acts as a sort of stain or crack in the structure and organisation of the social 
field; every social formation is a ‘failed totality’. Therefore the question of 
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attachment to the break qua antagonism is never purely one of individual 
subjectivity. It arises, rather, in the formation of the group. As in a film with a 
twist ending, in which a series of flashbacks reveal the presence of the great 
secret all along, this theoretical insight retroactively reframes my previous 
practice. The interstitial community, therefore, is not a means of smoothing 
over an antagonism, but rather, produces it. 
In this chapter I examine the ideas of formation of the group, antagonism, and 
attachment in practice. As in Kim Noble’s work (Chapter 5), a politically 
efficacious comedy practice must give space to ‘antagonisms,’ which are an 
immanent, generic element of comedy itself. What I rehearse in these final 
pages is a model of comedy as political praxis, that opens a space to make the 
Real of antagonism sensible. In other words, to make sensible the 
uncomfortable, ambiguous space in which particularities of meaning are 
suspended28. This chapter comprises three case studies. I first examine a recent 
performance in Eton, Berkshire, which demonstrates the way in which a 
suspension of meaning can make the Real of antagonism sensible in a ‘safe’ way 
(and which also demonstrates that the model derived from this thesis is not 
limited to an experimental practice). Working backwards, I then examine the 
transition work Easy, Tiger (a), a one-to-one performance. I then devote the 
remainder of the chapter to a discussion of Easy, Tiger (b), an hour-long stand-
up piece incorporating various modes of audience-performer relationship.
 
  6.1 - Alliances, universalities, and particulars
The Funny Farm Eton is the type of show comedians rarely enjoy performing at
—not particularly well-paid, nor an easy audience to get along with. The gig is 
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28 In The Odd One In, Alenka Zupančič suggests that ‘comedy is the universal at work,’ (2008, 
p. 27) she draws on Hegel, who in her words, argues that ‘the comic character is not the physical 
remainder of the symbolic representation of essence; it is this very essence as physical.[…] the 
comic work of art does away with representation’ (ibid., p. 26, original emphasis). She discusses 
the old trope of the baron slipping on a banana peel. In contrast to the suggestion that the 
baron, in his slipping, reveals the particular humanness behind his universal baron-ness, 
Zupančič proposes that the baron is made human precisely in his getting up again and behaving 
as if he were a baron; therefore, the scene enacts a short circuit between the universal and 
particular. 
I would suggest further than comedy is the universal at work precisely because it suspends 
particularities within a universal relation, that is to say, with recourse to the ahistorical bar of 
the Real, the void behind meaning (symbolic, imaginary). 
located in the large but poorly lit function room of The Waterman’s Arms, 
alongside the Thames. The audience is predominantly composed of couples in 
their 30s and 40s, with one large birthday party in attendance on the evening I 
performed. Tickets for the show are fairly expensive; at £10, they are nearly 
twice that of the average pub-based London comedy club.
Eton, as the reader will no doubt already know, is a small town on the River 
Thames that is home to Eton College, a public school for boys well known for 
educating a number of British politicians, including current Conservative Prime 
Minister David Cameron. Eton is part of the parliamentary constituency of 
Windsor, which, since 1874, has been a Conservative stronghold. I performed 
20 minutes of stand-up to the people of Eton on 30 April 2010, less than one 
week before the UK general election, which would see Cameron become PM 
through a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The show opened 
with difficulty. The first comedian struggled against a chatty and restless crowd. 
After an interval things calmed down substantially, and I found myself building 
an enjoyable, dynamic rapport with the audience. The set was going well and 
both I and the audience were having a great time. At the 15 minute mark, 
however, I decided to test the waters—there was little to lose with five minutes 
to go. I said: ‘You guys vote Tory, don’t you?’ The response from the crowd was 
affirmative (some cheers and more nods) but tentative. I then proceeded to 
deliver a final five minutes of unrehearsed anti-Conservative rhetoric, 
deliberately teasing the audience for their (stereotypical) political leanings. The 
audience response was interesting, as is the fact that I could ‘get away with it.’ 
The audience continued to laugh at my punch-lines, as they had during the 
previous 15 minutes, however, the quality of the laughter had changed—it was 
now tinged with (good-natured) grumbling from certain sections of the 
audience, some chatting, some scandalised gasping. I ended on the following 
line: ‘Listen, you go vote for whoever you want… It’s not like it’ll affect this part 
of the country anyways!’ There was some laughter, and some strange nods of 
assent. I left the stage, was paid, and hurriedly left the venue. Despite some 
audience members congratulating me, I decided it would be best to find the 
train station as quickly as possible.
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This moment represents ‘suspension’ on a large, group scale. Whereas in 
Chapter 2 I had suggested that the linguistic capsule of the joke potentially 
suspended the receiver between meanings, one might read this moment as 
opening up a relational or dialogic space that suspends ideological attachments, 
suspending the antagonism between Left and Right, Labour and Conservative, 
so that it may be viewed from an objective distance. In theoretical terms we 
might say that in the moment of performance, the social field became 
disrupted, so that the inabilities of the articulatory processes of naming and 
hegemony to reach full closure were exposed, for example, various audience 
members at different times laughed, agreed with me, disagreed with me, and so 
on. This variance of responses is substituted for the clash of identities supposed 
by the names ‘Conservative,’ ‘Labour’ or even ‘middle-class.’ It is also important 
to note that I did not have to concede in order to produce this result. Rather, it 
arose in part from my ‘abjecting’ myself, placing myself in the excluded position 
outside of the group. This moment is political in a way that satire which 
‘preaches to the choir’ is not, and it is political in the way that even voting is not. 
In satire, and in voting, performer, audience, and citizen must retreat to his/her 
‘universal’ position, designated by a hegemonic name. Whereas in a moment of 
suspension there is an aleatory potential in which, perhaps, losing their 
ideological bearings, subjects might form around a new demand. 
This moment also illustrates the quantitative difficulty of ascribing efficacy to a 
performance practice. In the early morning of 7 May 2010, as I performed at an 
all-night election party in Bethnal Green with a distinctly ‘Left’ leaning 
audience, Conservative incumbent Adam Afriyie was re-elected to parliament 
with a staggering 60.8 per cent of the vote, an 11.4 per cent gain. It is ridiculous 
to assume that 50 people could ever change the face of an election, and 
furthermore, I have no idea of what those 50 might have voted, which perhaps 
serves as a cautionary tale against ascribing too much efficacy to a performance 
form or practice. What new knowledge my thesis and experimental practice is 
contributing to is in the work of theory. 
  6.2 - Easy, Tiger! (a): return to performance
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Easy, Tiger! (a) was the first project since Homework for Heroes in which I was 
fully present (and live) as a performer and expressive locus of the work. 
Dangerology AAC presented a highly self-conscious art practice integrating 
self-portraiture, journalling, and viewer participation, however, my presence in 
the space was limited to photographic representation. Easy, Tiger! (a) could be 
said to develop this self-portraiture in a live situation. The piece is a 15 minute 
relational performance intended for single audience members or small groups. 
As the visitor enters the space, he or she faces a long trestle table, side-on. I am 
sitting at the table, in profile to the visitor entering, with several items, 
including a laptop computer, projector, speaker, books, papers and 
photographs. Behind me is a white flip-chart, upon which is projected a live 
image of my face. This is a projection from the webcam embedded in the screen 
of my laptop. By zooming out of this image I can also show the audience the full 
desktop of my computer and whatever programs are on it: essentially the 
projector functions as my ‘electronic eyes,’ allowing the visitor to see what I am 
seeing (on the computer screen). 
 
I invite the visitor to sit down across from me at the table, and ask his/her name 
(if I do not already know it). With a black felt-tipped pen, I write ‘Hi, (name of 
visitor)’ on the whiteboard in the space upon which is projected a reduced image 
of the whiteboard. The piece then begins. I say some vague introductory 
remarks, which the visitor responds to (or doesn’t). Then, using the computer, I 
play back those introductory remarks and response (which I had been 
recording) now underscored by gentle, acoustic guitar music. Simultaneously, 
using the webcam as mirror, put on a pair of thick, black-rimmed glasses, and 
tidy my appearance. The event proper then begins. Easy, Tiger! (a) is a 
structured conversation with a very loose performance score (see DVD 
Appendix Disc 3). The score consists of questions and stories about myself 
written to engage the visitor in open discourse. At certain points in the piece I 
pass photographs, books and papers across the table, including a negative 
review of a previous performance (of another show) found on the internet. 
Finally, with the permission of the visitor, I type their name into an internet 




I thank the visitor for coming, and he or she leaves the table. On the way out of 
the space the visitor passes a wall hung with the visual work from Dangerology 
at the AAC, which develops many of the same themes found in the conversation 
piece. 
 
Easy, Tiger! (a) is a departure from the majority of my previous work in its use 
of the single audience member. While the work had been advertised as also 
appropriate for small groups, no such groups appeared, and when three or more 
audience members simultaneously found themselves in the space, they 
preferred not to participate together, but rather to watch, as others participated 
in the piece, a development I did not anticipate. Easy, Tiger! (a) also addresses 
the four principles I had identified as lines of exploration at the beginning of 
this phase of my research. These were:  
a. Incorporation of the performance ‘score’: a simple, undemanding form of 
structure allowing both the audience and performer to focus on an ‘object 
of encounter’ in the moment of performance.
b. Acknowledging that the spectator is an already active participant in the 
work through his/her choice to receive the work.
c. Use of the single, expressive locus for the production of comedy.
d. Use of relationality to explore a theme.
These four principles are all explored in Easy, Tiger! (a) far more than in my 
previous work at the Alsager Arts Centre Gallery, however, it is important to 
note that the AAC work was a formal and methodological exploration and thus a 
vital stepping stone.
 
The use of a performance score, a loosely structured list of moments, pieces of 
text, and verbal cues, was intended to enable myself, as a performer, to maintain  
overall control over the event while still creating an open discursive space. In its 
realisation, the performance score created a productive tension between open 
dialogue and performer as expressive locus. While the majority of post-event 
visitor responses stated that the piece did create open dialogue (and several  
stated that the most enjoyable thing about the work was responding, rather than 
simply listening), there was a surprising but not entirely unwanted annoyance 
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on my part when it seemed the event was moving out of my control. Despite 
accounting for the possibility of deviations from the score, I found deviations 
when they did arrive difficult and frustrating to contend with. This tension 
between the score (or programme) and the event is a welcome finding for two 
reasons. First, is this space between the way the world is and how you want it to 
be not at the root of political efficacy at its simplest? That is to say, these escapes 
from the control of the score through the relation between performer and visitor  
are the bearers of a transformative potential. Any emotional annoyance or even 
antagonism should be read as an escape from existing categories; thus the goal 
of such conversational work should not be merely to open smooth flows of 
dialogue within existing channels of communication, for these may reproduce 
situations of dominance or exploitation29. It was in the actualisation of the piece 
that I found that antagonism is always antagonism between, which is to say, it is 
based on a relation between self and other, rather than some abstract 
qualification in terms of content. It is primarily a recognition of  ‘antagonism’ as 
a comic value that links Easy, Tiger! (a) and (b).
 
Second, when manifested in the body of the performer, this distance between 
want and is finds itself in a long line of artworks using failure as humour. While 
it has never been the intention of this project to connect my work on the comic 
function to traditions of clowning, or failure as comedy, this finding points to a 
sort of fluid comic aesthetic in which generic categories are fairly permeable.
  ‘I always felt like I was watching’ (Visitor, 2 May 2009).
 
The use of visual and electronic media in Easy, Tiger! (a) was a significant 
departure from my previous work, which often took a ‘lo-fi’ approach in its 
aesthetic; this would provide an interesting point of enquiry into the nature of 
my relationship with the audience and the nature of such relational work as a 
whole, especially with regards to the role of ‘spectating’ in the piece. One visitor 
towards the end of the day responded that she ‘always felt like (she) was 
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29 This is surely related to the many misinterpretations of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
deterritorialisation, primarily within the field of digital media and internet communication. By 
ignoring the ‘earlier Deleuze’ of Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense, we thus lose the 
idea that deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are in constant flux, and it is moments of 
transformative subjectivity, that are desirable, not merely an open, rhizomatic network for the 
flow of information (the internet). 
watching,’ an interesting response considering her earlier statement that the 
most enjoyable part of the piece were moments of direct participation and 
dialogue. The screen and projector and use of laptop were, in this visitor’s 
opinion, the primary contribution to her partial-scopophilia. To an extent, the 
use of visual media was intended to provide a certain ‘theatricality’; in 
particular, the opening of the piece (in which I played back my own recorded 
words underscored with music) was intended as a simple yet uncanny framing 
device that would mark the departure into the ‘event’ proper. So it is not wholly 
unexpected that the visitor might enjoy looking or watching. Yet Easy, Tiger! 
(a) collapses the physical distance between performer and audience to the 
everyday proximity of two diners across a lunch-time table, which leads me to 
conclude that a change in proximal distance is not the sole factor in a 
heightened engagement between performer and spectator. 
   Conclusions
From this small but necessary experiment, two major areas of exploration 
presented themselves, one in terms of form, the other content. The use of the 
one-on-one performance form, while both relevant to the history of relational 
aesthetics and participation in art practice, allowed me to explore antagonism in 
terms of power, control, and ‘escaping.’ But while highlighting the 
intersubjective nature of antagonism, the one-on-one performance form lacks 
the group dynamic that makes ‘audience participation’ a valid site of exploration 
with regard to the political in performance. The question then, is one of passing 
from the serial individual(s) (the self and the other) to the group, which is the 
site of politics itself.  It also became clear that I must, from this point onwards, 
incorporate a more central theme, perhaps even a narrative. While the 
performance score in this iteration was heavily fragmented and often felt ‘flat,’ a 
more cohesive structure in conjunction with an open form, it seems, opens up a 
distance for the performer between want and is, and provides a fruitful ground 
for comedy.
  6.3 - Easy, Tiger! (b) - return to comic performance
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The final piece of practice presented in this practice-as-research project returns 
to the traditional conventions of stand-up comedy, being an hour of stand-up 
augmented with multimedia and participatory elements. Easy, Tiger! (b) would 
slot easily alongside the tradition of comedians bringing hour-long shows to the 
Edinburgh Festival Fringe (and indeed, it will be performed there in August 
2010). So how can Easy, Tiger! (b) be distinguished as experimental practice?
The first thing to keep in mind is that the work is in no way definitive. If in the 
political theory that provides the background of this work the universal can 
never fully draw together a series of particularities without some sort of 
exclusion or failure, a praxis cannot fully embody the principles of its theoretical 
source. In situating this work in a context of practices that all, to some extent, 
embody certain aspects of the theoretical model of comedy performance as 
political praxis detailed above, Easy, Tiger! (b) should perhaps be viewed as one 
‘praxical’ attempt. What it represents, then, is not a summation of the thesis but 
an instance, a manifest work of comedy performance that has been coloured 
and inflected by the experimental practice and concurrent theoretical research. 
As a moment in a hopefully life-long personal research project into the politics 
of comedy performance it is a small milestone, rather than an end-point.
Easy, Tiger! (b) is an hour-long stand-up performance with a Marxist theme. As 
in my earlier analysis of Kim Noble Will Die, the content of the material ‘signals’ 
the way in which the form of the show should be read, as precise political 
critique. The show explores what constitutes a political subject in the 21st 
century, which is not a subject that immediate brings comedy performance to 
mind. In essence, the show’s theme is derived directly from the theoretical 
questions of my research. In translating these into performance, I personalise or 
‘subjectivise’ them, and the material of the show draws on my own failure to 
present a certain ideal political subjectivity. I interweave a loose philosophical 
analysis with perhaps more conventional stories about being a defiant child and 
my father (who grew up in China and left with his family during Mao Zedong’s 
Cultural Revolution). A long essay is given to every audience member, with 
accompanying bibliography. Therefore, all audience members, even those 
booking tickets strictly for ‘stand-up comedy’ had their attention drawn to the 
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theme of the work. By avoiding any Leninist pronouncements of ‘what is to be 
done,’ but by making the general theme of the work explicit, I hoped a shared 
problem would open for the audience that would encourage certain readings 
and more importantly, discussion and intellectual engagement. In the 
September 2009 version of the work, which took place as part of TheFestivalOf 
at The Central School of Speech and Drama (which this analysis mostly looks 
at), the performance took place in between three locations. Beginning in the 
foyer of the building, I engage individual audience members in small 
conversation. To three individuals I hand a pen, slip of paper, and envelope, 
asking them to write on the paper something they would like to change in the 
world, anywhere from ‘I want a swimming pool,’ to ‘I want fair and accountable 
politicians.’ I then ask them to seal the slip in the envelope without showing me, 
and to hand it back to me. As the show proper begins, I gather the audience 
together, telling them of a personal fantasy or wish to assemble a cabal or 
sleeper cell that would ‘overturn capitalism.’ I hold an ‘election,’ and the 
audience decides on a deputy head of our new state. I then lead the audience out 
into the street and around the building, while we collectively sing our ‘new 
national anthem,’ accompanied by my ukulele playing. We enter the large studio 
in which the remainder of the show takes place through a back door, and I lead 
the audience over to a table covered in plastic. At this point I begin to talk about 
refusing the products of ‘Empire.’ This section very much resembles a ‘funny 
version’ of Alain Badiou’s statement (2004, p. 103): ‘All art, and all thought, is 
ruined when we accept this permission to consume, to communicate and to 
enjoy. We should become pitiless censors of ourselves.’ Removing a book by the 
popular ‘chick-lit’ author Sophie Kinsella, I invite the audience to commit an 
‘ethical act’ by destroying the book with the use of spray paint (or simple 
tearing). Once done, I take a picture of the destroyed object with a digital 
camera. I tell the audience I will email this picture to Sophie Kinsella, with a 
note reading ‘I really enjoyed your book, Sophie.’ 
After this iconoclastic passage à l’acte I lead the audience over to the 
performance area, which is structured as per the conventional form of comedy 
audience. Onstage there is a large table, with a laptop, projector, and sound 
system. There is a stool for my notes and several books of political philosophy 
on the floor. The projector shines onto the (white) back wall of the space, and 
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shows a number of images, primarily self-portraits in the style of Dangerology. 
I perform roughly 20-25 minutes of themed stand-up in this setting. At the end 
of the piece I recount the story of Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener, designating 
his ‘I would prefer not to’ as a political ‘act,’ a way of asking new questions about 
‘what is to be done.’ I reveal the envelopes from the pre-performance chat. One 
by one I open these, and in dialogue with the audience we proceed to have a 
‘surgery’ on their personal or political problems. This engagement is left entirely   
open to chance. After this the show is over, and the audience exits the space. 
The most useful way to examine Easy, Tiger! (b), a mixture of a number of 
elements, is to break it into separate instances, each of which corresponds 
roughly to a principle of my research: audience-performer relations, ‘act’ (or 
passage à l’acte) and exclusion, and contingency and aleatoric materialism/
performance. In a systematic way, I will now examine each of these principles, 
making specific reference to the material of Easy, Tiger! (b), speculating on the 
possible implications of this as political praxis. Each accompanying instance of 
practice can be found on the DVD Appendix (Disc 3). 
   Audience; and the group
The first site of experimentation in Easy, Tiger! (b), was, of course, engagement 
with ‘audience.’ The previous phases of practice-as-research required positing a 
false alternative between the seated mass of spectators (usually designated 
‘audience’) and the freely navigating viewer of participatory art. This false 
binary suggests a denigration of the audience as the mass, the crowd, a series of 
unthinking bodies imprisoned by the regime of representation. Hence, a 
‘political theatre’ would either be pedagogical or immediately efficacious, as in 
my earlier discussion of Rancière (Chapter 3, section 2). In trying to escape the 
confines of traditional spectatorship, I moved towards this second model, 
which, as Rancière writes, was proposed by Rousseau as an alternative to the 
pedagogical model of theatre as early as 1760: ‘Rousseau sought to contrast this 
separation with the collective body of a city that enacts its own unity through 
hymns and dances, such as in the celebration of the Greek City Festival 
(Rancière 2010, p. 137). But there is a distinct ideological problem with 
Rousseau’s model—if art immediately ‘acts’ on the social body, building or 
Chow, D.V.B.
167
strengthening community or the social bond, from where does the critical 
moment arise? In the levelling of the social field to a community of equals, who 
is the privileged member who holds the critical faculty to designate whether this 
of that celebration or festival is, as Kant might say, ‘a good’? The tradition of 
Carnival wrestled with this problem precisely by being a tradition; the critical 
role is bestowed upon the Lord of Misrule, however this figure is only able to 
exist through the positing of an a priori set of strictures, which is, perhaps, 
another way of invoking my thesis that the Carnivalesque is merely the obscene 
double of official culture. Relational artists have also struggled with this 
problem—in this work, the critical role is held by the artist, which is why Ben 
Lewis’ criticism is warranted: 
On an intellectual level they’re still living off the arguments of the 
Frankfurt School – Adorno and Horkheimer […] They argue that we are 
all slaves to something called dominant ideology; this bourgeois thing 
that was constructing our way of thinking for us […] The weakness of the 
art to me is that […] they’re trying to tell me something I disagree with 
and they’re saying ‘because we’re artists we know better.’ (Lewis 2004 
quoted in Mulholland 2004: http://www.tate.org.uk/research/
tateresearch/tatepapers/04autumn/mulholland).
Furthermore, we might say the conflating of ‘relations’ of a relational artwork 
with everyday relations is only possible under a theoretical framework which 
posits space outside of the artwork as ‘non-relational,’ as Bourriaud does, 
extending Debord’s Society of Spectacle into a Society of Extras, in which all 
human interrelations are tainted by commodification. So, in the model 
designated ‘ethical immediacy,’ we are faced with the problem of the outside of 
the interstitial community. 
Easy, Tiger! (b) intends a more nuanced reading of audience and efficacy. 
Undoing the false binary above in Chapter 5, we see that the problem of the 
outside, from which a critical moment can arise, is produced by community, 
which is to say, critical moments arise from antagonisms. In performance, this 
means that audience should be read as already active, with the agency to unite 
around particular demands. The stand-up audience gives a good demonstration 
of this model—while they are generally happy to sit back and watch, they are not  
‘passive’ viewers, at the very least because of the customary transgressions of 
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direct address and heckling. While there is some similarity between the form of 
stand-up and the form of relational aesthetics, in most cases the audience is 
happy to be led into comic bliss by someone who at least seems to know what he 
or she is doing. However, the stand-up audience, unmoored from the superego 
conventions of proscenium arch and ushers, can very quickly form factions and 
groups when comedy ‘goes wrong.’ This idea of forming a group is useful, not 
least because it demonstrates an attachment, the production of which is a key 
question for my research. We will use ‘group’ in its technical sense, referring to 
Sartre’s basic question of the political in Critique of Dialectical Reason, the 
passage from the ‘series’ of individuals, to the ‘group.’ Whereas the series is 
defined by contingent circumstances, as individuals happen to be at the same 
place at the same time (for example, the bus queue), the group, on the other 
hand, is a self-conscious unity around a demand.  Earlier, I have argued that the 
passage to group (a) can never form a fully realised totality, and (b) produces an 
antagonism, the recognition of which is the beginning movement of politics. As 
in my discussion of Kim Noble Will Die, answering this question of the 
formation of the group can create performance comedy that is a very particular 
type of political critique, and I have attempted a similar experiment in this 
piece. 
The audience begins in a state of series. This is particularly clear in the context 
of Easy, Tiger!, which officially begins in the foyer of the building. The audience 
mills around the foyer, loitering, waiting for something to capture their 
attention. By engaging personally with individual audience members or small 
groups, I intensify this ‘seriality.’ Three random audience members are given a 
task (the envelope), further serialising the group, three of whom now have a 
unique investment in the piece. When I begin to address the audience as a 
group, I take on the capacity of leader, in the sense that I occupy a particular 
place in the chain: I am the point of interest that unites the crowd in an act of 
viewing. In Group Psychology, Freud argues that (in certain types of crowds, at 
least): 
[The leader] need often only possess the typical qualities of the 
individuals concerned in a particularly clearly marked and pure form, 
and need only give an impression of greater force and more freedom of 
libido; and in that case the need for a strong chief will often meet him 
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half-way and invest him with a predominance to which he would 
otherwise perhaps have had no claim. (Freud 1921[2001] p.  134, quoted 
in Laclau 2005[2007], pp. 57-58).
In other words, not only does the crowd desire a leader, the qualities they desire 
in a leader are to an extent identificatory qualities in themselves; Laclau clarifies
—‘he is the father, but also one of the brothers’ (Laclau 2005[2007], p. 58). 
Ultimately, what Laclau concludes is that this form of identification with and of 
a leader is a ‘democratic’ form. To return to Easy, Tiger!, as a performer I 
occupy this position through a similar combination of identification and trust. 
After milling around with the rest of the audience as part of a group I separate 
myself from it, while remaining accountable to it. Once I begin ‘performing,’ 
telling jokes and stories, I become accountable to my audience, who cannot but 
make their demand on the performer (myself) known through laughter (or lack 
of laughter), smiles, heckles, silence and so on. 
The first thing to note is that this is not far from the conventional position of the 
comedian, particularly the element of accountability to the group, therefore it is 
not sufficient to argue that because the comedian occupies a ‘democratic’ 
position, it follows that comedy is an inherently democratic form, or that it is 
any way transformative (we are back at Rancière’s [2009] notion of ethical 
immediacy). I would argue, in fact, that the group formed through the comic 
occupying the position at the head of the chain is not a group at all, for they 
have not yet been split by some sort of naming, identification, or demand. So 
how do we pass from the series or crowd to the true group (in the event of 
performance)? While the September 2009 version of Easy, Tiger! (b) attempted 
to actualise this idea right away, it was not until the discomfort of the 
destruction of the novel when any real antagonism of group identification was 
able to emerge. However, one participatory strategy I employed in the opening 
moments of the piece was the staging of an ‘election.’ 
Addressing the audience, I designated myself ‘Leader,’ (‘Like Stalin, just like in 
my childhood fantasies,’ I say, a somewhat contentious but throwaway joke that 
is characteristic of my comic brain). I then held an election to find a Second-in-
Command (‘I need a Nikita Khruschev’). Picking two members of the audience 
at random, I asked them to tell me what qualities they would bring to the role of 
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second-in-command, which they do (‘I will obey you ruthlessly…’). I then asked 
the audience to vote on their choice, by show of hands. My phrasing is 
particularly important here (‘Who votes for…?’); as in Kim Noble’s show, it is 
somewhat ambiguous what exactly the audience is voting for, although, it 
seems, most interpret the raising of hands as a positive vote, as in normal 
elections. After a quick count to tally the votes, the person with the most votes 
was eliminated. The discontent of this moment perhaps contributed to a comic 
atmosphere. The chosen second-in-command was then charged with leading the 
audience through the public square and through the street to the main venue for 
the performance. 
While this instance demonstrates the formation of a ‘group,’ it is superficial. It 
lacks a requisite antagonism or discomfort, and more importantly, the 
audience’s interaction was here of no consequence. I remained in the position of 
power. In the further development of the work (seen in the live submission 
accompanying this thesis), the interaction with the audience takes on greater 
consequence—the second in command is asked to suggest something we as a 
group might do, and it is followed through. This engenders a discomfort, and 
reveals an antagonism, which in a way, was more present in the September 
2009 version, in the procession through the street (the range of participation 
here was hugely varied, some refusing to participate out of embarrassment of 
public singing or not knowing the words, some throwing themselves into the 
task full-throttle). I am reminded of a singular and unrepeatable performance 
by Hugh Hughes (the alter-ego of Welsh theatre maker Shôn Dale-Jones) at the 
2009 Edinburgh Festival. Hughes’ show 360 is a traditional stand-up and 
storytelling piece, though what sets Hughes apart is his seeming limitless 
capacity for good-natured audience interaction. On the evening I attended, 
there was an extraordinary rupture in the structure of the show. At the ten-
minute mark, as Hughes began to launch into the main part of the story (of 
going up a mountain with a childhood friend), two women in the audience got 
up and tried to surreptitiously leave the auditorium. Hughes noticed them, 
asking ‘Where are you going?’ They replied, embarrassed but laughing, ‘Sorry, 
we’re in the wrong show!’ They had, it transpired, booked tickets for stand-up 
Sarah Millican’s show Typical Woman, playing in the venue next door. After the 
women had gone, Hughes proposed that the audience should go en masse to 
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Millican’s show, in progress, interrupt it, and demand that the women come 
back to our group. After some open discussion with the audience (mostly about 
logistics), he held it to a vote; the motion (to disrupt Millican’s show) passed 
with around 60 per cent support. We left the auditorium and gathered in the 
Pleasance Courtyard, as ushers attempted to dissuade Hughes from following 
through with the plan. Eventually, the plan was stopped by the front-of-house 
staff; as the audience booed them, yelling ‘fight the power,’ they seemed visibly 
confused at having suddenly become ‘power.’ As we filed back into the 
auditorium, and Hughes returned to his story, there was a sense of 
disappointment that nothing, from this point, could be as exciting. For me, this 
instance of group demand illustrates the possibilities of discomfort. It is 
political because it makes sensible the antagonism that arises in consensus. 
Suturing the field of differences into a single action generated a huge range of 
responses. While I was somewhat uncomfortable with participating, others were 
visibly distressed. Still others left, while a representative of the British Council 
stood at a distance and scrawled notes in his pad. These responses, of course, 
were accompanied by a great majority of the crowd, baying in the Courtyard and 
ready to go.
   ‘Act?’ or acting out?
The second instance of alternative audience engagement is the shared, 
collaborative action of destroying a Sophie Kinsella novel. In the text of Easy, 
Tiger! (b), I framed this instance as ‘an ethical act.’ ‘Ethical act’ is uneasy 
terminology, at once suggesting action as well as the Lacanian psychoanalytic 
‘act.’ In the end, this instance demonstrates a participatory moment that 
incorporates antagonism and discomfort. As described above, the audience is 
led over to a table covered in plastic, whereupon I tell the audience of my 
objections to her work. The material is persuasive as opposed to angry or 
manipulative—my primary objection to Kinsella’s writing (as representative of a 
larger culture of ‘chick-lit’) is its contribution to misogynistic attitudes and its 
un-ironic celebration of consumerist values—and feedback from audiences 
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shows that, to an extent, others agreed.30 The shared destruction of the book 
represents a move from the commentary of the material into an intervention in 
the real. The material destruction of a book creates an uneasiness among the 
audience (as a cultural object books hold a certain sanctity, and the destruction 
of books raises the spectre of censorship and book burning, associated with 
totalitarian or illiberal regimes). Therefore, I proposed, to invite audiences to 
destroy the book would be to ‘break with’ social constraints, that perhaps to a 
larger extent prevent us from acting upon damaging or exploitative situations. 
Paraphrasing Brecht’s Threepenny Opera I tell the audience, ‘what is destroying 
a Sophie Kinsella novel compared to writing a Sophie Kinsella novel?’ 
But is this an ‘act’? To what extent is a break with social convention (the 
transgression of the unspoken rule that books are not to be destroyed) an 
authentic ‘act’? My view on the matter has changed significantly since originally 
devising this moment. While I still believe that the shared destruction of the 
book carries an important sense of iconoclasm, and also reinforces in an 
informative (that is, didactic) way the thesis of the show, a true ‘act’ requires 
more than a transgression of social norms, which is a point I have articulated 
throughout this thesis. The way in which this supposedly experimental moment 
retrospectively falls into the naive logic of transgression demonstrates the 
degree to which transgression is bound up with performance comedy. Let us 
examine the moment more carefully. I address the audience in the spirit of 
sharing, inviting them into a safe space in which to ‘break the rules,’ which of 
course, is the very definition of Carnival as suspension of hierarchy and norms. 
In attempting to break with the logic of the Carnivalesque through 
experimentation with different forms of audience engagement, this moment 
seemed to fall back into this logic in a different form. Crucially, the framing of 
this moment as ‘art’ relieves the moment of any true transgressive potential, 
unlike Kim Noble’s interventions with everyday products explored in the 
previous chapter, which take place in a private sphere and are only framed as 
art after the fact. So when, particularly in the second performance of the 
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30 In emailed feedback from a showing of Easy, Tiger! (b) at the Open Arts Cafe (West London 
Synagogue), I received this anonymous comment: ‘Right on! Thanks for talking about misogyny 
too and making us laugh at it, a nice counterpoint to all the “blokey” humour this country 
currently subscribes to. Brilliant use of material – I learnt a lot and laughed – don’t apologise/
explain for the material – we need to hear it!’
September 2009 run of Easy, Tiger! the action of destruction escalates into a 
progressively more delirious fury of paper tearing, laughter, and misfired spray 
paint, this moment has the status of a passage a l’acte, an excessive ‘acting-out’ 
that does not particularly change the coordinates of the symbolic order. In 
planning the possible act I determine in advance its outcome, therefore in effect, 
this form of comedic ‘act’ is as ineffectual as satire. 
Žižek notes (1992[2008], p. 40) that the ‘foundation’ for the ‘act’ is words, or 
rather, ideology itself, just as psychoanalysis as ‘talking cure’ is predicated on 
the notion that it is possible to touch some part of the Real through intervention 
in the Symbolic, with words. Which is to say, the ‘act’ emerges from ideology 
and in doing so reveals ‘[…] a certain surplus which eludes the domain of 
ideology as such.’ As in Mouffe and Laclau’s (1985) concept of hegemony, 
ideology can never fully ‘totalise,’ and always leaves some excess. Perhaps it is 
this dimension that this particular section of Easy, Tiger! lacks. To be precise, 
in this section I pit one ideology against another in a very deliberate ‘false 
choice.’ There is, on the one hand, the ideology of global capital and 
consumerism, represented by a sort of fetishistic object (Kinsella’s book), and 
on the other there hand, there is a rejection of this in the course of the 
performance. What I failed to take into account was the degree to which the 
rejection of the products of global capital is already part of the ideology of global 
capital, which is predicated on the notion of ‘choice.’ This particular part of the 
piece, then, provides a safe space in which to take the choice of ‘rejection,’ an 
important action in itself. But it is not satisfying from the theoretical position I 
have reached in this thesis.
  ‘I would prefer not to…’ 
The closing section of Easy, Tiger! (b), is/was a framed dialogue with audience 
members. In my notes, as well as the DVD documentation. this section is 
referred to as ‘Bartleby,’ and takes Bartleby’s ‘formula,’ his ‘I would prefer not 
to,’ and proposes it as a sort of panacea for all social, political, public, or private 
ills. The reader will recall the discussion in Chapter 2 of this verbal formulation, 
which, I argued (following Deleuze 1997 and Žižek 2006), is a comic form that 
breaks from the disjunctive synthesis (false alternative). My intention in this 
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piece was not to actualise Melville’s text but to frame a piece of direct audience 
engagement, and to explore moments of chance and contingency in comic 
performance. With the audience gathered in the foyer of the building, I ask 
three separate visitors (on most occasions these were people standing or sitting 
alone at the time), to write, on a slip of paper, something ‘they would like to be 
different about the world.’ I noted that in past performances, responses had 
ranged from ‘I want a swimming pool’ to ‘I want honest, accountable 
politicians.’ When this has been written, it is, unseen by me, sealed in an 
envelope and given back. These sealed envelopes sit on stage for the duration of 
the performance. This action draws on certain ‘showman’ elements of stage 
magic, perhaps demonstrating the historical continuity between stand-up and 
vaudeville. Towards the end of the show, I briefly recount the story of ‘Bartleby, 
the Scrivener.’ Opening the envelopes, I reveal (to myself, as well as to the rest 
of the audience), what is written on the slips of paper. Taking each ‘problem’ in 
turn, I improvise, in dialogue with the audience, the ways in which Bartleby’s 
formula might be used to solve that problem. 
The first thing to note is that, superficially at least, this act (in the vaudevillian 
sense) resembles the conventional trick of ‘putting someone on the spot’ used by  
compères at comedy nights, so often loathed by audiences. In this case, 
however, the general tone and feeling is different from those often forced 
moments of interaction; there was little sense, that the audience member in 
dialogue was, as it were, ‘on the spot,’ having chosen to put forward a 
contribution earlier they were already aware of their commitment to the pact. 
Let us examine this instance in greater detail. In the narrative of my practice-as-
research project, this instance of formalised participation is, to an extent, 
cumulative and exemplary. I am somewhat reluctant, however, to declare this 
simple and formal act the model of the political in performance comedy. Is this 
the political dimension of performance comedy evoked by the title of this 
project? The answer, of course, is yes, and no—no, because to relocate the 
political dimension of performance comedy is to engage in an ongoing process 
of re-invention based on a series of theoretical propositions, this being a 
landmark. The Lacanian ‘act’ always breaks free of its circumstances while 
arising from them; a prescriptive model of a comic act qua ‘act’ is therefore 
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anathema to my method. But yes—in that ‘Bartleby’ serves to illustrate the four 
theoretical propositions I have to this point detailed as required to call a comedy  
performance ‘political’ in the strictest sense. Breaking it down we see that it 
embodies: 1) an antagonism or exclusion, 2) the ‘break’ with ideology, or the 
potential for the break, 3) a ‘relational’ process of attachment, and 4) an 
ambiguous, suspended atmosphere, that serves to hold the antagonism in a 
place of safety. I will address each of these elements in turn, making reference 
to various documented instances of ‘Bartleby’ (all of which can be found on the 
supporting DVD appendix). 
 1) Antagonism or exclusion
‘Singling out’ a member of the audience, not only through direct address, but 
through the demand for verbal response, is exclusionary, elevating a single unit 
of the audience from the rest of the crowd and denying them the freedom of 
silence. Ridout (2006, p. 71) considers that ‘it is when direct address arises as a 
disruption to dominant conditions of spectatorship that it produces […] 
discomfort and embarrassments […].’ This embarrassment is both pleasurable 
and political, political in that the economic relationships that produce the 
machine of the theatre are exposed: ‘[…] the phenomenon of embarrassment 
arising from eye contact seems to expose the consumer as consumer in her own 
eye, whether she looks away or not’ (ibid., p. 89). This line of analysis is useful: 
what economic conditions are exposed in the stand-up comedy event through 
the particular mode of direct address employed (which we might call 
antagonistic)? In my experience, there is, paradoxically, a general distrust for 
direct address in stand-up, a form which requires a phenomenologically 
sensible response of the audience through common laughter in order to be 
stand-up. Take, for example, the lengths to which an audience member will go 
in order to avoid sitting in the front row (in  two years of running the regular 
comedy night Every Other Monday in Angel, London, I have seen audience 
members go so far as to bring furniture from the bar downstairs and place it in 
the back row). The usual justification here is ‘I don’t want to be picked on,’ 
which must be distinguished from the imperative ‘Don’t pick on me!’; the latter 
is an attempt at bargaining with the form, while the former perhaps reveals the 
understood contract (if not me, the compère has to pick on someone). In 
Chow, D.V.B.
176
circumstances where either compère or audience member disrupt the fragile 
niceties of picking-on and being picked-on, ‘taking the piss’ and (to be perfectly 
symmetrical) ‘donating it,’—one party being overly aggressive, and so on—a 
common response (from the audience) is ‘I’m paying here, you make the jokes, 
not me.’ What economic conditions are thus revealed in the act of direct address 
(in stand-up)? The answer is that nothing is revealed, because nothing was ever 
being concealed. There is effectively an already-antagonistic relationship 
between performer and audience which, in the transparency of the stand-up 
mechanism is already on show. When the direct address collapses through 
aggression, violence, or conversely, shyness or reluctance, the imbalance of the 
(economic) relationship (‘We’re paying you so we can do the work?’) is 
acknowledged directly and therefore the form is stripped of its symbolic 
efficiency. We must of course note the ideological dimension to this collapse; 
the unbalanced economic relationship is the disavowed element that allows the 
symbolic ritual/performance to exist. 
In all instances (thus far) of ‘Bartleby,’ the direct address was not met with 
silence or refusal but rather felt fairly ‘easy’—I will deal with this ease or ‘safety’ 
further on. Suffice it to say here that if fundamental antagonism is not being 
acknowledged through the collapse of the direct address ‘work,’ something else 
must be doing the work. I want to argue it is the use of envelopes and the 
temporal displacement effected by these that makes the exclusion sensible. 
There is a delay between writing the statement and the reading of the statement, 
as well as a difference in the ‘to whom’ the statement is addressed. That is, if I 
were to ask a member of the audience ‘what do you want to make different 
about your life?’ they are aware that in their answer they are addressing the 
group. In ‘Bartleby,’ though I am honest that the statement in the envelope will 
be read out, the process is much more a matter of writing a statement in the 
past and being made responsible for it in the present. For example, at the 
‘scratch’ performance at The Green Man (a full recording of which is captured 
on the DVD), I read a statement from a woman in the audience which reads ‘I 
want a swimming pool.’ In this moment a sense of identity and circumstances of 
a nameless audience member are conjured. The rest of the audience (group) is 
made aware of their own relation to this person’s circumstances or identity and 
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(psychically) organises itself accordingly. The woman must take responsibility 
for her statement in the agora of the comedy event. 
2) The break with ideology
Bartleby’s comic formula allows for a potential ideological ‘break,’ although in a 
way totally unintended by Melville. ‘Bartleby’ is a kind of improvised joke with a 
fixed punch-line, similar to the legendary vaudevillian joke ‘The Aristocrats’ 
popularised by the 2005 film by Paul Provenza and Penn Gillette. In ‘The 
Aristocrats,’ the comedian tells a story of a performer, usually the patriarch of a 
performing family, visiting an agent’s office, who tells the agent ‘Have I got an 
act for you!’ The comedian then proceeds to describe the act, improvising an 
escalating series of gleefully disgusting and taboo acts. The now shocked agent, 
asks the performer, ‘what do you call this act?,’ whereupon the performer 
always replies ‘The Aristocrats!’ The incongruity between the punch-line and the 
set-up, of course, produces the comedy. What is interesting about Provenza and 
Gillette’s film is that very few of the comedians featured manage to wring 
laughter from the punch-line itself. What no one seems to realise is perhaps we 
should call the ‘performative problem’—after so many repetitions (with 
variation) of the same joke, the words ‘The Aristocrats’ are perhaps elevated (or 
more properly, denigrated) to a kind of Master Signifier of filth. In their 
symbolic efficiency they simply become shorthand for ‘dirty joke’—the 
incongruous punch-line no longer functions because there is no incongruity 31. 
There is a similar reiterative danger in ‘Bartleby’—however, the fact that the 
premise and set-up are effectively co-authored guards against this. In ‘Bartleby’ 
the formula of ‘I would prefer not to’ is always too narrow a formula. As in 
Melville’s story, it does not actually solve a problem but creates further ones. 
The incongruity, or incommensurable gap is between the unwavering ethical 
consistency of Bartleby’s formula and the personally invested problems of the 
audience, and this produces the ‘funny.’ Again, as above, let us use the example 
of ‘I want a swimming pool.’ Here my improvisation leads to ‘solving’ this 
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31 The two comedians in this film who manage to make ‘The Aristocrats’ work in the traditional 
joke formula (set-up/punch-line) are Wendy Liebman and Sarah Silverman, both of whom solve 
the performative problem of reiteration by playing with the meta-structure of the joke itself.
problem by ‘getting rid of your kids,’ which might be read as a straightforward 
satire of middle-class, consumerist aspirations. Bartleby’s solution in this 
scenario utilises a naive, over-identificatory strategy (in other words, stick to 
your guns, and when your kids knock on the door wanting to be let in, simply 
reply ‘I would prefer not to’) which gives the joke a measure of ambiguity. 
Unlike more traditional satire, it is not read by the audience as an attack on the 
(as established above) ‘excluded’ audience members. 
 3) Attachments 
As I have argued in these pages, the form of performance is crucial to 
establishing the ‘efficacy’ of comedy performance, as it may lead to the 
formation of an attachment—a relationship of fidelity to the moment of the 
‘break’ with dominant ideology and the emergence of the new. In Chapter Two I 
argued that different forms of performance comedy may produce different 
attachments (and therefore may be efficacious in different ways). What form of 
attachment does ‘Bartleby’ produce, and how does it produce said attachment? I 
will now argue that ‘Bartleby’ produces attachments in two ways. First, there is a 
psychic investment on the part of the participant, who contemplates a 
proposition and produces (writes) a response. In an earlier phase of practice-as-
research (see Chapter Four, Dangerology), I might have valorised this process 
on its own, arguing for the transformative quality of participation for the 
participating subject; here emphasis must instead be placed on the 
transformative quality within the group.  Therefore, the second way ‘Bartleby’ 
comes to produce an attachment is through the psychic investment on the part 
of the remainder of the audience. In other words, the remaining (still 
anonymous) members of the audience must suddenly re-establish their relation 
to the excluded (that is, made visible) party, as when, perhaps a stranger is 
revealed to be a friend of a family member, or when a close friend says 
something off colour or offensive at a dinner party. 
As ‘Bartleby’ is the culmination of Easy, Tiger! (b), one can argue that the 
previous relational moments (the ‘election,’ destroying the book) ‘set-up’ an 
affective space (producing a sensus communis) which is (potentially) broken/
reorganised (into a dissensus communis) by ‘Bartleby,’ in which the audience 
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member must re-organise his or her relation to the excluded party of the group. 
But this dissensus does not result here in a deadlocked antagonism. Rather, in 
my experience of performing ‘Bartleby,’ what was exceptional was the ease of 
discussion. This is one example of what I speak of when I say ‘making the Real 
of antagonism sensible in a “safe” way.’ 
 4) Danger and safety
Several audience members commented that this particular section of the show 
felt ‘dangerous,’ with a real sense that it could ‘all go wrong.’ At the same time, it  
was also commented that my manner in performance produced a degree of 
‘safety.’ How are we to read this paradoxical opposition? 
Addressing danger first, despite the title of my work produced in Phase Two of 
my practice-as-research, Dangerology, it could be argued that danger was far 
from the object of study. Rather, in retrospect, the work denied danger through 
formal structures of conviviality. What is, formally speaking, dangerous32 about 
stand-up is the uncomfortable (see introduction to Chapter 1) possibility of 
failure created by its already-relational form, such as failure to respond to 
heckles, silence, or any number of contingent circumstances. The experiments 
in Phase Two, denied this danger by removing the possibility of ‘failure’—the 
participation lacked a clear objective, or rather, was the objective itself. 
Furthermore, the formal deconstruction of the mechanisms of address (one-to-
one, not necessarily regarding the rest of the group) denied the clear 
‘exclusionary’ principle that has become so important to later phases of the 
work. However, what has remained a clear benefit from this earlier work was 
the negotiation of conviviality, which finds its proper place here. The convivial 
atmosphere produces a relationship of safety, which tempers the antagonism of 
the exclusion. Effectively, the singled-out/excluded element of the group, under 
this aegis, can have the experience of both being-laughed-at and laughing-with. 
The remainder of the group can have a similar experience of at/with, which 
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32 While I am speaking of danger in somewhat abstract terms of ‘failure’ or ‘success,’ it is 
perhaps useful to note, especially with regard to ‘efficacy,’ that this danger can lead to physical 
danger and violence. In April 2007 at the Manchester Comedy Store, Australian comedian Jim 
Jeffries was punched in the face by an audience member who rushed onto stage after some 
banter had not been to his taste. This scenario is exceptional, but it is interesting to keep in 
mind that terms such as ‘antagonism,’ ‘exclusion,’ and ‘danger’ can have bodily consequences. 
means the antagonistic relationship is opened and viewed from an objective 
distance, ‘ironic’ in the sense used by Empson, which ‘can believe at once that 
people are and are not guilty’ (Empson 1930[2004], p. 44). The reader will note 
that throughout this project I have employed varieties of ‘incongruity’ in both 
my theoretical and creative practice, the final incongruity is here, between a 
‘convivial,’ united group ready to lose their ‘selves’ in the sweep of laughter, and 
the excluded, antagonised singularity. This incongruity is required to reach the 
condition of comedy in performance that opens the space for a rupture in 
categorical reason, for the exception of the situation to be made visible33.
The conviviality of the audience is formally produced by the possibility of 
abjection for the stand-up comedian, which Limon claims is the very basis of 
stand-up in general: ‘what is stood up in stand-up comedy is abjection. Stand-
up makes vertical (or ventral) what should be horizontal (or dorsal)’ (Limon 
2000, p. 4). In the situation of comedy, the comedian is already the excluded 
element, directing the audience’s investments to a central expressive locus.  
 Negotiation(s)
Let us review the precise stages in this act of political comedy (for we must be 
confident enough to now give it its proper name). In ‘Bartleby’ a proposition is 
answered, in secret, by one audience member. This is then read out to the 
group, singling-out that audience member. Improvising around this moment of 
structured chance I make a joke from the audience member’s written response 
and the ensuing discussion. On the surface, this does not appear political at all, 
unless the content of the written response is directly ‘political’ in as much as it 
refers to the political process (it often did: ‘I want fair, accountable politicians’; 
‘How do I collectivise my struggle?’ were two such responses). But what actually  
happens in this moment correlates to three elements that, I have argued, 
determine a political comedy in performance. Firstly, there is an exclusion, 
secondly, a break, and finally (the possibility of) an attachment. 
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33 This feeling is captured by Nicolson in his 1946 book The English Sense of Humour, a feeling 
‘existing at a level of consciousness between sensation and perception,’ that can be enjoyed, 
anytime, by the ‘curious sensation produced when we cross the middle finger over the index and 
then push the v-shaped aperture up and down the nose,’ a haptic illusion of ‘having two noses 
and one nose at the same time’ (Nicolson 1946, quoted in Thompson 2004, p. xxiii). 
What is striking about this model in practice is the way in which it clearly 
sidesteps a direct engagement for a kind of ‘looking awry’ (Žižek 1991). As I have 
argued above, the political dimension of a joke is not necessarily located in its 
content, but rather in the way this peculiar sort of word-game (to use Virno’s 
analysis [2008]) breaks with an existing logic. While this argument, as 
formulated in Chapter 2, might seem to preclude the possibility of any effective 
direct comic engagement with the political, in practice, we see that the comic 
artist can use a number of strategies to negotiate between exclusion, break, and 
attachment. What is employed here is a sort of misdirection via laughter and 
conviviality, so that while the Bartlebeian formula34 will always fail to solve the 
problem directly, a new set of problems is opened.
Again, I must emphasise that though ‘Bartleby’ is a landmark in an ongoing 
process, it should in no way be viewed as a prescription for a mode of making 
and doing political comedy. It is anathema to my methodological framework to 
presuppose that one single form of political comedy might be applicable to all 
situations. What is required is a constant re-negotiation between the elements 
of the political itself, which I have identified, within the comic frame, according 
to the particular circumstances in place and time (context).
  6.4 - How to do things with jokes - live submission (5 
July 2010)
My final piece of experimental practice expands on propositions of ‘Bartleby,’ 
documented above. Seating the audience in a ‘boardroom’ formation, I engage 
the audience in a mixture of written jokes, anecdotes, and verbal participation. 
This live submission is intended to crystallise the principles of my PhD enquiry, 
and highlight moments of exclusion/antagonism, break, attachment, and 
suspension in safety in a particularly ‘intimate’ affective space that suggests a 
certain discursive mode (not the conviviality of the party, but the urgency or 
discomfort of the war room or political negotiation).
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34 Melville’s genius, firmly established by Deleuze, is demonstrated by the way in which the 
formula ‘I would prefer not to’ is at once familiar in its ordinary, prosaic language, and strikingly 
strange. Against the usual ‘I don’t want to,’ and ‘I’d rather not,’ it sounds almost too formal, even  
for mid-1800s Manhattan; as Deleuze writes: ‘Despite its quite normal construction, it has an 
anomalous ring to it’ (Deleuze 1997, p. 63). 
  
 6.5 - Conclusions: Political articulations in the moment of 
performance
In this chapter, I have examined two performances that represent a return to a 
more traditional form of comic performance, through the analytical lens 
developed in previous chapters. The first piece, Easy, Tiger! (a) employed a 
one-to-one form of audience engagement. Incorporating a performance score as 
well as moments of chance, ambiguity, and suspension, this was an important 
albeit tentative synthesis of the formal discoveries of the second phase of my 
research with an increasingly sophisticated theoretical frame. In Easy, Tiger! 
(b) I continued to undo the (false) binary between active and passive audience, 
this time in practice. Employing the concepts of articulation, hegemony, and 
antagonism from Chapter 5 (under the Sartrean question of how a group is 
constructed) to several moments in practice that best represent the synthesis of 
relational and stand-up practice (that is to say, an open, interactive mode of 
stand-up), I have concluded that the political dimension of performance comedy  
resides in its making sensible the Real of antagonism. These moments of 
suspension hold a multiplicity of potential choice open; they are characterised 
by an ambiguity that cannot be articulated. To reference Chapter 2 again, they 
are like moments of ‘non-sense’ for Deleuze: they donate ‘sense.’ The political 
dimension of performance comedy is not to provide answers to questions in a 
satirical fashion, but to pose different problems entirely. By suspending 
meaning (a break with ideology) in situations where the articulation of 
groupings in the audience is forefront, an attachment to a new ‘problem’ can be 
produced. 
There are, of course, limitations. Though this practice in its intertwining with 
theory both explicates and is explicated by the theoretical model, measurement 
and evaluation can and should be done through self-reflexive analysis. But while 
this thesis does not propose a model of evaluating efficacy, it does model ways 
of making and doing for political comedy practice, and aims to reinstate comedy  
as an important and worthy of theoretical consideration. The old oppositions—
comedy/tragedy, humorous/serious, carnival/official—are hardly sufficient in 
the era of late capitalism. If the paradigmatic elements of comedy are 
incorporated into an official ideology of neoliberalism, it is imperative for any 
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Leftist practice of resistance to take comedy very seriously, and alter its 
techniques and practices accordingly. The ‘apocalyptic’ sites of critical 
resistance Žižek identifies—ecological crisis, economic imbalance, bio-genetics, 
and social divisions and apartheid—are not going away. All the same comic 
practice helps facilitate official discourse to carry on as normal, from Sarah 
Palin’s postmodern appearances alongside her imitator Tina Fey, to Silvio 
Berlusconi’s clownish media persona. It can even allow corruption to escape 
unpunished: I will allow myself one final example from Žižek: 
A supreme case of […] comedy occurred in December 2001 in Buenos 
Aires, when Argentinians took the streets to protest against the current 
government, and especially Domingo Cavallo, the Minister of Economy. 
When the crowd gathered around Cavallo’s building, threatening to 
storm it, he escaped wearing a mask of himself (sold in disguise shops so 
that people could mock him by wearing his mask). (Žižek 2005[2007], p. 
219).
Is this not the ideal example of power employing the tools of satire to further its 
own ends? This moment must therefore be read as a call to action. In the spirit 




CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF PERFORMANCE 
COMEDY
  7.0 - Doing things with jokes
‘I’m finishing a PhD, but unfortunately, it’s about the philosophy of comedy. 
When my parents said they wanted me to be a doctor, they really should have 
been more specific.’ (Broderick Chow)
In this thesis I have described and analysed a three-year practice-as-research 
project. The driving question was the following: ‘What constitutes “political” 
comedy today?’ My research aimed to ‘rethink political comedy’ outside the 
superficial categories of political satire and topical comedy that have become 
synonymous with ‘political comedy’ in the present. This was achieved through 
an intertwined process of critical reflection on practices and practice-driven 
theoretical work, made clear by the use of varied and numerous examples from 
the much larger generic field of ‘Comedy.’ In this concluding chapter I 
recapitulate my arguments, making a case for a contribution to new knowledge. 
I address potential limitations of my research and research framework, and 
suggest possibilities for further research. I suggest to the reader how the 
practice and documentation might be read, and finally, summarise the 
argument of each chapter. 
To recapitulate the primary argument, firstly, we must posit the following 
axiom: the ideological situation of global capitalism represents a limit or 
problem for a critical and resistant comedy practice. This may be 
demonstrated both materially (the increasing discourse of offense that is 
correlative to social atomisation and identity politics; the problem of translation 
and cultural specificity for humour) and theoretically (capitalism, as Deleuze 
and Guattari have argued [1984, 1987], is an endlessly deterritorialising force 
that consumes and incorporates codes of both culture and state, hence, from 
where does a site of resistance emerge?). Following from this axiom, ‘political 
comedy’ must break with ideology (must be a form of Ideologiekritik), and thus 
must circumvent the logics of satire and Carnival, in which making sensible to 
‘obscene double’ of official ideology is presented as in-itself radical or 
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emancipatory. The political dimension of the joke is not its content, but in the 
incommensurable gap between set-up and punch-line, which is correlative to 
Lacan’s definition of the impossible Real as a ‘crack’ in the symbolic order. A 
second problem appears at this point: how, in practice, does the subject become 
attached to the break with ideology in a relationship of fidelity? This question 
suggests that the conventional, ‘pedagogical’ mode of audience engagement is 
insufficient. The practice of performance comedy must produce an attachment 
by making sensible an ‘antagonism,’ which defines every group demand, and 
which is the site of political practice (here I follow the theoretical framework of 
radical democracy that relates the mode of politics to an agon or ‘struggle,’ 
elaborated by a variety of theorists, especially Laclau and Mouffe [1985]). My 
practice-as-research suggests that performance of comedy may create a space of 
‘suspension,’ in which an antagonism (effected by the ideological break) is held 
and can be viewed from another perspective. This redefined ‘political comedy’ is 
characterised by ‘discomfort’—instead of conciliatory ‘plaisir’ (pleasure), it 
approaches the much more radical condition of ‘jouissance’ (enjoyment, but 
also, an intolerable excess of enjoyment; pain in pleasure). This conclusion was 
reached through a series of practice-as-research experiments, and produces a 
set of four practical-theoretical propositions. (1) As Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
and Žižek (2000) argue, antagonism is constitutive of the social, rather than 
operating as a division within it. Operating on this principle, in comic practice 
this antagonism can be made visible within the audience through a process of 
‘singling-out.’ (2) The work of a political comedy, as argued in Chapter 2, is an 
act of Ideologiekritik. The second proposition therefore synthesises the critique 
of ideology with its relation to audience. In other words, the ‘break’ with 
ideology must in some way be related to its audience. (3) The third step of the 
process is one of an ‘attachment.’ How, after the break with ideology, is the 
audience able to form and ‘attachment’ or psychic investment with the moment 
of the break? In my practice-as-research this attachment could be said to be 
formed as the audience reorganised its relation to the excluded member of their 
party. (4) Finally, to prevent this reorganisation from slipping into hostility or 
unproductive aggression, I argued that some guarantee of safety be made 
present in the performance, in order to hold this newly visible antagonism in a 
moment of suspension. These propositions, as you can see, are not prescriptive 
with regard to their actualisation in practice. Though they are grounded in the 
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theoretical and philosophical model laid out in the early chapters of this thesis, 
they were discovered in the process and analysis of my experimental practice.
  7.1 - Contributions to new knowledge
This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge in four ways, and in three 
different fields. My approach has been primarily philosophical, though it 
contributes as well to both performance/theatre studies and comedy studies. 
Firstly, I contribute a redefinition of the political dimension of performance 
comedy and the limits of satire under the ideological situation of neoliberalism 
and global capitalism. This may be considered a significant contribution to the 
study of comedy as a sociopolitical phenomenon, which is, at present, 
dominated by discourses of offense, but rarely considers determination by 
ideology. Additionally, however, the reconsideration of satire and carnival as 
forms of resistance contributes to the philosophical field of the critique of 
ideology, particularly as a detailed critical analysis of humour and comedy in 
Žižek’s oeuvre.Secondly, and additionally in the field of comedy studied, my 
reading of comedy with Lacan,  contributes significant additional knowledge to 
psychoanalytic readings of comedy and humour. This is not to say that my 
thesis posits a new theory of humour against Morreall’s triad. But rather like 
Lacan’s own return to Freud my thesis contributes to a more complex and 
developed understanding of the relation of jokes, joking, and humour to the 
Unconscious mind. Whereas the ‘relief theory’ of humour (Freud) is well-
rehearsed, and Critchley has written on the relationship of super-ego to 
humour, this thesis contributes the Lacanian triad of Real, Symbolic, and 
Imaginary to the reading of comedy in its relation to ideology and discourse. 
More generally, the decision to take a primarily theoretical approach redefines 
the terms of how comedy practices have been read as forms of resistance. 
Thirdly, this thesis contributes a formal model for comedy as critical and 
resistant political praxis, and actualised this through several instances of 
practice-as-research that may serve as reference points for future artists. 
Finally, with regard to the field of performance and theatre studies, in line with 
current discourses of participation, engagement, and efficacy, this thesis 
contributes a more nuanced understanding of audience/performer engagement 
that is to a degree opposed to a current discourse of the emancipatory 
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immediacy of participation and ‘liberation of the spectator.’ While the project is 
focused specifically on comedy in performance, with all its attendant 
problematics, the four practical-theoretical propositions contribute to 
discourses in theatre studies perhaps exemplified by Ridout (2004) and Read 
(2008), particularly in relation to the conditions, material or otherwise, for a 
theatre of radical critique and transformation in the age of global capitalism. It 
can also be seen as a deepening of the discourses surrounding the possibility of 
a ‘radical democratic theatre,’ for example, Janelle Reinalt’s paper ‘Notes for a 
Radical Democratic Theatre: Productive Crises and the Challenge of 
Indeterminacy’ (1998), or Jill Dolan’s essay ‘Performance, Utopia, and the 
“Utopian Performative”’ (2001). While such discourse has remained, 
predominantly, in the theoretical, my practice-as-research methodology 
contributes a very specific analysis of the material and affective conditions for a 
radical democratic performance — which is a specific finding that could not be 
achieved through a conventional PhD. 
With regard to the status of practice in this thesis, which has produced several 
outcomes in ‘theory,’ we must note that the discoveries in theory and practice 
were co-dependent, which means, that rather than seeing the work as practice-
based or practice-led, it is in the strictest sense practice-as. That is to say, 
theory, theorising, and critical reflection are an integral part of the practice and 
not an adjunct to it. Throughout, choices were made in practice as a result of the 
work of theory, and theoretical discoveries (for example, the idea of suspension) 
were made as a result of embodied knowledge produced through actualisation 
in practice. This is hardly accidental—if anything, stand-up comics are among 
the most self-critical (read: neurotic) artists. The research has led to the 
discovery, in my continuing practice, of a facilitative model of creativity, 
particularly in terms of comedy writing — a model less based on scripting than 
‘scoring,’ incorporating formalised moments of participation and interactivity. 
The thesis suggests a number of points to be explored in future practice. One 
such point is as an investigation of comic writing with regard to the notion of 
(Lacanian) Ideologiekritik, which, due to the necessary focus on the field of 
audience has not yet been fully developed in my stand-up practice — yet 
developing my comedic writing in line with my theoretical convictions is an 
interesting prospect. Another point of investigation is the use of the facilitative 
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model of creative comic practice in traditional stand-up venues (clubs, pubs, 
and the ‘hour-show’ format). As argued in Chapter 1, stand-up in the United 
Kingdom is yoked to capital and free-market economics, with the government 
maintaining an ideological stance towards funding (that is to say, comedy is 
viewed as self-funding, regulated by the ‘Invisible Hand’ of the market and thus 
receives none). While I have at times in this thesis derided the conservative/
conventional work this state of affairs produces, the grassroots nature of the art 
(especially in the UK) suggests communal tendencies that, given the proper 
context, might support experimentation. Though I maintain that experimenting 
as a practice-as-researcher in comedy practice, within an academic context, has 
a radical edge, my research must be outward facing, and must remain in touch 
with the wider field of comedy practice. 
  7.2 - Summary of Chapters
I will now revisit each chapter, summarising the main argument in each and its 
salient points, attempting to make a case for final closure.   
Chapter 1 introduced the field of stand-up comedy in the United Kingdom and 
situated my existing practice upon embarking on my research in a historical 
framework. It was concluded that the tradition of stand-up, as it exists, is deeply  
implicated in the system of capital. I then reflexively described my practice 
through two projects, Akira California and Homework for Heroes, each of 
which attempted an experimentation with a different mode of performer-
audience engagement. The audience-performer relationship, I argued, is the 
potential site of the political efficacy of performance comedy.
Chapter 2 developed a theoretical model for a transformative political comedy 
through a theoretical framework based in the Lacanian triad of Real, Symbolic, 
and Imaginary and the Deleuzian dyad of Virtual/Actual. I argued that the 
logics of satire and the Carnivalesque did not take into account the larger 
question of ideology and how it functions in the era of the postmodern/global 
capitalism. I suggested a number of possibilities for comedy qua Ideologiekritik. 
This chapter raised the further question of attachments—while I identified a 
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number of possible modes of attachment, an attachment of objective critique 
presented itself as lacking.
In Chapter 3 I drew upon Nicolas Bourriaud’s writings on Relational Aesthetics 
as a provocative possibility for practical experimentation, concluding that 
relational work is useful because it produces a shared context and affective 
space. In Chapter 4, I analysed a set of practices under the banner 
‘Dangerology,’ which put these ideas into practice. I identified several useful 
ways of making relational art. However, what this practice lacked was the 
dimension of ‘antagonism,’ which I found was correlative to a lack of jokes. 
Chapter 5 revisits the terrain of Relational Aesthetics critically, informed by the 
concept of antagonism. Extending the Lacanian framework developed in 
Chapter 2 into the discourse of political philosophy, I drew on the work of 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau to suggest that antagonism is constitutive of 
both the joke (the incommensurable gap at its heart) and the social (the frontier 
of exclusion that defines every discursive articulation and hence, social 
formation). I examined a case study, Kim Noble’s show Kim Noble Will Die, 
which provided a foundation for the work examined in Chapter 6. This chapter 
discussed two pieces that marked a return to a more traditional stand-up form 
in my experimental practice. Experimenting with alternative forms of audience 
engagement, moments of chance and contingency, and most of all, the 
constitution of the ‘group,’ it was suggested that an attachment might be formed 
through a practice that makes sensible an antagonism, ‘suspending’ it in a 
relation of ambiguity so it may be viewed from another perspective. My four key  
propositions are developed in this chapter. These can effectively be read as a 
synthesis of my theoretical analysis (Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5) with issues arising from 
practical experimentation (Chapters 4, 6). These propositions — ‘antagonism,’ 
‘ideological break,’ ‘attachment,’ and ‘safety,‘ — arose from an analysis of a 
participatory method developed in the experimental piece Easy, Tiger! (b). In 
Chapter 2 I contributed a Lacanian reading of performance comedy and its uses 
either as an constitutive element of ideological disavowal or a means of escaping 
it. While this reading has been maintained through the remainder of the thesis, 
through my four key propositions I am able to deal with certain problems of 
how this comedy qua Ideologiekritik might appear in practice. Rather than 
Chow, D.V.B.
190
remaining on the abstract-theoretical level, my experimental practice, along 
with close readings of other artists (for example, Kim Noble’s work Kim Noble 
Will Die) has allowed me to deal with the problem of attachment to the 
ideological break. Using Mouffe and Laclau’s concept of antagonism as 
constitutive of the social, I map onto the audience-community a process by 
which social change can occur — a splitting of the group, a moment of critique 
from which other possibilities may be revealed, a process of attachment by 
which political subjects choose to act in fidelity to this moment — adding a final 
element, the safe, non-violent space of the performance. It is important to add 
here that these propositions set up a provisional formal space for the regaining 
of political agency through performance; the comedian’s role is perhaps similar 
to what Augusto Boal nicely termed the ‘Joker,’ an artist of facilitative creativity 
who sets up the ground of the event and augers the participation, but can never 
predict its outcome. The comedian, facilitating performance comedy, sets up the 
material conditions for the claiming of new political consciousness and the 
regaining of political agency — the four key propositions thus form a practical 
and theoretical guide.
In summary, these pages, accompanied by a live submission and archive of 
documented practices, redefines within certain parameters the notion of 
political comedy, providing a practical model to suggest further ways of making 
and doing in the field of comic performance. 
  7.3 - Envoi
This is not to say that the contributions I make in this thesis form a conclusive 
totality. One area of for further research is the evaluation of ‘efficacy.’ The 
problem of evaluating efficacy has been a central one for radical emancipatory 
theory since Marx elaborated his well-known eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, on 
what philosophers had hitherto done and what they in fact should do. I have 
argued that it is not appropriate for this project (or any such practice-as-
research project) to evaluate efficacy quantitatively; rather, the intention of this 
research was always to contribute to ways of making, doing, and thinking. This 
is not to say that evaluation is not an important question, only that it is beyond 
the scope of this practical/philosophical enquiry. My contribution to the field of  
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comic practices in performance raises another question: what is the 
applicability to the existing field? One might argue that, as I have established, 
the practice of stand-up comedy in the United Kingdom being driven exclusively  
by free-market economics, the model I have contributed is difficult and, some 
may say, impossible to apply to the existing terrain of comedy clubs, arts 
centres, and television programming. My response to this objection is more 
complicated than the previous. What my research suggests is that, to a degree, 
stand-up is immanently ‘political’ in its form, particularly in its engagement 
between performer and audience member, and as such can always be a site for 
the agon of politics, through the failure of a joke, generation of antagonism 
through offense, exclusion of a group or person, and so on. However, I would 
also argue that the precise form of attachment I have elaborated in these pages 
is generated by the production of a space of ambiguity or suspension; which 
requires a degree of risk of possible failure and symbolic ‘death’35 that the 
economy of the comedy circuit, with its laughs-per-minute ratio and 
overwhelming injunction to pleasure, simply cannot tolerate. I would argue 
then, that at certain junctures performance comedy must free itself from the 
market, taking support from institutions including the Arts Council, Arts and 
Humanities Research Council, National Lottery, and university drama and 
performance departments in order to facilitate greater experimentation. At the 
time of writing, only one of these bodies (university drama and performance 
departments) in any way supports such experimental practice, which limits 
public dissemination of the work, which of course, is the entire point. I therefore 
whole-heartedly support the ongoing struggle by comic artists for recognition 
within the remit of state and governmental funding bodies. 
What of the objection to this source of support I raised earlier, that state 
funding would as a matter of course dull comedy’s oppositional edge? I might 
respond by noting my earlier discussion of comedy in relation to Lacan’s 
concept of the Big Other. While the (reasonable) fear is that state funding would 
lead to greater surveillance and eventual curtailing of objectionable material, 
which is to say, material critical of the state, I argue that this applies only to 
material directly critical of the state. Through my reading of ideology and its 
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35 As in, ‘that comedian is dying on his arse.’ 
relation to performance comedy, I have since argued that Ideologiekritik must 
take a form of what Žižek calls ‘looking awry,’ not a direct objection but a 
sideways glance. As demonstrated by my discussion of the concept of ‘over-
identification,’ critique of ideology in this form can actually, far from forcing 
official culture or the state to exercise its power, paralyse that power entirely. 
This raises the possibility for further research into historical instances of over-
identificatory practices.
A further response to those who object to state funding for the purposes of 
experimentation in performance comedy: far from being separate to the state, a 
free-market driven culture of comedy is already inculcated in state power. 
Moreover, we must consider the way in which formal techniques of comedy are 
already incorporated into the ideological text of neoliberalism and global 
capitalism. One need only point to Barack Obama’s recent stand-up 
performance at the 2010 White House Correspondent’s Dinner. Contrasted with  
Stephen Colbert’s performance at the same event under the Bush 
administration does this not represent an unprecedented conflagration of the 
places of critic and power? In the first instance we have the figure of power 
(Bush), whom everyone knows is a laughing-stock, and a send-up/celebration 
in the tradition of the ‘Roast’ by a well-known satirist. In the second instance we 
pass to a situation in which power and critic are one and the same; the effect of 
this is to place power above critique (as critique is already laughed-with). 
Obama was very funny, but our response should not be to further his 
hagiography, but to become ever more vigilant and critical. Similar examples 
from the political right include Silvio Berlusconi’s buffoonish political persona, 
David Cameron and Nick Clegg’s ‘double-act’ to introduce the new coalition 
government, and of course, Sarah Palin, who, throughout her political career 
has used humour to repel every objection to her lack of experience or skill. 
Again, a detailed study of the postmodern uses of humour in politics is beyond 
the scope of this research, but suggests itself as timely. 
If figures of state power are employing comedy to their advantage, this is even 
more so for Capital itself, which, at every turn, bombards the subject with 
injunctions to Enjoy!. There has never been a better time for those with a vested 
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